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ABSTRACT 
Corporate Governance has engaged the attention of academics and practitioners alike for 
some time now. It is sad to note, however, that most of the studies carried out in this area 
have been conducted in countries such as the USA and the UK. In recent times, interest in 
Corporate Governance on the African continent has assumed heightened proportions, 
probably as a result of the 1997 East Asian crisis and the relatively poor performance of 
Corporate Africa. Melvin Ayogu who researched into governance matters around the 
continent pointed out that corporate governance perhaps is nothing but a mirror image of 
political governance bridled with a lot of corruption. In spite of the recognition that 
corporate governance is critical for firm performance and for sustained macroeconomic 
growth coupled with the heightened interest in the area, research in corporate governance 
has not received the needed attention on the continent. This was the main motivation for 
the study. In carrying out this study we considered 103 listed companies drawn from Ghana, 
Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa and 52 Microfinance Institutions from Ghana. Data 
consisted primarily of governance and financial variables. Though, most of the financial data 
was obtnaied through secondary sources, the governance data was essentially obtianed 
through questionnaire administration. Analysis of the data was done primarily within the 
Panel Data Framework and various shades of panel data estimations were run.  
 
This dissertation presents the results of the research work underlying seven stand-alone but 
related essays that focus on the relationship between corporate governance and various 
aspects of firm behaviour. Whilst, five of the essays dwell on corporate governance and firm 
attributes, one considers determinants of board size and composition by using data from 
Ghana and the last essay explores how corporate governance and stock market development 
affect economic growth. The first essay looks at corporate governance and firm performance 
and the second focusses on the determinants of board size and composition. The third essay 
concentrates on corporate governance and shareholder value maximisation. The fourth essay 
considers how corporate governance affects the financing choices of firms. The link between 
firms’ investment opportunity set and corporate governance is the subject matter of the fifth 
essay. While, the sixth looks at how corporate board diversity through gender affect the 
performance of microfinance institutions in Ghana, the last and seventh essay is devoted to 
an exploration of the linkage between corporate governance, stock market development and 
economic growth using board independence as the main governance indicator.  
 
The findings of the study indicate that large and independent boards enhance firm value and 
that when a CEO serves as board chair, it has negative effect on performance and such firms 
employ less debt. We also found that a CEO’s tenure in office enhances firms’ profitability 
while board activity intensity has a negative effect on firm profitability. The study also 
revealed that while larger boards employ more debts, the independence of a board has a 
significant negative relationship with short-term debt. The size of audit committees and the 
frequency of their meetings have a positive influence on market-based performance 
measures and institutional shareholding essentially sends a positive signal to potential 
investors thereby enhancing market valuation of firms. The study also confirmed the widely-
held view that board size and its composition are functions of firm and industrial 
characteristics. Thus, while firm level risk has a positive relationship with board size, CEO 
tenure  correlates negatively with board size and that firms with larger institutional 
shareholding employ fewer outside directors. Firms in the finance sector were seen to 
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employ smaller board sizes and fewer outside directors partly due to the existence of other 
regulatory mechanisms in these institutions. More so, it was found that large board sizes 
enhance shareholders wealth and that both sector and country specific effects impact on 
shareholders value. The mining sector was seen as dominant in maximising shareholder 
value in terms of dividend yield. The study once again showed that shareholder value 
maximisation is also dependent on the level of country specific risk. Our results also point to 
the fact that firms with investment or growth opportunities employ large boards (high board 
and auditor fees), have longer CEO tenure and are profitable, and that the extent of growth 
response to governance structures is influenced by both country and sector specific effects. 
Findings again, suggest that board diversity through the inclusion of women is important for 
enhanced performance of microfinance institutions and the independence of corporate 
boards in particular is important for firm performance. These findings have important policy 
implications.   
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OPSOMMING 
Vir ’n geruime tyd reeds neem korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer in gelyke mate die aandag in 
beslag van akademici en praktisyne. Dit is egter jammer om te sê dat die meeste studies wat 
uitgevoer is in hierdie veld, gedoen is in lande soos die VSA en die VK. Onlangs het 
belangstelling in korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer in Afrika egter toegeneem, waarskynlik as 
gevolg van die Oos-Asië krisis in 1997 en die relatiewe swak prestasie van Korporatiewe 
Afrika. Melvin Ayogu, wat navorsing gedoen het oor bestuur-en-beheerkwessies regoor die 
kontinent, het uitgewys dat korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer dalk niks anders is as ’n 
spieëlbeeld van politieke bestuur-en-beheer, wat aan bande gelê word deur baie korrupsie. 
Ten spyte van die besef dat korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer ’n kritiese faktor is vir 
maatskappye se prestasie en vir volhoubare makro-ekonomiese groei, gekoppel aan ’n 
verhoogde belangstelling in die veld, word die nodige aandag nie gegee aan navorsing oor 
korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer op die kontinent nie. Dit was die belangrikste motivering vir 
hierdie studie. In die uitvoer van hierdie studie het ons gefokus op 103 genoteerde 
maatskappye gekies uit Ghana, Nigerië, Kenia en Suid-Afrika en op 52 
mikrofinansieringsinstellings uit Ghana. Data het bestaan in die eerste plek uit bestuur-en-
beheer- en finansiële veranderlikes. Alhoewel die meeste finansiële data verkry is uit 
sekondêre bronne, is die bestuur-en-beheerdata in wese verkry deur vraelysadministrasie. Die 
analise van die data is gedoen hoofsaaklik binne die Paneeldataraamwerk en verskeie nuanses 
van paneeldataberamings is gedoen. 
 
Hierdie proefskrif toon die resultate van die navorsingswerk onderliggend aan sewe 
alleenstaande maar verbandhoudende verhandelings wat fokus op die verhouding tussen 
korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer en verskeie aspekte van maatskappygedrag. Hoewel vyf van 
die verhandelings toegespits is op korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer en maatskappy-
eienskappe, gee een oorweging aan determinante van raadgrootte en -samestelling deur 
gebruik te maak van data uit Ghana en die laaste verhandeling verken die invloed van 
korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer en aandelemarkontwikkeling op ekonomiese groei. Die 
eerste verhandeling kyk na korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer en maatskappye se prestasie, en 
die tweede een fokus op determinante van raadgrootte en samestelling. Die derde 
verhandeling konsentreer op korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer en die maksimering van 
aandeelhouerwelvaart. Die vierde verhandeling oorweeg hoe korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer 
die finansieringskeuses van maatskappye beïnvloed. Die verband tussen maatskappye se 
beleggingsgeleenthede en korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer is die onderwerp van die vyfde 
verhandeling. Terwyl die sesde verhandeling kyk hoe diversiteit in korporatiewe rade op 
grond van gender die prestasie van mikrofinansieringsinstellings in Ghana beïnvloed, is die 
sewende en laaste verhandeling gefokus op ’n ondersoek na die skakeling tussen 
korporatiewe bestuur-en-beheer, aandelemarkontwikkeling en ekonomiese groei, met 
raadonafhanklikheid as die hoof- bestuur-en-beheeraanwyser. 
 
Die bevindinge van die studie dui daarop dat groot en onafhanklike rade maatskappye se 
waarde verbeter en wanneer ’n hoof- uitvoerende beampte dien as raadsvoorsitter, dit ’n 
negatiewe uitwerking het op prestasie en sodanige maatskappye maak gebruik van minder 
skuld. Ons het ook gevind dat ’n hoof- uitvoerende beampte se ampstermyn ’n maatskappy 
se winsgewendheid verbeter terwyl intensiteit van raadaktiwiteit ’n negatiewe impak het op ’n 
maatskappy se winsgewendheid. Verder het die studie onthul dat al maak groter rade gebruik 
van meer skuld, die onafhanklikheid van ’n raad in ’n beduidende negatiewe verhouding 
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staan tot korttermynskuld. Die grootte van ouditkomitees en die gereeldheid van hulle 
vergaderings het ’n positiewe invloed op markgebaseerde prestasiemaatstawwe en 
institusionele aandeelhouding stuur in wese ’n positiewe sein aan potensiële beleggers 
waardeur die markwaardasie van maatskappye verbeter word. Die studie het ook die 
algemeen aanvaarde siening bevestig dat raadgrootte en -samestelling funksies is van 
maatskappy- en industriële eienskappe. Dus, al staan risiko op maatskappyvlak in ’n 
positiewe verhouding met raadgrootte, korreleer die ampstermyn van ’n hoof- uitvoerende 
beampte negatief met raadgrootte en dat maatskappye met groter institusionele 
aandeelhouding gebruik maak van minder eksterne direkteure. Maatskappye in die finansiële 
sektor het geblyk om van kleiner rade en minder eksterne direkteure gebruik te maak, 
gedeeltelik oor die bestaan van ander regulerende meganismes in hierdie instellings. Nog 
meer, dit is gevind dat groot raadgroottes aandeelhouers se welvaart verbeter en dat beide 
sektor- en landspesifieke effekte ’n impak het op aandeelhouerwelvaart. Die mynbousektor is 
gesien as oorheersend in die maksimering van aandeelhouerwelvaart in terme van 
aandeelopbrengs. Die studie het weereens gewys dat die maksimering van 
aandeelhouerwelvaart ook afhanklik is van die vlak van landspesifieke risiko’s. Ons resultate 
het verder gewys daarop dat maatskappye met beleggings- of groeigeleenthede van groter 
rade (hoë raad- en ouditeursfooie) gebruik maak, langer ampstermyne vir hoof- uitvoerende 
beamptes het en winsgewend is, en dat die omvang van groeireaksie op bestuur-en-beheer 
beïnvloed word deur beide land- en sektorspesifieke effekte. Bevindinge dui weereens 
daarop dat diversiteit in rade deur die insluiting van vroue belangrik is vir die verbeterde 
prestasie van mikrofinansieringsinstellings en dat veral die onafhanklikheid van korporatiewe 
rade belangrik is vir maatskappyprestasie. Hierdie bevindinge hou belangrike 
beleidsimplikasies in. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 Background and Statement of Research Problem 
 
Corporate governance is an emerging and exciting issue especially on the African continent. 
It became the focus of attention especially after the recent corporate scandals in the US and 
elsewhere. How should firms be governed and managed in the interest of shareholders? The 
term “corporate governance” has dominated policy agenda in developed market economies 
for over a decade especially in relation to large firms. Consequently, the concept is gradually 
warming itself to the pinnacle of policy agenda on the African continent. Indeed, the East 
Asian crisis and the relatively poor performance of the corporate sector in Africa seem to 
have served as the main historical antecedents necessitating the incorporation of corporate 
governance in the development debate (Berglof & von Thadden, 1999). It is believed that 
good governance generates investor goodwill and confidence and a number of recent studies 
have shown that good corporate governance increases valuations and boosts the bottom 
line. For instance, a study by Gompers et al. (2003) concluded that companies with strong 
shareholder rights yielded annual returns that were 8.5 percent greater than those with weak 
rights and also more democratic firms are seen to enjoy higher valuations, higher profits, 
higher sales growth, and lower capital expenditures. Poorly governed firms are thus, 
expected to be less profitable, have greater bankruptcy risk, lower valuations and pay out less 
to their shareholders, while well-governed firms are expected to have higher profits, be less 
at risk of bankruptcy, have higher valuations and pay out more cash to their shareholders. 
Claessens et al. (2003) posits that better corporate frameworks benefit firms through greater 
access to financing, lower cost of capital, better performance and more favourable treatment 
of all stakeholders. It has been argued that weak corporate governance does not only lead to 
poor firm performance and risky financing patterns, but is also conducive for 
macroeconomic crises like the 1997 East Asia crisis. Other researchers contend that good 
corporate governance is important for increasing investor confidence and market liquidity 
(Donaldson, 2003). The separation of ownership and control in a modern firm which creates 
agency problems because managers (agents) pursue a set of objectives different from the 
objectives of the owners (principals) is one of the fundamental rationales for corporate 
governance. In this instance, corporate governance is a mechanism that is intended to reduce 
the costs associated with the principal-agent paradigm. 
 
The concept “corporate governance” has attracted various definitions. Metrick and Ishii 
(2002) define corporate governance from the perspective of the investor as “both the 
promise to repay a fair return on capital invested and the commitment to operate a firm 
efficiently given investment” suggesting that corporate governance has an impact on a firm’s 
ability to access capital markets. Metrick and Ishii argue that firm-level governance may be 
more important in developing markets with weaker institutions as it helps to distinguish 
among firms. The Cadbury Committee (1992) defines corporate governance as “the system 
by which companies are directed and controlled”. Zingales (1995) also defines a governance 
system as “the complex set of constraints that shape the ex-post bargaining over the quasi 
rent registered by the firm”. 
 
According to Mayer (1997), corporate governance is concerned with ways of bringing the 
interests of investors and managers in line and ensuring that firms are run for the benefit of 
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investors. Corporate governance is indeed concerned with the relationship between the 
internal governance mechanisms of corporations and society’s conception of the scope of 
corporate accountability (Deakin & Hughes, 1997). It has been defined by Keasey et al. 
(1997) to include ‘the structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the successful 
operation of organisations. Corporate governance is also seen as the whole set of measures 
taken within the social entity that is an enterprise to favour the economic agents to take part 
in the productive process in order to generate some organisational surplus, and to set up a 
fair distribution between the partners, taking into consideration what they have brought to 
the organisation (Maati, 1999). 
 
From these definitions, it may be stated more generally that corporate governance embodies 
what are considered to be legitimate lines of accountability by defining the nature of the 
relationship between the company and key corporate stakeholders. In other words, 
corporate governance comprises the systems, structures and processes that a firm puts in 
place to ensure a clear line of accountability in the day-to-day running of the firm basically as 
a mechanism to reduce agency problems and costs.  
 
Becht et al. (2002) identify a number of reasons for the growing importance of corporate 
governance including the world-wide wave of privatisation of the past two decades, the 
pension fund reform and the growth of private savings, the takeover wave of the 1980s, the 
1980s deregulation and integration of capital markets, the 1997 East Asia Crisis, and the 
series of recent corporate scandals.  Studies in corporate governance have mainly been 
carried out in the developed economies mostly the USA and UK. Developing countries and 
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especially those in Africa are now increasingly embracing the concept knowing that it leads 
to sustainable growth.  
 
1.2 Research Problem  
 
In spite of the renewed enthusiasm concerning issues of corporate governance in Africa, 
relevant empirical studies are still few and far between.1. This has invariably led to limitations 
in the depth of our understanding of corporate governance issues and a comparison of the 
continent’s experiences with other continents. In Africa, one of the reference point studies 
in corporate governance was conducted by Ayogu (2001). In this study, Ayogu looked at 
regulatory and governance mechanisms in some selected African countries. However, studies 
linking corporate governance to firm-specific attributes cross-country wise are virtually non-
existent on the continent. That is the vacuum the current study seeks to address. This study 
aims at linking corporate governance to firm specific attributes including performance in a 
cross-country investigation to aid our understanding of corporate governance issues on the 
continent. 
 
In more general terms, it is possible to identify three levels of determinants of firm 
performance. The first relates to external market factors that are beyond the firm’s control 
and generally occur economy-wide. The second set of factors are those that are internal and 
firm specific factors under the direct control of the firm. These factors include managerial 
efficiency, governance structure, ownership structure, managerial characteristics, etc., and 
                                                 
1 Only a handful of countries in Africa, namely South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria, have had 
studies on governance structures. 
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they do affect a firm’s ability to cope with the external factors. Finally, there are other factors 
such as size, leverage and the nature of the industry that affect a firm’s performance.   
 
Studies in corporate governance on the African continent, which are scanty, have tended to 
concentrate on some aspects of corporate governance and structure only, neglecting a 
deeper analysis of the causal relationships among corporate governance indicators and 
company performance. Studies have indeed shown that governance structures and indicators 
matter for corporate performance. The present study will provide empirical evidence on 
corporate governance and firm performance from the African perspective. It represents yet 
another platform to a better understanding of corporate governance and corporate 
performance in Africa. In attempting to address the problem that has been stated, the 
following research objectives will be pursued.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The broad research objective of the study is to provide an empirical assessment of the effect 
of corporate governance on corporate performance on the African continent. The specific 
objectives are as follows: 
 
a) To examine the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in 
selected African countries; 
b) To examine the determinants of corporate board size and its composition 
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c) To examine the link between corporate governance and shareholder value 
maximisation; 
d) To examine how corporate governance affects the financing choices of firms; 
e) To examine how corporate governance affects investment opportunities of firms 
f) To examine how gender as a proxy for corporate board diversity affects 
performance; and 
g) To explore the linkage between corporate governance, stock market developments 
and economic growth. 
 
Data for the study was primarily obtained from the financials of the firms together with a 
questionnaire that solicited for some of the governance variables which were not in the 
annual reports.  The questionnaire was sent out to about three hundred firms across the four 
countries that were used in the study. Reminders were sent a number of occasions as a 
follow up on the questionnaire. After about three months, we received 165 completed 
questionnaire back. However upon careful scrutiny for accuracy and completeness, one 
hundred and thirty-three of the returned questionnaire (representing 44.33% response rate) 
were found to be valid for the study. The response rate is appropriate for a study of this 
nature. 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
 
Issues regarding governance have received increased attention in recent times on the 
continent, more so as it is highlighted by the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
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Agenda.2 An understanding of the pattern of corporate governance in the African corporate 
sector will provide an invaluable insight to top policy makers and assist in the on-going 
restructuring of corporate Africa.   
 
Within the context of the current dynamic economic environment, the African corporate 
sector must face up to the challenges of globalisation in which the inability of firms to adapt 
to modern business culture may necessarily interfere with their ability to survive. It is 
imperative therefore for the African corporate sector to identify the best corporate practices 
in other parts of the world and to identify how these could be integrated into African 
business culture to enhance performance. 
In spite of the importance of corporate governance, very little study has been undertaken in 
this area on the continent and a cross country study is yet to come. It is therefore hoped that 
the current study will fill this gap in our knowledge by providing robust value to the existing 
useful, though scanty studies on this subject in Africa. It is hoped that findings of the study 
will be very useful to policy makers, investors, researchers, corporate managers and other 
stakeholders involved in an effort to reshape corporate Africa.  
  
1.5 Limitations of the Study  
 
The study focussed on firms quoted on a number of regional stock exchanges in Africa. 
These stock exchanges were chosen out of convenience and with due regard to data 
accessibility and availability. We were also mindful of the fact that the underlying behaviour 
of these stock markets (bullish or bearish) could have effect on especially the performance 
                                                 
2 http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Conference_Reports_and_Other_Documents/nepad/NEPAD 
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variables which could skew regression results. However, it is hoped that most of these 
effects were catered for by the use of control variables in the analysis. Listed companies were 
mostly used because of data reliability as these companies are required by law to publish 
annual reports and accounts. It is natural to expect a study of this nature on an emerging 
issue such as corporate governance that the issue of sample size could pose a problem. It 
would have been ideal to have a large sample but institutions were not forthcoming with the 
required primary data especially concerning the governance variables because most of the 
governance data were obtained through questionnaire survey. This also hindered our 
selection of what constituted the governance variables in the subsequent essays. This is a 
tacit admission of the fact that corporate governance embraces a broader set of variables.  
 
For instance, both the King Report and the Cadbury Committee Report highlight seven key 
dimensions of good corporate governance summarised broadly as  
 
 Board of Directors 
 Audit Committee 
 Executive and Director Compensation 
 Insider Ownership Issues 
 Director Characteristics  
 Issues surrounding Charter/By-Laws, and  
 Progressive Practices 
 
Issues raised under Board of Directors could be summarised as board size, composition, 
CEO tenure, CEO duality, process of election of board members, committees within the 
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board and their composition, role of former CEOs, the mode of changing board size, CEOs 
and/or board members serving on other boards and how it is controlled, and whether there 
is a governance committee and how frequent does it meet. 
 
With regards to audit committee, emphasis is on whether such committees exist, how it is 
composed, policy on auditor rotation, and whether shareholders are involved in the 
ratification of auditors. 
 
Under executive and director compensation, matters concerning independence of 
compensation committees, shareholders participation in compensation issues, who qualifies 
to participate in firm’s pension fund, and mode and method of CEO compensation are 
raised.  
 
With regards to Insider ownership, issues of concern revolve around directors’ ownership of 
stock and mode of qualification, percentage of insider ownership, and guidelines for 
executives and directors ownership of shares are highlighted. 
 
Level of education, competencies and background experience are some of the issues that are 
raised under director characteristics. 
 
Under corporate charter/by-laws, matters surrounding process and mode of approval of 
mergers, the right of shareholders to call for special meetings, and the mode and process of 
amendment of company’s charter/by-laws are discussed. 
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With regards to progressive practices, issues such as timeliness of information dissemination, 
quality leadership, quality and flow of information between board and management and 
between board, management and employees and between board and employees, quality of 
reporting, review of board performance, the existence of board-approved succession plan, 
director tenure limits, the existence of advisory body to the board, the number of board 
meetings per year, etc are also deemed as critical for effective corporate governance.   
 
Indeed, indicators and variables of corporate governance could be limitless as the list is 
highly in-exhaustive. In this breadth therefore, it is imperative to indicate that data 
availability, accessibility and measurability influenced our choice of variables in this study 
with due regards to the difficulty of modelling such variables. This stems from the fact that 
most of these governance variables have substantial measurement errors and therefore pose 
a danger in modelling which inevitably has implications for reliable results and interpretation 
thereof. Gathering most of these variables was made the more difficult because firms just 
failed to respond to the questionnaire submitted.  
 
Though, the study assumes that the efficient performance of firms hinges on corporate 
governance as mentioned above, it does not explicitly rule out the fact that some other 
variables (such as political stability, bribery and corruption, undue bureaucracy, etc.) could be 
critical for firm performance. However, the study of corporate governance is especially 
important because it is expected a well structured corporate governance mechanisms could 
have a reduction effect on corruption, undue bureaucracy, bribery etc as result of increased 
transparency and accountability. 
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It must also be indicated that, the above limitations highlighted do not compromise the 
validity of the conclusions that are based on the findings of the study. 
  
1.6 Organisation of the Study  
 
The study is a collection of seven independent but related essays. This is because each of the 
seven papers discusses some aspects of corporate governance. Hence, the central theme of 
the essays is corporate governance. While Chapter one deals with the general introduction, 
problem statement, objectives, significance and limitations of the study, the first essay, 
“Corporate governance and firm performance: a dynamic panel data analysis”, follows in 
Chapter two. Chapter three looks at what determines board size and its composition by 
using data from listed firms in Ghana. Chapter three is not a cross country study because the 
banking sector is included in this chapter for comparative analysis. In addition to the 
exclusion of the Banking sector in our cross-country data set, this specific data has a 
different end point as well covering 1998-2003. This formed the usable data for Ghana this 
paper.. Since, listed banks in Ghana are few it was our opinion that using that small sample 
in the large data-set could lead to skewed results.  
 
In Chapter four, we look at how corporate governance affects shareholder value 
maximisation. The fundamental argument raised in this essay is that firms that perform well 
may not necessarily improve shareholders’ value. In this chapter, a comparative analysis of 
shareholders’ value maximisation in different sectors and countries is carried out. Chapter 
five is devoted to understanding how corporate governance influences a firm’s financing 
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choice of debt or equity. Data from Kenya is used for this essay. This chapter is yet another 
specific country study which was based essentially on the fact that the data set had an 
entirely different end point. Data for the cross-country study was from 1997-2001 but this 
study used data from 1999-2003. We build on Chapter five and look at how corporate 
governance affects growth or investment opportunities of firms in chapter six.  
 
In Chapter seven we use a unique data set on microfinance institutions and look at how 
board diversity with emphasis on women affects performance of these institutions. The 
specific country study in chapter seven is quite understandable since microfinance 
institutions have different characteristics as compared to the other firms. It is the last of out 
specific country study. We then make an attempt to explore how corporate governance and 
stock market developments affect economic growth in chapter eight. The study is 
summarised, conclusions drawn and policy recommendations offered in chapter nine. 
Suggestions for future research are also included in chapter nine. Due to the nature of the 
thesis, every chapter which is a stand alone essay has its own conclusion and policy 
recommendations. Thus, the conclusion and policy recommendations offered in chapter 
nine is essentially a summary of some of the major highlights of the various conclusions and 
recommendations from the individual essays.  
 
Thus, apart from chapters three (3), five (5) and seven (7), the rest of the papers in carried 
out from a cross-country perspective. 
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Though, three out of the seven papers are country specific studies, it is our candid opinion 
that results, findings and conclusions emanating from these essays are not compromised or 
undermined because of this limitation and therefore could be generalised.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN AFRICA: 
 
A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS∞ 
 
 
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of people’s money than of their own, it cannot well 
be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own…” (Adam Smith, 1776) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Effective governance is critical to all economic transactions especially in emerging and 
transition economies (Dharwardkar et al., 2000). It is argued that in an economy, public 
savings are channelled into investment through a multi-layer agency as separation of 
ownership and control of capital functions pervasively through banks, pension funds, 
insurance companies and stock markets and in some cases, through government receipt of 
taxes. Thus, the market’s institutional conditions that reduce informational asymmetries and 
facilitate effective monitoring of agents impinges on the efficiency of investment at varying 
levels of agency interactions. Corporate governance, in the same breadth, has assumed centre 
stage for enhanced corporate performance. Corporate governance has been defined as “ways 
                                                 
∞ Three Papers based on this Chapter have been published. They are:  
 
1. The Relationship Between Board Size, Board Composition, CEO Duality and Firm Performance: 
Experience from Ghana, Corporate Ownership and Control Journal, Vol. 4(2), pp.114-122;   
  
2. The Link between corporate governance and performance of the non-traditional export sector, Corporate 
Governance, Vol. 6(5), pp.609-623.  
 
3. Bo Boards and CEOs Matter for Bank Performance? A Comparative Analysis of Banks in Ghana. Corporate 
Ownership and Control, Vol. 4(1), 119-126 
 
Two Papers based on this chapter were also presented at the Biennial Conference of the Economic Society of 
South Africa, Durban, September 2005. 
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of bringing the interests of investors and managers in line and ensuring that firms are run for 
the benefit of investors (Mayer, 1997). Indeed, it is concerned with the relationship between 
the internal governance mechanisms of corporations and society’s conception of the scope 
of corporate accountability (Deakin & Hughes, 1997) and has also been defined by Keasey et 
al. (1997) to include ‘the structures, processes, cultures and systems that engender the 
successful operation of organisations’. From this we would want to state that corporate 
governance comprises the structures and processes laid down by a corporate entity to 
minimise the scope of agency problems that result from separation between ownership and 
control. We must however, indicate that different systems of corporate governance will 
embody what are considered to be legitimate lines of accountability by defining the nature of 
the relationship between the company and key corporate constituencies. 
 
The East Asian crisis and the recent corporate scandals around the world coupled with the 
seemingly poor performance of corporate Africa have given prominence and impetus to 
corporate governance on the continent. The extant literature on corporate governance which 
is generally about large and listed firms in the US and UK considers the relationship between 
corporate ownership structure, the composition of boards of directors and corporate 
performance. One of the comprehensive studies done on the continent with regard to 
corporate governance is by Ayogu (2001). The focus of Ayogu (2001) was on regulations, 
legalities and governance practices across selected African countries. Thus, the point must be 
made that linking corporate governance and firm performance in a cross-country study on 
the continent is yet to emerge. This is our primary motivation for carrying out this study. It 
must also be indicated that South Africa has the most well-structured governance 
mechanism among the selected countries. On the African continent and in our sample 
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countries, corporate governance is driven by the Companies Code, Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the Stock Exchange listing requirements, regulations and rules and other 
country specific regulatory agencies. Even though, corporate governance in Africa has taken 
off on a good note, there is still insufficient relevant empirical research, which limits the 
basis for comparison of the continent’s corporate governance experiences and outcomes 
with other continents. 
 
In this paper, therefore, we attempt to determine how corporate governance influences 
corporate performance in a cross-country investigation. The hope is that findings will enable 
us appreciate the role of governance in firm performance. The rest of the paper is organised 
as follows: section two discusses relevant literature; section three looks at data and 
methodological issues; section four is devoted to the discussion of empirical findings; and 
section five concludes and highlights policy implications.  
 
2.2 Literature Review 
 
The existence of divergent and sometimes conflicting objectives among corporate managers 
and shareholders has given rise to the design of many concepts and mechanisms to ensure 
that the cost associated with such divergent interests is minimal. One of the arrangements 
proposed to deal with this is corporate governance. It has been argued that the agency 
theory has been the most dominant issue in corporate governance. However, several other 
theories have emerged, all in an attempt to highlight the objective of a firm and how the firm 
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should be responsible in meeting its obligations. In the following, these theories are 
discussed. 
 
2.2.1 Agency Theory 
 
It is an acknowledged fact that the principal-agent theory is generally considered as the 
starting point for any debate on the issue of corporate governance emanating from “The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property”, the classical thesis by Berle and Means (1932). In this 
thesis, there is a profound description of a fundamental agency problem in modern firms 
due primarily to the separation between financing sources and management. Modern firms 
suffer from a separation of ownership and control and are therefore run by professional 
managers (agents) who are not accountable to dispersed shareholders. This view fits into the 
principal-agent paradigm. In this regard, the fundamental question is how to ensure that 
managers follow the interests of shareholders in order to reduce cost associated with 
principal-agent contract. The principals in this wise are confronted with two main problems. 
Apart from facing an adverse selection problem in that they are faced with selecting the most 
capable managers, they are also confronted with a moral hazard problem because they must 
give the agents (managers) the right incentives to put forth the appropriate effort and make 
decisions aligned with shareholder interests. 
 
In a further definition of agency relationship and cost, Jensen and Meckling (1976) describe 
agency relationship as a contract under which “one or more persons (principal) engage another person 
(agent) to perform some service on their behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to 
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the agent”. In this scenario, there exists a conflict of interests between managers or controlling 
shareholders and bondholders and outside or minority shareholders leading to the tendency 
that the former may extract “perquisites” (or perks) out of a firm’s resources and be less 
interested to pursue new profitable ventures. Agency costs include monitoring expenditures 
by the principal, such as auditing, budgeting, control and compensation systems; bonding 
expenditures by the agent; and residual loss due to divergence of interests between the 
principal and the agent. The share and the bond price that shareholders and bondholders 
respectively (as principal) pay reflect such agency costs. To increase firm value, one must 
therefore reduce agency costs. The following represents a summary of the proposition aimed 
at overcoming opportunistic behaviour of managers within the agency theory: 
 
• Composition of board of directors: The board of directors is expected to be made up of 
more non-executive directors for effective control. The reason behind this relies on 
the argument that it reduces the conflict of interest and ensures a board’s 
independence in monitoring and passing a fair and unbiased judgement on 
management; 
 
• CEO duality: It is expected that different individuals occupy the positions of CEO 
and board chairperson as this corrects the concentration of power in one individual 
and thus greatly reduces undue influencing of management and board members. 
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2.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
 
One argument against the strict agency theory is its narrowness, hence the need to explore. 
The stakeholder theory stipulates that a multipurpose corporate entity invariably seeks to 
provide a balance between the interests of its diverse stakeholders in order to ensure that 
each interest constituency receives some degree of satisfaction (Abrams, 1951). The 
stakeholder theory is managerial because its shows and directs how managers operate rather 
than primarily addressing management theories and economists. The basic question that 
stakeholder theory seeks to address concerns the purpose of the firm. Identification of the 
firm’s purpose therefore becomes the driving force underlying its activities (Freeman et al. 
2004). Stakeholder theory consequently highlights the responsibility of the firm to its various 
stakeholders and thus pushes management to design and employ appropriate methodologies 
to determine the nature of the relationship between the management and the interested 
parties in order to deliver on their purpose. There is a realisation that economic value is 
created by people who voluntarily come together and cooperate to improve everyone’s 
circumstances (Freeman et al., 2004). 
 
Stakeholder theory has become more prominent because many researchers have recognised 
that the activities of a corporate entity impact on the external environment thereby requiring 
accountability of the organisation to a wider audience than simply its shareholders. For 
instance, McDonald and Puxty, in the late 1970s, proposed that companies were no longer 
the instruments of shareholders alone but existed within society and therefore had 
responsibilities to that society (1979). One must however, point out that wide recognition of 
this fact has been a rather recent phenomenon.  
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Relating to the above discussion, John and Senbet (1998) have provided a comprehensive 
review of the Stakeholders theory of corporate governance. The main issue raised in the 
theory is the presence of many parties with competing interests in the operations of the firm. 
They also emphasised the role of non-market mechanisms such as the size of the board and 
committee structure as important to firm performance. 
 
Jensen (2001) offered a critique of the Stakeholders theory for assuming a single-valued 
objective by identifying share and bondholders as the only interest group of a corporate 
entity necessitating further exploration. An extension of the theory, the enlightened 
stakeholder theory, was proposed. However, problems relating to empirical testing of the 
extension have limited its relevance (Sanda et al., 2005). 
 
2.2.3 Stewardship Theory 
 
This theory, in arguing against the agency theory, posits that managerial opportunism is not 
relevant (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). According to the stewardship theory, a manager’s objective is primarily to 
maximise the firm’s performance because a manager’s need for achievement and success is 
satisfied when the initial condition of better firm performance is met. One key distinguishing 
feature of the theory of stewardship is that it replaces the lack of trust to which Agency 
theory refers with respect for authority and an inclination to ethical behaviour. In summary, 
the stewardship theory considers the following as essential for ensuring effective corporate 
governance in any entity: 
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 • Board of directors: The involvement of non-executive directors is important to enhance 
the effectiveness of the board’s activities because executive directors have full 
knowledge of the firm’s operations. This is believed to enhance decision-making and 
to ensure the sustainability of the business; 
 
• Leadership: Contrary to the agency theory, the stewardship theory stipulates that the 
positions of CEO and board chair should be concentrated in the same individual, 
the reason being that it affords the CEO the opportunity to carry through a decision 
quickly and without the hindrance of undue bureaucracy; 
 
• Finally, it is argued that small board sizes should be encouraged to promote effective 
communication and decision making. What constitutes small, however, is not 
determined by the theory. 
2.2.4 Resource Dependency Theory 
 
This theory, by introducing a critical dimension to the debate on corporate governance, 
accessibility to resources, and the separation of ownership and control, indicates that a board 
of directors generally works as a link. Again, the theory points out that, in real practical 
terms, organisations usually tend to reduce the uncertainty of external influences to ensure 
that resources are available for their survival and development. By implication, this theory 
seems to suggest that the issue of the dichotomy between executive and non-executive 
directors is actually irrelevant. How then does a firm operate efficiently? To resolve this 
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problem, the theory indicates that what is relevant is the firm’s presence on the boards of 
directors of other organisations to establish relationships in order to have access to resources 
in the form of information which could then be utilised to the firm’s advantage.   
 
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that the above schools of thought have but one single 
objective, namely proper corporate governance for enhanced performance, though they 
propose different approaches in addressing the fundamental objective. From the agency 
perspective, it is argued that the delegation of managerial responsibilities by principals 
(owners) to agents (managers) necessitates the presence of mechanisms that align the 
divergent interests of the corporate constituencies or that ensures that managers use their 
delegated power to generate the highest possible return for the principals. As noted earlier, 
one of such mechanisms is effective corporate governance. In this vein, the governance 
mechanism seeks to protect the interests of all stakeholders in a firm.  
 
The structure of laws and accountability issues regarding corporate governance is changing 
worldwide and directors are being held responsible everyday for the success or failure of the 
companies they govern. Corporate boards are responsible for major decisions like changing 
corporation bylaws, issuing shares, declaring dividends, etc. This, to some extent, explains 
why discussions on corporate governance usually focus on boards. The board of directors is 
the “apex” of the controlling system in an organisation and it is there to monitor the 
activities of top management and to ensure that the interests of shareholders are protected 
(Jensen, 1993; Short et al., 1998). It acts as the fulcrum between the owners and controllers 
of the corporation (Monks & Minow, 2001). It is the single most important corporate 
governance mechanism (Blair, 1995). The board of directors is the institution to which 
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managers of a company are accountable before the law for the company’s activities (Oxford 
Analytica Ltd, 1992:7). Studies have shown that boards of directors are effective mechanism 
for effective monitoring of managers (Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Again, 
Fama and Jensen (1983) extend the argument that boards will be able to effectively monitor 
management when there are more non-executive directors on the board. According to 
Tricker (1984), the regulation of companies is necessary to prevent the abuse of corporate 
power and make the board of directors effective. Apart from the duty of loyalty to the 
company’s shareholders, the board is also responsible for exercising due diligence in decision 
making. Specifically, it selects, evaluates, and if necessary, replaces the CEO based on 
performance. Is there any link between corporate governance and firm performance?   
 
2.3 Corporate Governance and Firm performance 
 
It is widely claimed that good corporate governance enhances a firm’s performance (Brickley 
et al., 1994; Brickley & James, 1987; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Chung et al., 2003; Hossain et al., 
2000; Lee et al., 1992; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988). In spite of the generally 
accepted notion that effective corporate governance enhances firm performance, other 
studies have reported a negative relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance (Bathala & Rao, 1995; Hutchinson, 2002), or find that there is no relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance (Park & Shin, 2003; Prevost et al., 
2002; Singh & Davidson, 2003; Young, 2003). Reasons for such inconsistencies are several 
and varying. Some have argued that the restrictive use of either publicly available data or 
survey data could be part of the problem. It has also been pointed out that the nature of 
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performance measures (i.e. restrictive use of accounting-based measures such as return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on capital employed (ROCE) or restrictive use 
of market-based measures (such as Market value of equities) could also contribute to this 
inconsistency (Gani & Jermias, 2006). Furthermore, it has been argued that the “theoretical 
and empirical literature in corporate governance considers the relationship between 
corporate performance and ownership or structure of boards of directors mostly using only 
two of these variables at a time” (Krivogorsky, 2006). For instance, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991) and McAvoy et al. (1983) studied the correlation between board composition and 
performance while Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Himmelberg et al. (1999), and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) studied the relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
performance. Thus, to address some of these problems, it is recommended that a look at 
corporate governance and its correlation with firm performance should take these issues into 
account. The present study adds to the literature by employing both market-based and 
accounting-based performance measures namely return on assets and Tobin’s Q, and relating 
these to governance variables on board characteristics as a proxy for governance. In addition 
to board characteristics, we also include board activity intensity (using the frequency of 
board meetings on annual basis), as well as audit committee practices and characteristics. 
Further to that, we also combine survey and publicly available governance data to broaden 
the scope of governance. The rationale for this broad set of variables is to reduce, to some 
extent, the degree of biasedness. 
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2.4 Data and Methodological Issues 
 
2.4.1 Sample Selection and Variable Description 
 
We employ unique data on a sample of 103 listed companies on the Ghanaian, Nigerian, 
Kenyan and South African stock exchanges. In addition, we also depended on INET-Bridge 
for their electronic data. We have to state that our selection of the 103 firms was primarily 
based on convenience and on their submission of completed questionnaires that elicited data 
on some of the governance variables. Thus, while the performance variables were largely 
computed based on the firms’ financial statements, most of the governance variables were 
obtained through the administration of a questionnaire. Firms that were sampled covered the 
Industrial, Manufacturing, Mining, Agricultural and Service sectors. Table 2.1 shows both 
country and sector distribution of firms used in the study.  
 
Table 2-1: Firm Distribution by Sector and Country 
Country Sector 
 Industrial Manufacturing Mining Agricultural Services Total 
South Africa 15 5 15 3 4 42 
Ghana 4 10 1 2 5 22 
Nigeria 4 3 5 2 2 16 
Kenya 8 7 3 3 2 23 
Total 31 25 24 10 13 103 
 
In arriving at the definition of what constitutes these sectors, we largely depended on the 
classifications given by the various stock exchanges. We recognise the possibility of non-
uniform classification which could pose a problem with regard to the analysis and results. 
However, we are of the opinion that such differences are marginal and thus have little 
impact on compromising the validity of our results. The banking and finance sector is 
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omitted in tandem with studies on corporate governance (Faccio & Lasfer, 2000). The sector 
has peculiar governance issues which make it different from all other sectors. The data 
covers the period 1997 to 2001.  
 
We used return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q as our performance measures. This is in 
tandem with arguments that suggest that the use of only accounting or market-based 
performance measures are responsible for the inconsistencies in establishing a clear 
relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance. We measured ROA 
as the ratio of Earnings Before Interest and Taxes to Total Assets (EBIT/TA). Refer to 
Appendix for the measurement of Tobin’s Q. A broader interaction in this manner is the 
only way that can enhance greater appreciation of the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance of firms. The governance variables are discussed below: 
 
Board Size 
 
The monitoring role of corporate boards has been a central issue in both the financial and 
the academic press. Organisational theory presupposes that larger groups take a relatively 
longer time to take decisions and that a larger group will therefore require more input time 
for a given level of output (Steiner, 1972). Jensen (1993) has since indicated that a value-
relevant attribute of corporate boards is its size. What should the optimal board size be? This 
is a difficult question to answer because it seems to be situated in the realms of relativity and 
subjectivity against the backdrop of unbiased objective measure. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
have suggested an optimal board size of between seven and nine directors. In this respect, 
empirical studies have shown that the market values firms with relatively small board sizes 
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(Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Yermack, 1996; Sanda et al., 2005; Eisenberg et al,, 1998). Hence, as 
board size increases, board activity is expected to increase to compensate for increasing 
process losses (Vafeas, 1999). The argument is that large boards are less effective and are 
easier for a CEO to control. The cost of coordination and processing problems is high in 
large boards and this makes decision taking difficult. One other issue is that smaller boards 
reduce the possibility of free riding. We measure the size of the board by the number of 
directors serving on such boards and expect this to have a negative relationship with firm 
performance. Hence, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: The size of the board is negatively related to firm performance. 
 
Board Independence 
 
John and Senbet (1998) argue that a board is more independent if it has more non-executive 
directors. As to how this relates to firm performance, empirical results have reached 
inconclusive results. It is asserted that executive (inside) directors are more familiar with a 
firm’s activities and therefore are in a better position to act as monitors with regard to top 
management. On the other hand, it is contended that non-executive (outside) directors may 
act as “professional referees” to ensure that competition among insiders stimulates actions 
consistent with shareholder value maximisation (Fama, 1980). In buttressing this point, most 
prior research has focussed on board composition and has underscored the important role 
of outside directors in protecting shareholders’ interests through effective decision control 
(Weisbach, 1988; Cotter et al., 1997). Some research has also found that there is no 
significant relationship between the number of outside directors and firm performance 
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(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Bhagat & Black, 2002). Though it has been shown that the 
effectiveness of a board depends on the optimal mix of inside and outside directors (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Baysinger & Hoskinsson, 1990; Baums, 1994), the 
available theory on the determinants of optimal board composition is scanty (Weisbach, 
2002). We measure the independence of the board by finding the ratio of non-executive 
directors to board size and we expect this to have a positive relationship with firm 
performance. Subsequently we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: Non-executive directors have a positive relationship with firm performance. 
 
Board Activity Intensity 
 
In this study, we introduce another variable namely the board activity intensity as an 
important value-relevant board attribute in tandem with Vafeas (1999). A priori, the nature 
of the association between board activity intensity and firm performance is not clear. Some 
contend that board meetings are beneficial to shareholders. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) for 
instance suggest that “the most widely shared problem directors face is lack of time to carry 
out their duties”. In a similar argument, Conger et al. (1998) suggest that board meeting time 
is an important resource for improving the effectiveness of a corporate board. In support of 
this, criticisms have been levelled at directors who spread their time too thinly as a result of 
undertaking too many outside directorships and thereby making it difficult for them to 
attend meetings regularly (Byrne, 1996). The implication is that when boards of directors 
meet frequently, they are likely to enhance firm performance and thus perform their duties in 
accordance with shareholders’ interests. Some critics on the contrary, have contended that 
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board meetings are not necessarily useful in that the limited time outside directors spend 
together is not used for meaningful exchange of ideas among themselves or with 
management (Vafeas, 1999). This position has been recognised as a natural consequence of 
the fact that agenda setting for such meetings is done by chief executive officers (Jensen, 
1993). In addition, it is believed that routine tasks absorb much of the meetings and this 
limits opportunities for outside directors to exercise meaningful control over management 
and therefore boards would be relatively inactive, becoming more active when there are 
corporate crises (Jensen, 1993). In view of the debate surrounding board meetings and their 
relationship with firm performance, the significance of board activity intensity is an open 
question. We measure the intensity of board activity by the frequency of meetings annually. 
Though this is an open situation, we test the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: The number of board meetings is negatively related to firm performance. 
 
CEO Duality 
 
A considerable amount of attention has been devoted to the critical role of a board’s ability 
to monitor managers and remove non-performing CEOs. Jensen (1993) shows a deep 
concern with regard to the fact that a lack of independent leadership makes it difficult for 
boards to respond to failure in top management. In this regard, Fama and Jensen (1983) also 
argue that the concentration of decision management and decision control in one individual 
hinders a board’s effectiveness in monitoring top management. It has also been noted that, 
when a CEO doubles as board chair, it leads to leadership facing a conflict of interest 
thereby increasing agency problems (Berg & Smith, 1978; Brickley et al., 1997). It is therefore 
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suggested that the two positions should be occupied by two persons. The direction of 
impact of this variable on firm performance also seems inconclusive. Sanda et al. (2005) 
show a positive relationship between firm performance and separating the functions of the 
CEO and board chair while Daily and Dalton (1992) have found no relationship between 
CEO duality and firm performance. Nonetheless, it must be indicated that, when a CEO 
doubles as board chair, it affords the CEO the opportunity to carry out decisions and 
projects without undue influence of bureaucratic structures and in this regard it is expected 
that CEO duality should have a positive relationship with performance (Rechner & Dalton, 
1991). We measure CEO duality as a dummy (equals unity when a CEO doubles as board 
chair and 0 otherwise) and expect a negative coefficient. The hypothesis to be tested is as 
follows: 
 
H4: The separation of CEO and Board chair positions has a positive relationship with 
performance. 
CEO Tenure 
 
It has been argued that the tenure of the CEO constitutes another governance mechanism. 
How long should a CEO serve? In this study, we are arguing that when a CEO serves longer 
in a firm, it serves as an added incentive to promote the interests of shareholders due 
essentially to the fact that the CEO becomes a witness to results of decisions taken. In this 
regard, longer tenure is expected to have a positive influence on performance, though some 
have indicated that a longer tenure enables CEOs to resort to empire-building with little 
concentration of productive activities.  
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H5: Longer serving CEOs enhance firm performance. 
 
Audit Committee and its Characteristics 
 
In the US, the Wall Street Journal reported in September 1998, that some accounting 
irregularities that necessitated the restatement of earnings of companies concerned3 were 
discovered in the previous year. This event stimulated interest in the effectiveness of audit 
committees as part of a scheme of structures in corporate governance. The argument was 
advanced that the audit committee perhaps is the most reliable entity in safeguarding public 
interest. In addition to the recommendation by the Cadbury Commission, that audit 
committees should be established, it was also recommended that audit committees should 
have a minimum size of three members and should consist solely of non-executive directors. 
This feeds into the independence of such committees. Thus, it is posited that, in an ideal 
case, a strict independent audit committee is made up solely of non-executive directors and 
non-affiliates of the company (directors who have worked in the company before). Audit 
committees thus represent another internal governance mechanism for the improvement of 
the quality of financial management of a company and hence its performance. However, 
very little empirical work that examines the impact of audit committees and firm 
performance has been done. Wild (1994) has shown that markets react favourably to earning 
reports after the establishment of audit committees. In this study, we have used the size of 
the audit committee (measured by number of members), its independence (measured by the 
ratio of non-executive directors/affiliates to the size of the audit committee), and also audit 
committee activity intensity (measured by the number of meetings per year). While we 
                                                 
3 “Accounting Firms Facing More Pressure From S.E.C.” Wall Street Journal, September 1, 1998, p. C5. 
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expect the size of audit committee to have a negative relationship with firm performance, we 
expect both audit committee independence and number of meetings per year to have a 
positive correlation with firm performance. The following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
H6: The size of audit committee has a negative relationship firm performance. 
 
H7: More non-executive directors on the audit committee have a positive relationship with 
the performance of the firm. 
 
H8: Intensity of audit committee activities has a positive relationship with the performance 
of the firm. 
 
Institutional Ownership 
 
It has been argued that the nature of ownership of a firm, which is a dimension of its 
governance structure, also has an influence on performance. It is known that in countries 
like Australia, Belgium, Germany and Italy, more than half of listed industrial companies 
have large blockholders who own at least 50% of such companies (Krivogorsky, 2006). 
While this is not common in the US, it is contended in Europe that ownership is less 
dispersed and control rights are not fully separated from ownership. In this study, we 
consider institutional shareholding measured by the percentage volume of shares held by 
institutions. Institutions under such circumstances serve as extra monitoring devices 
concerning the operations of the firm. It is therefore expected that institutional ownership 
would have a positive relationship with the performance of a firm.  
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 H9: Institutional shareholding is positively related to performance. 
 
We recognise the difficulty of adequately modelling a firm’s performance and thus control 
for firm size (measured by the number of employees), leverage (measured by the ratio of 
total debt to assets) and assets tangibility (measured by the ratio of fixed assets to total 
assets).  
 
2.5 Analytical Framework and Empirical Model Specification 
 
We employ panel data framework for our analysis due basically to its advantage of allowing 
for more data points. The basic panel data model is of the form: 
 
ititit xy εαφ ++= /                  1 
 
Where φ  is a constant,  is a itx K -dimensional vector of explanatory variables and itε  is the 
error term which is further decomposed into the following disturbance terms: 
 
ititit u νε +=                    2 
 
Estimation of the basic model could be done via several methodologies, depending on the 
behaviour of the component of the error term and whether there is serial correlation 
between the dependent variable and the disturbance term. Thus, one could employ the 
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, the Random Effects (RE), the Fixed Effects (FE), 
or the Dynamic Panel Estimation methods. Why Panel Data methodology? Hsiao (2003) and 
Klevmarken (1989) highlight some merits of the use of panel data as follows: 
 
i. The use of Panel data controls for individual heterogeneity. The underlying principle 
of panel data is the assumption that firms, states or countries are heterogeneous. In 
time series and cross section analysis, this heterogeneity is not taken care of and this 
poses a threat because of the risk of obtaining biased results (Moulton, 1986, 1987). 
 
ii. Unlike time series studies which are plagued with multi-collinearity issues, panel data 
gives more informative data, more variability, less collinearity among the variables, 
more degrees of freedom and more efficiency.  
 
iii. Panel data offers the ability to study the dynamics of adjustment because cross-
sectional distribution that looks relatively stable conceals a lot of changes. Again, it is 
able to measure effects that are difficult to detect in pure cross-sectional or time-
series data. 
 
We employ panel data analysis because it was more suited to this study. Our data consist of a 
a relatively short longitudinal dimension coupled with relatively small cross-sectional 
observations. Hence, the use of panel data methodology enables us to obtain more data 
points. 
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2.5.1 Empirical Model Specification 
 
 
For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we estimate the following dynamic panel model: 
 
titititi uZyy ,,1,, +′++= − ψλδ ,                                3 
            
where, and  ,5................1;103.............1 == ti
tiy ,  is the performance measure of ROA and Tobin’s Q for firm i at time t, is a vector 
of explanatory variables of corporate governance indicators, control variables; and the error 
term 
tiZ ,′
tiitiu ,, νμ +=                     4 
 
An autocorrelation problem occurs due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable 
among the regressors and individual effects characterising the heterogeneity among the 
individuals. Thus, in carrying out our estimation we employ the Arellano and Bond estimator 
which uses additional instruments and utilises the othogonality conditions that exist between 
lagged values of and the disturbances tiy , ti,ν  (Arellano & Bond, 1991). In this regard, the 
study adopts the Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) 
dynamic instrumental variable modelling approach, where the lagged values of the 
dependent variable (performance) and differences of the independent variables are suitably 
used as a valid instrument to control for this bias. The use of instruments is important 
because, in the dynamic panel, the lagged dependent variable [ 1−− itit yy ] will be correlated 
with the lagged error terms [ ] by construct and induce the possibility of endogeneity 
of some explanatory variables. Based on the following assumptions; no serial correlation in 
1−− itit ee
 38 
 
the error terms; and weak exogeneity of explanatory variables, the following moments 
condition applies: 
 
( )[ ] 011 =− −− ititit eeyE                      5 2≥y
 
( )[ 011 =− −− ititit eezE ] 2≥y    ,                 6 
 
where  is a set of explanatory variables. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimation is 
based on these moment conditions and is consistent if lagged values of explanatory variables 
are valid instruments. The validity of the use of instruments is checked using a Sargan test of 
over-identifying restrictions which tests for correlation between the instruments and the 
model residuals. 
itz
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2.6 Empirical Findings 
 
2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2-1: Summary Statistics (Observations=388) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Manager Characteristics:     
    CEO Tenure 
 
3.51 
 
1.5 
 
 
2 
 
8 
Board Characteristics 
    Board size   
    Independence 
    CEO duality 
    Number of Board Meetings 
 
9.22 
0.42 
0.19 
10.53 
 
3.41 
0.26 
0.40 
2.15 
 
3 
0.05 
0 
5 
 
23 
0.85 
1 
14 
Audit Committee Characteristics 
    Size of audit committee 
    Audit committee independence 
    Number of annual meetings    
 
4.14 
0.77 
4.71 
 
1.18 
0.18 
1.50 
 
2 
0.33 
2 
 
9 
1.00 
12 
Organisational characteristics 
    Organisational size (employees) 
    Organisational age (years) 
    Institutional shareholding (N=176) 
    Organisational growth 
 
9873.71 
42.13 
0.56 
0.72 
 
36954.1 
23.55 
0.19 
0.38 
 
20 
5 
0.10 
0 
 
303098 
154 
0.91 
3.35 
Finance 
    Leverage 
    Short-term Leverage 
    Long-term leverage 
 
0.66 
0.29 
0.37 
 
0.24 
0.21 
0.21 
 
0.01 
0.0013 
0.001 
 
0.99 
0.92 
0.87 
Organisational Performance 
    Return on Assets 
    Tobin’s Q 
 
0.13 
0.30 
 
0.15 
0.31 
 
-0.43 
0.002 
 
0.68 
3.47 
 
Most of the firms represented in Table 2-1 have been operating for the past 42 years, though 
some have been in existence for over 150 years. On average, these firms employ about 9900 
staff members; some, however, employ more than 300,000. It must be pointed out that the 
sizes of these firms are highly varied considering the minimum and maximum employment 
levels of 20 and 303098 respectively. In order to estimate the regression model therefore, we 
employ the logarithm of firm size basically to cater for the wide variation of the variable at 
levels. It is also evident that most of these organisations have a heavy institutional presence, 
with 56% representing the mean value of institutional shareholding. We must indicate, 
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though, that most of the firms did not provide information on this variable. Thus, the 56% 
represent a sample of the firms that provided this information. The mean growth value of 
these organisations is 72% though some experienced no growth at certain points during the 
period under study. While most of the organisations depend on debt as a source of finance 
for their operations, long-term debt relatively represents the major component of total debt. 
In comparing accounting and market-based performance measures, it seems the firms are 
doing relatively better on the market-based measure. While the mean value of ROA is 0.13, 
that of Tobin’s Q is 0.30, indicating an average return on assets of 13%. The mean board 
size is nine, with a maximum of twenty-three directors. The standard deviation of 3.41 
suggests that there is a rather wide dispersion. Hence, in estimating the regression model, the 
logarithm of the board size is used instead of levels. In tandem with John and Senbet (1998), 
these boards are relatively less independent as they are mostly dominated by executive 
directors. The mean value of 0.42 for board independence suggests that about 58% of these 
boards on average are made up of executive directors. However, some of these boards could 
be said to be highly independent with 85% of their membership being constituted of non-
executive directors. Most of these boards have separate personalities for the CEO and board 
chair positions, with only about 19% of the firms having the CEO and board chair positions 
entrusted to the same personality. However small it may be, recent thinking has shown that 
the appointment of one person into these two key positions has serious repercussions for 
agency costs and firm performance. Such situations generate enormous conflict of interest 
because decision control and decision management functions are all embedded in the same 
person. Not surprising therefore, The King Reports on Corporate Governance in South 
Africa, among others, recommended a clear separation between the positions of CEO and 
board chair likewise other regulatory frameworks of corporate governance in the other 
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countries. With an annual mean meeting frequency of about eleven, one could say that these 
boards are relatively busy meeting almost on a monthly basis throughout the year. The 
question is, does this improve performance or meetings are necessitated by corporate crises? 
More light could be shed on this in the regression analysis. The audit committees of these 
firms have member sizes ranging between two and nine, with a mean size of about four 
members. Most of these boards are dominated by non-executive directors and non-affiliates 
of these organisations. Thus, one could say that these firms to a large extent have 
independent audit committees. Unlike the boards, the audit committees have a mean annual 
meeting frequency of about five, suggesting that the audit committees may be meeting on 
quarterly basis to attend to business of interest. Not explained by anything, some of these 
committees virtually meet on a monthly basis for the entire year. The high meeting 
frequency of some of the audit committees’ meetings coupled with some boards meeting 
fourteen times in the course of the year, suggests that such meetings may be called for 
problem solving and that this essentially could be due to corporate crises. 
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2.6.2 Discussion of Regression Results 
 
Board characteristics and activity intensity 
Table 2-2: The Effect of Board Characteristics (N=333)4 
Independent variables Dependent Variables 
 Return on Assets (ROA) Tobin’s Q (Tob Q) 
ROA lagged (-2)  0.1453 
(2.70)** 
 
ROA lagged (-1)  -0.0301 
(-0.57) 
 
Tob q lagged (-2)   -0.0417 
(-0.81) 
Tob q lagged (-1)   -0.1437 
(-2.71)** 
Log of board size 0.0212 
(0.82) 
0.0535 
(2.70)** 
Board independence 0.1404 
(3.60)** 
0.0770 
(0.75) 
CEO duality -0.0474 
(-2.06)** 
0.0370 
(0.80) 
Tenure of CEO 0.0.0230 
(3.81)** 
-0.0047 
(-0.38) 
Frequency of board meetings -0.0049 
(-1.30) 
0.0029 
(0.37) 
Log of firm size 0.0176 
(2.68)** 
0.0182 
(1.35) 
Assets tangibility -0.1107 
(-4.14)** 
-0.0745 
(-1.39) 
Leverage -0.1637 
(-4.26)** 
-0.0014 
(-0-02) 
Constant 0.0013 
(2.22)** 
0.0023 
(1.91)** 
Wald Chi2(10) 197.37 31.44 
Note:  All regressions include a constant and ** indicates significance at 5% level. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis. 
 
Table 2-2 shows the model results of the interaction between performance variables and 
board characteristics including board activity intensity. Contrary to expectations, the size of 
the board has a positive relation with both performance variables. While it is statistically 
insignificant in the case of return on assets, it is significant for Tobin’s Q. The results 
                                                 
4 All models pass the diagnostic testing of validity of instruments via Sargan Test and second order serially 
correlated errors via AR tests. Results are not shown for brevity. 
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corroborate other studies that suggest that having a larger board enhances the performance 
of a firm because there is a range of expertise to help make better decisions, and it is more 
difficult for a powerful CEO to dominate. In this context, we could assume that, in the wake 
of privatisation, political appointments to corporate boards which make them large, may be 
waning and that board members are largely being appointed on the basis of merit and 
therefore bring their expertise on board to enhance firm performance. The question that still 
needs attention is whether boards should therefore have limitless membership? This could 
be best explained by an in-depth understanding of determinants of board sizes which has 
received very little research attention. However, we contend that boards should have a 
ceiling taking into consideration the size of the organisation and other peculiar 
characteristics.  
 
Similar to other studies (Fama, 1980: John & Senbet, 1998), the appointment of 
outside/non-executive directors makes such boards more independent and enable them to 
act as “professional referees” to ensure that competition among executive directors promote 
firm value maximisation. Again, though, the CEO duality is not significant in explaining the 
variation in Tobin’s Q; it has a negative relationship with ROA which is consistent with 
other studies (Berg & Smith, 1978; Brickley et al,, 1997; Sanda et al., 2005). This is because a 
conflict of interest results when the same person holds the positions of board chair and 
CEO and agency cost increases which has the potential to stifle performance. This is also 
consistent with recommendations of the King Report that there should be a clear separation 
of these key positions in any organisation to ensure accountability and effective monitoring 
so as to improve performance. Indeed, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Ghana 
also highlights this situation as does the Institute of Directors (IoD). This is in direct 
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contradiction to the suggestion that the combination of the two positions in the same 
individual rather enhances performance due to the seemingly absence of undue bureaucracy 
regarding decision making and implementation according to the stewardship theory. The 
organisational tenure of the CEO has a positive relationship with ROA but is insignificant in 
explaining Tobin’s Q. The tenure of the CEO indeed influences a firm’s investment 
decisions. The results of the study contradict studies that have shown that a long tenure does 
not augur well for performance as the CEO spends energy and time building an empire to 
control (Abor, 2006). However, we could argue that a longer tenure not only gives job 
security, but influences a CEO’s performance psychologically because of the realisation of 
the likelihood of investment decisions being witnessed by him/her. Hence, CEOs under 
such circumstances are likely to be proactive and magnanimous in their decisions because of 
the psychological influence.  
 
The frequency of board meetings as a measure of board activity intensity has a negative 
relationship with ROA, but a very weak positive relationship with Tobin’s Q. Against the 
backdrop of high board meeting frequency seen from the descriptive statistics; we could 
presume that such meetings were mainly due to corporate crises. The results also confirm 
studies undertaken by Jensen (1993), who argues that board meetings do not necessarily 
enhance firm performance and that board meeting frequency increases when there are 
problems. We must, however, indicate that this variable is not significant. Apart from the 
size of the firm, which shows the expected sign of having a positive impact on performance, 
asset tangibility and leverage rather show unexpected signs.  The findings of the relationship 
between leverage and performance (ROA) is inconsistent with Bos and Fetherston (1993) 
who argue that the level of total debt to total assets of a firm has a positive influence on the 
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profitability. The case of asset tangibility could however, be explained because assets in 
themselves do not promote efficiency if they are not managed well and turned in a profitable 
manner. For instance, one of the leading banks in Ghana with a huge assets base has been 
performing relatively poorer than other banks with relatively smaller asset tangibility. We 
must also indicate that the results show that while firms that have been profitable are likely 
to continue to be profitable, market valuation of a firm today does not necessarily depend on 
its past market valuation but could be a result of other factors. This is shown by the negative 
influence of a firm’s previous Tobin’s Q on current performance. Could it be due to the 
volatile nature of stock markets?  
 
Audit committee characteristics 
 
The regression results reported in Table 2-3 show that the size of an audit committee has a 
positive influence on both accounting based measures of performance (ROA) and market-
based performance measures (Tobin’s Q). Indeed, the size of the audit committee could be 
an indication of the seriousness attached to issues of transparency and this sends the right 
signal to the public who then develop confidence in the organisation. Again, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) indicate that there is a tendency for large firms to make accounting 
choices which reduce the probability of regulatory scrutiny. They also cite other literature 
documenting the penchant of firms to make accounting choices aimed at smoothing out 
reported income. In this circumstance, the presence and to some extent the size of an audit 
committee is an assurance mechanism to promote fairness. The independence of the audit 
committee however, does not show any significant relationship with any of the performance 
measures. The frequency of audit committee meetings (activity intensity) has a positive and 
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significant relationship with the market-based performance measure of Tobin’s Q, but seems 
to have no relationship with ROA (an accounting-based performance measure). What is the 
reason? It could primarily be due to the fact that audit committees are generally perceived to 
serve the interests of shareholders and the public at large. Thus, frequent meetings further 
re-affirm the position of the organisation in dealing with transparency and working to 
promote shareholder value. Menon and Williams (1994) have argued that for audit 
committees to be effective monitors, it is not enough just to be independent: they must be 
active (measured by the frequency of their meetings). The control variables as well as lagged 
values of the dependent variables show similar signs and significance to those dealt with in 
the previous discussion.  
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Table 2-3: The Effect of Audit Committee Characteristics (N=333)5 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
 Return on Assets (ROA) Tobin’s Q (Tob Q) 
ROA lagged (-2)  0.2354 
(4.57)** 
 
ROA lagged (-1)  0.0481 
(0.96) 
 
Tob q lagged (-2)   -0.0582 
(-1.17) 
Tob q lagged (-1)   -0.1590 
(-3.10)** 
Audit committee size 0.0309 
(2.20** 
0.0401 
(1.42) 
Independence of audit 
committee 
0.0977 
(1.16) 
-0.2157 
(-1.26) 
Freq. of audit c’mtte meetings -0.0006 
(-0.10) 
0.0166 
(1.56)** 
Log of size 0.0193 
(2.96)** 
0.0046 
(0.35) 
Asset tangibility -0.1005 
(-3.78)** 
-0.0442 
(-0.85) 
Leverage  -0.2129 
(-5.75)** 
-0.0134 
(-0.18) 
Constant 0.0011 
(2.32)** 
0.0022 
(2.31)** 
Wald Chi2(8) 169.95 50.01 
Note:  All regressions include a constant and ** indicates significance at 5% level. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis. 
 
 
Effect of institutional shareholding 
 
Institutional shareholding has a different influence on performance depending on whether 
an accounting-based or market-based measure is applied. When institutions have more 
shares in a company, this tends to stifle performance (accounting based) as shown by the 
results presented in Table 2-4. This however, could be explained by the fact that institutional 
ownership of share in a firm does not necessarily help the firm to be efficient. What could be 
relevant is the level of involvement and influence such institutions have on the firms in 
                                                 
5 All models pass the diagnostic testing of validity of instruments via the Sargan Test and second order serially    
correlated errors via AR tests. Results are not shown for the sake of brevity. 
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which they own shares. Institutional shareholding however, is a key signal to other investors 
of the potential profitability of the firm. This leads to a higher demand for such shares 
thereby increasing price and thus improving market valuation of such firms. Hence the 
results, though surprising, point to an intuitive event that occurs in everyday life.  
 
Table 2-4: The Effect of Institutional Shareholding (N=156)6 
Independent Variables Dependent Variables 
 Return on Assets (ROA) Tobin’s Q (Tob Q) 
ROA lagged (-1) -0.1811 
(-2.69)** 
 
Tob q lagged (-1)  -0.0367 
(-0.67) 
Institutional shareholding -0.1962 
(-3.49)** 
0.3233 
(3.04)** 
Log of size 0.0220 
(2.89)** 
0.0531 
(3.65)** 
Asset tangibility 0.0036 
(0.07) 
-0.0330 
(-0.35) 
Leverage -0.1131 
(-3.02)** 
-0.1314 
(-1.83)** 
Constant -0.0033 
(-1.52)** 
-0.0026 
(-0.62) 
Wald Chi2(5) 28.22 31.29 
Note:  All regressions include a constant and ** indicates significance at 5% level. T-statistics are in 
parenthesis. 
 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
The relevance of corporate governance cannot be over-emphasized since it constitutes the 
organisational climate for the internal activities of a company.  Corporate governance brings 
a new outlook and enhances a firm’s corporate competitiveness. The study examined the 
effect of corporate governance on the performance of firms in Africa by using both market- 
and accounting-based performance measures.  Data covering the five year period from 1997-
                                                 
6 All models passed the diagnostic testing of validity of instruments via the Sargan Test and second order 
serially correlated errors via AR tests. Results are not shown for the sake of brevity. 
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2001 was collected from a sample of 103 firms drawn from Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria 
and Kenya, and the analysis was done within the dynamic panel data framework. Results 
show that these firms have a heavy institutional presence with a mean institutional 
ownership of 56%. The mean board size of the sample was nine members but there are wide 
variations in this variable. The boards are also deemed to be relatively non-independent, with 
about 58% of their composition being made up of executive directors and there is a clear 
separation of the functions of the CEO and board chair. The boards of the sampled firms 
furthermore appear to be very busy with a mean annual meeting frequency of 11. In 
addition, the firms also have relatively independent audit committees who seem to meet on a 
quarterly basis. 
 
The regression results further show that the direction and the extent of the impact of 
governance is dependent on the performance measure being investigated. Results reveal that 
large and independent boards enhance corporate performance. Whiles, the CEO duality 
does not significantly impact on the market-based performance measure of Tobin’s Q, it has 
a negative relationship with firm profitability in tandem with other studies. We also found 
that CEO’s tenure in office enhances a firm’s profitability and that board activity intensity 
has a negative effect on profitability consistent with other studies. Furthermore, the size of 
audit committees and the frequency of their meetings have a positive influence on Tobin’s Q 
(a market-based performance measure) but seem to have no relationship with a firm’s 
profitability. Likewise, it is seen that institutional shareholding essentially sends a positive 
signal to potential investors and this enhances market valuation of a firm.  
 
 50 
 
From the foregoing analysis, it is evident that corporate governance has an influence on a 
firm’s performance. Indeed, while some of our findings are revealing, clear policy 
implications should not be lost. For enhanced performance of corporate entities, it is 
important to separate the positions of CEO and board chair and firms should also be 
encouraged to maintain relatively independent board and audit committees. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3 THE DETERMINANTS OF BOARD SIZE AND ITS COMPOSITION: 
 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM GHANA↓ 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the literature of corporate governance, one of the key issues that has stood out is the 
matter of boards and their characteristics. Corporate boards play a critical role by offering 
direction and guidance to any corporate entity. The question of what determines the size of a 
board and its composition has been debated by both academics and practitioners. The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act which was enacted in 2002, was a practical attempt to restrict corporate 
board structure in order to enhance corporate governance in the USA. With regard to 
academic literature, various investigations relating to various aspects of corporate boards, 
such as the relation between the proportion of outsiders on the board and firm performance 
have been undertaken. There is an ongoing debate as to whether existing corporate 
governance mechanisms promote sufficient protection for investors’ capital. In particular, 
board size and its composition have been the focus of attention. It must also be pointed out 
that there have been attempts to explain the determinants of board size and its composition 
theoretically (Raheja, 2005), and some limited empirical studies have also indirectly looked 
into factors affecting corporate board sizes and their composition (Yermack, 1996; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998).  However, most of these studies have been carried out in advanced 
economies and mostly on relatively large firms. Determinants of corporate board size and 
                                                 
↓ This paper has been published in the Journal of Accounting and Organizational Change, Vol. 3(1), pp. 68-77 
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composition are critical especially when corporate boards have been the focus of attention 
for some time now. It is regarded as the apex of the governance structure of any corporate 
entity. This explains why failure of any company is largely blamed on its board. In Ghana, 
like most developing economies, corporate boards were largely influenced by political 
appointments and government interventions. Moving away from a controlled regime to 
liberalized environment, it is expected that this should give way to corporate ethics and that 
corporate boards should be seen as being appointed on merit. Indeed, the size and 
composition of corporate boards has been an issue in Ghana which has necessitated this 
study. Thus, a study of this nature in a country like Ghana provides further empirical results 
in the on-going debate. Hence, the focus of this paper is to provide further empirical 
evidence on the determinants of board size and its composition from a small and developing 
country perspective. Does this follow standard finance theory or are there some 
peculiarities? 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; section two reviews related literature; section 
three looks at the data and methodological issues; section four discusses empirical findings; 
and section five concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review  
 
The corporate board comprises three important positions namely the CEO, the inside 
directors who are in most cases senior managers of the firm, and outside directors. All of 
these have knowledge of what a good and a bad project is. The main responsibility of the 
board is to offer vision and direction to any corporate entity. Indeed, the board is about the 
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most important constituency of a corporate structure. Every corporate board has at least one 
outside director and all outside directors benefit from enhanced performance of the firm. 
The fundamental question concerns what determines the size of a corporate board and its 
composition. Some studies have investigated board size, composition and linkage with firm 
performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) have shown that the larger the 
board the greater the difficulty of co-ordination and this adversely affects a firm’s 
performance. They contend that in addition to the fixed cost of observing and producing 
information,θ , each outside board member also incurs coordination and communication 
cost, . Hence, with  outside board members, the total cost of verification of any 
information given by an inside board member will be given as:  
C m
 
Verification Cost = Cm+θ                   1 
 
The implication of the above is that the more outsiders there are on a board, the greater the 
cost, which invariably affects performance negatively. This is because, it takes more 
resources from the company to ensure that outside directors obtain the right information 
thereby increasing operational cost and thus affecting operating profit for the organisation. 
Previous empirical studies have also used agency theory or strategic contingency models to 
develop hypotheses with regard to the economic determinants of board size and 
composition (Beatty & Zajac, 1994). Explanations based on agency theory depend on 
efficiency propositions and the fact that governance structures are designed to mitigate the 
effect of agency cost. There is evidence to show that variations in governance structures 
between firms could be due partly to firm specific variables. Strategic agency models 
 65 
 
consider the linkage between factors that determine company performance and the 
composition of corporate boards (Pearce & Zahra, 1992).  
 
Thus, in the extant literature on the determinants of the size of corporate boards and their 
composition, it is evident that these have emanated from agency theory. It has been agued 
that the optimal size and composition is a function of directors’ and firm characteristics 
(Raheja, 2005). Available evidence on the other hand provides inconclusive results regarding 
the types of board characteristics that enhance effective monitoring and improved 
governance (John & Senbet, 1998; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003). We must indicate that 
studies on board structure, its composition and effectiveness to monitor the activities of a 
firm have been few and far between and have tended to be theoretical in nature. For 
instance, Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) examined the endogenous dynamics of director 
nominations and CEO entrenchment and its possible effect on board structure. Warther 
(1998) also looked at the ability of the CEO to fire dissenting board members and its 
subsequent impact on the decision-making functions of a board. Furthermore, Adams and 
Ferreira (2003) and Gutierrez (2001) conducted research into designing a board to ensure 
that there are incentives for the CEO to reveal his private information. It is evident therefore 
that the board and its structure is a matter of grave concern in the gamut of corporate 
governance. What then determines the size of a board and its composition? Pincus et al. 
(1989), and Pearce and Zahra (1992), contend that larger firms tend to have larger boards 
and also more outsiders on their boards. According to Raheja (2005), “firms for which the 
incentives of insiders are better aligned with those of shareholders, such as those firms in 
very competitive industries or firms with a high degree of inside ownership require smaller 
board sizes”. It is argued that smaller boards have the ability to save on outside co-
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ordination costs related to non-executive directors. A further argument that has been 
advanced is that firms in which it is easier for outsiders to verify projects, such as grocery 
store chains, usually have a higher proportion of outside directors. On the other hand, firms 
in which it is relatively difficult for outsiders to verify projects and operations, for instance 
high-tech firms, normally have more insiders on their boards. One reason that has been 
given for this situation is that, when it is difficult to motivate outside directors to verify 
projects, the firms gain by allowing for competition among insiders in spite of the existence 
of distortion as a result of private benefits and internal competition. Within the agency cost 
perspective, the argument is that representation by outside directors will increase with the 
conflict of interests between management and outside shareholders. In Hermalin and 
Weisbach’s (1998) model, the case is stated that board composition varies with the 
bargaining ability of the CEO and the degree of uncertainty associated with the CEO’s 
ability. Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) argue that the proportion on non-executive directors 
of a corporate board is negatively related to the proportion of equity held by insiders. There 
is further evidence that the composition of a board is determined partly by the ease with 
which outside shareholders are able to monitor management. 
 
In trying to explore the correlates of board size and its composition, studies in the USA 
showed that the tenure of the CEO also influences the composition of a board. This variable 
has yielded inconclusive results. Bathala and Rao (1995), for instance, show a negative 
relationship between CEO tenure and the proportion of non-executive directors on a board. 
However, Whidbee in 1997 studied the banking industry in the USA and concluded that 
there is no relationship between CEO tenure and the proportion of non-executive directors 
on a board. We must, however, point out that Whidbee was criticized on the basis that the 
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use of the banking industry is inconsistent with studies on board size and composition, 
which usually exclude the banking industry. This position was defended and justification was 
provided for the inclusion of the banking sector.  
 
In the literature, one other variable that has been identified as affecting board composition is 
investment or growth opportunities available to a firm. This has also produced mixed results. 
Smith and Watts (1992) posit that: 
 
“…manager’s actions are less readily observable if the firm has more investment opportunities. It is 
difficult for shareholders who do not have managers’ specific knowledge to observe all investments 
from which the manager chooses”. 
 
The above presupposes that there is an inverse relationship between the proportion of 
outside directors on a board and a firm’s investment or growth opportunity. This position is 
confirmed by Bathala and Rao (1995). On the contrary however, Whidbee (1997) finds no 
evidence of a relationship between a firm’s growth or investment opportunity and the 
proportion of non-executive directors. In the present study we also include the profitability 
of the firm as a possible determinant. This variable stems from Raheja’s (2005) argument 
that the nature of a proposed project has an influence on board composition. Thus, we 
associate a successful and less risky project with high probability whereas a more risky 
project is associated with a higher probability of loss and is therefore considered less 
profitable. Emanating from this is the issue of risk. It is asserted that firm characteristics do 
indeed affect board size and composition. In tandem with that position, we again include the 
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level of firm specific risk as one of our explanatory variables. In addition, we examine 
whether the size of the board and its composition is also industry specific. 
 
3.3 Data and Methodological Issues 
 
The study uses annual data covering a six-year period (1998-2003) from 22 firms listed on 
the Ghana Stock Exchange. Though, there were more than twenty-two firms listed on the 
stock exchange, year of enlistment and data availability influenced the selection of our 
sample. The industries that were investigated include Breweries, Manufacturing, Banking and 
Finance, Petroleum and Distribution. In tandem with Whidbee (1997), we include the 
Banking and Finance Industry for comparison with other sectors. Due to the small sample 
size, we recommend that interpretation of the results from this study should be done with 
some degree of caution. 
 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
 
Our dependent variables are board size and board composition. While board size is 
measured by the number of board members, board composition is the ratio of non-executive 
board members to the size of the board.  
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3.3.2 Independent Variables 
 
We use firm risk, CEO tenure, profitability, institutional shareholding, firm growth, and firm 
size as the explanatory variables. We measure risk (earnings volatility) as the standard 
deviation of the first difference of the ratio of Earnings Before interest and Taxes (EBIT) to 
total assets. Thus, 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛Δ=
TA
EBITdeviationStdRisk .                  2 
 
The tenure of the CEO is measured by the number of years a CEO serves in that capacity. 
Return on total assets (ROA) measured by the ratio of EBIT to total assets is used as our 
measure of profitability. We also measure institutional shareholding as the percentage of 
shares held by institutions other than insiders. It must be noted that institutional 
shareholding invariably also indicates the level of insider shareholding. Again, we measure 
firm growth by finding the rate of change in annual turn-over, and the size of the firm is 
measured by the value of total assets. As part of the explanatory variables, we also include 
firm categorical variables to enable us capture the influence of specific firm attributes. 
  
3.3.3 Control Variables 
 
We control for firm age as a proxy for reputation (this is measured by the number of years 
the firm has been in operation, using the year of incorporation as the starting point), capital 
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structure measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets, and a firm’s asset structure 
measured by the ratio of total fixed assets to total assets. The rationale behind the use of 
control variables is our recognition of the inability to adequately model determinants of 
board size and composition.  
 
3.4 Analytical Framework and Empirical Model Specification 
 
In carrying out this study, we employ panel data multiple regression techniques. Hsiao (2003) 
and Klevmarken (1989) showed that the use of panel data gives some advantage over the 
conventional time series modelling. Some of the advantages in the use of panel data include 
controlling for cross-sectional heterogeneity by observing individual firms as heterogeneous 
and this therefore reduces the risk of biasedness in the results (Moulton, 1986, 1987; Baltagi 
& Levin, 1992). Panel data allows for more data points, more variability, more degrees of 
freedom and reduces collinearity among the variables. Our basic model is thus specified as: 
 
ititit uXy ++= βα /                    3 
 
where TtNi ..,..............................1;.......,....................1 == , with i  denoting our cross-
sectional dimension, firms, and t  representing the time series. α  is a scalar, β  i it  
is th th  firm o
s
e
 1Kx , X
 i n K  explanatory variables an itu  the error term. The estimation technique 
to be applied in the basic panel data modelling is dependent on the behaviour of the 
components of the error term. Thus, we conduct the Hausman (1978) specification test 
which is based on a contrast vector H: 
d 
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 H= [bGLS-bw]´[V(bw)-V(bGLS)]-1[bGLS-bw] ,                    4 
 
in deciding whether to use the fixed or the random effect technique in our estimation. 
 
3.4.1 Empirical Model Specification 
 
From the above discussion, we specify equation 5 as the estimable model 
 
ititiitit uControlIndusFirmXticsCompoBoardSizen ++++= δφβα             5 
 
where BoardSizenCompo is our dependent variable comprising Board size and Board 
composition of firm i in time t; FirmXtics is a vector of explanatory variables for firm i at 
time t; Indus is a categorical industry variable relating to firm i; Control is a vector of control 
variables for firm i at time t; and  is the disturbance term.  itu
 
6..,..............................1;22.......,....................1 == ti . 
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3.5 Empirical Findings 
 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
In Table 3-1, of the 22 firms studied, most of them are in the Manufacturing sector. The rest 
are in the Petroleum, Distribution, Breweries and Banking and Finance industries.  
 
Table 3-1: Industrial Breakdown of Firms   
Industry Number of Firms 
Banking and Finance 5 
Breweries 3 
Distribution 2 
Manufacturing 10 
Petroleum 2 
Total  22 
 
 
Table 3-2 presents the summary statistics. Together these firms have been operating in 
Ghana for the past 107 years, though most of them have been in the Ghanaian economy for 
about 39 years. The firms are of varying sizes and are widely dispersed as shown by the 
standard deviation both in levels and in log form. Other characteristics of these firms are 
discussed below. Most of the firms depend largely on debt as the main financing option and 
this is mostly driven by short-term debt. Furthermore, most of the firms have about 63 
percent of their total assets in current form, though some have about 97 percent asset 
tangibility. In addition, these firms have shown some moderate growth potential. With a 
mean percentage of about 11.2 and the maximum of 54 percent, the firms are relatively 
profitable. Risk associated with the firms in terms of earnings volatility is also on the lower 
side and this suggests some relative stability. Table 3-2 also shows that most of these firms 
are institutionally owned with a mean percentage of about 78 percent. In addition, most of 
the firms operate with a board of about nine members, the maximum board membership 
being thirteen, while the minimum is five. It must also be understood that the mean ratio of 
0.23 suggests that most of the firms have a small proportion (about 23%) of non-executive 
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directors on their boards – an indication of a relative less independent of these boards. The 
firms with the highest number of non-executive representation on their boards recorded 
only 40% in this regard. The implication is that most of the firms depend largely on 
executive directors and are therefore relatively non-independent (John & Senbet, 1998). The 
average tenure of a CEO stands at three years with the maximum being four years.  
 
Table 3-2: Summary Statistics  
Variable Observations Mean Std. deviation Minimum Maximum 
Industry 132 1.818182 1.40782 0 4 
Board size 132 8.901515 1.968686 5 13 
Board composition 132 0.2292644 0.10565 0.0909 0.4 
CEO tenure 132 2.590909 0.5789507 2 4 
Total debt ratio 132 0.5941667 0.1997939 0.18 1.1 
Long term debt 
ratio 
132 0.0975 0.1774044 0 0.77 
Short-term debt 
ratio 
132 0.4963636 0.2258429 0.09 1.1 
Firm age 132 38.5 21.30925 6 107 
Firm size 132 8.62e+08 3.44e+09 2,139,398 3.73e+10 
Log of firm size 132 18.47002 1.960511 14.57604 24.34177 
Asset structure 132 0.3691667 0.2231969 0.02 0.97 
Growth opportunity 132 0.3614394 0.5142713 -0.75 4.85 
Profitability 132 0.112288 0.0239103 -0.14 0.54 
Firm risk 132 0.0112288 0.0239103 0 0.1357 
Institutional 
shareholding 
132 78.25487 24.56825 0.0091167 98.55 
 
3.5.2 Discussion of Regression Results 
 
 
Table 3-3 represents the regression results of the study. The results show that more risky 
firms have larger boards but have fewer non-executive board members. The rationale behind 
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having more board members and less non-executive members for risky firms is to tap 
diverse knowledge especially from executive board members who are conversant with the 
operations of the firm so as to enhance performance. Raheja (2005) concludes that the size 
of a board is dependent on a firm’s characteristics. In this regard, we have shown that less 
risky firms use smaller boards and vice versa. The results once again point out that risky 
firms use rather more inside directors and engage the services of fewer non-executive 
directors. This corroborates results of the size in that a risky firm requires the services of 
members who are knowledgeable in the firm and industry and in most cases this can be 
obtained from inside directors as against outside directors. 
 
Our results show that there is a negative correlation between board size and CEO tenure but 
a positive relationship between CEO tenure and non-executive board members. The 
implication of the board size could be explained by the fact that longer CEO tenure reduces 
the chances of succession of executive board members and this may lead to high inside 
director turn-over in search of other opportunities. The positive relationship between non-
executive directors and CEO tenure rather contradicts findings obtained by Smith and Watts 
(1992) and Bathala and Rao (1995) who argued that there is an inverse relationship between 
CEO tenure and the proportion of outside directors on a board. Our findings could be 
explained by the fact that non-executive directors do not in any case fight for CEO position 
and therefore may be reluctant in removing a performing CEO. Again, our results show that 
the profitability of a firm has a positive relationship with the size of a firm’s board, but 
negatively correlated with the proportion of outside directors. These are not significant 
though.   
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The level of institutional shareholding in a firm has a negative relationship with both the size 
of the board and the proportion of outside directors. The implication is that firms maintain 
smaller boards and appoint fewer outside directors when institutions have huge stakes as 
against insider ownership. This rather contradicts findings by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) 
who argue that that the proportion of non-executive directors of a corporate board is 
negatively related to the proportion of equity held by insiders. However, one reason for the 
situation may be the fact that institutions could also serve as an added control structure thus 
necessitating the use of smaller boards and fewer outside directors.  
 
Our results suggest that a firm’s growth opportunities play an insignificant role in explaining 
both the size of the board and its composition. Furthermore, the size of the firm is seen to 
be positively related to the size of the board but insignificantly and negatively related to the 
proportion of outside directors. The findings confirm studies by Pincus et al. (1989) and 
Pearce and Zahra (1992) who indicated that larger firms tend to have larger boards.   
 
With regards to sectoral classifications, using the Breweries as a reference point, our findings 
show that while firms in the Distribution sector operate boards that are smaller in size than 
those in the Petroleum industry, the Banking and Finance sector also uses smaller boards, 
compared to firms in the Petroleum industry. Among all the industries, the firms in the 
Manufacturing sector use the smallest boards. While it is understood that firms in the 
Banking and Finance industry have other regulations and control mechanisms to ensure 
effective governance, and necessitating the use of smaller boards, the rationale behind the 
other sectors may be sectoral competition, development and growth. 
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With the control variables, the age (as a proxy for reputation) of a firm has a negative 
relationship with both the size of the board and the proportion of outside directors. This 
could be explained by the fact that a reputable organization wins the trust and confidence of 
its shareholders and hence requires relatively relaxed checks and balances to ensure that 
shareholders’’ interests are pursued. Again, while the asset structure does not significantly 
impact on these variables, results show that firms that employ debt use large boards. 
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Table 3-3: Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable 
 Board Size  
(Fixed Effect Estimates) 
Board Composition  
(Random Effect Estimates) 
Explanatory variables   
Risk 9.2715 
(2.28)** 
-0.1802 
(-0.42) 
CEO tenure -0.8506 
(-5.07)** 
0.0522 
(2.86)** 
Profitability 0.2360 
(0.27) 
0.1195 
(1.29) 
Institutional Shareholding -0.0055 
(-1.37) 
-0.0016 
(-3.71)** 
Firm growth -0.1840 
(-1.16) 
0.0073 
(0.45) 
Log of firm size 0.8821 
(16.48)** 
-0.0030 
(-0.55) 
Log of firm age -1.0759 
(-7.20)** 
-0.0244 
(-1.50)** 
Asset structure 0.3670 
(0.60) 
0.0673 
(1.06) 
Total debt ratio 1.7378 
(2.97)** 
0.0295 
(0.47) 
   
Manufacturing -0.1411 
(-0.51) 
-0.1086 
(-3.62)** 
Petroleum -0.7402 
(-1.90)** 
0.0036 
(0.08) 
Distribution -1.4852 
(-4.54)** 
-0.0013 
(-0.04) 
Banking and Finance -0.2527 
(-0.71) 
-0.0829 
(-2.16)** 
   
Constant -1.9000 
(-1.80)** 
0.3732 
(3.26)** 
R-squared 0.85 0.15 
No. of obs. 132 132 
Test of probability F(13, 113)= 48.24 [ ]0.0000  Wald Chi2 (13)=60.75 [ ]0.0000  
Hausman test Chi2 (13)=19.10 [ ]0.1202  Chi2 (13)=0.13 [ ]1.0000  
Note: All regressions include a constant. T-statistics are in parenthesis and Probability values in square 
brackets. ** Indicates significance at 5 percent level. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
The issue of what determines the size and composition of a corporate board has engaged the 
attention of both academics and practitioners and remains an ongoing debate. Though, there 
have been attempts to explain this phenomenon, most of the studies have been theoretical in 
nature. This study set out to provide further evidence with an empirical dimension of the 
determinants of board size and composition. Findings of the study confirm that the size and 
composition of a corporate board is a function of firm and sectoral characteristics. 
Specifically, the study finds a positive relationship between firm-level risk and board size. On 
the other hand, it found that firms with longer CEO tenure and reputation employ smaller 
boards. Again, the findings of the study contradict other findings, namely that the longer the 
tenure of the CEO, the smaller the number of outside directors appointed; and also firms 
with heavy institutional shareholding use fewer outside directors. Furthermore, banks are 
seen to rely on smaller boards and fewer outside directors probably as a result of the 
existence of other regulatory mechanisms to ensure good governance in such institutions. 
 
We therefore conclude that the study by and large confirms theoretical expositions that 
board size and composition are affected by firm as well as industry characteristics. We would 
however want to indicate that due to our small sample size, interpretation of findings should 
be with caution.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SHAREHOLDER VALUE  
 
MAXIMISATION: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVEℵ 
 
4.1   Introduction 
 
Corporate governance, defined as measures, processes, structures, and a well-defined line of 
accountability to ensure effective governance and performance of corporate entities, has 
engaged the attention of both academics and practitioners following the East Asian crisis 
and recent accounting scandals in the corporate sector involving corporate giants such as 
Enron and WorldCom. Some of these developments necessitated a closer look at corporate 
governance matters resulting in its dominance in policy agenda in developed market 
economies, especially among very large firms. In Africa, corporate governance is receiving 
the needed attention in recent years, ostensibly due to the poor performance of corporate 
Africa. Thus, corporate governance is attracting the needed debate at both policy making, 
academic and practice levels, (Berglof & von Thadden, 1999). On the continent, South 
Africa has a well developed corporate governance structure comparable to the western 
world. Countries such as Ghana, Nigeria and Kenya have corporate governance of fledging 
nature. In Africa, the establishment of an Institute of Directors (IoD), the existing 
Companies Codes, Stock Market listing rules and regulations and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission work as supplements rather than substitutes and are the basic 
                                                 
ℵ This paper was presented at the 3rd African Finance Journal Conference, Ghana, June 2006 and was  
subsequently published in African Development Review, Vol. 19 (2), pp. 350-367 
 84 
 
channels through which corporate governance issues are addressed. In addition to the above, 
South Africa has the King Reports I and II as another source of reference for corporate 
governance, though it suffers largely from a lack of the necessary legal backing. Within these 
frameworks, issues surrounding disclosure, employee and investor protection, corporate 
social responsibility, insider trading, related party transactions, matters dealing with the 
responsibilities and privileges of boards of directors are outlined. It should be noted that 
there are other bodies that play some supervisory role and ensure adherence to good 
corporate governance practices and ethics in each of these countries.  
 
A considerable amount of research has been undertaken to explore the issue of corporate 
governance and firm performance, among other linkages, though most of these tended to 
focus on large and listed firms in the developed markets. Studies on corporate governance in 
Africa, as mentioned earlier, are few and far between and these studies have largely been case 
studies on country basis focussing on some aspects of firm performance. This study 
focussed on how corporate governance directly affects shareholders and this paper is of an 
empirical nature, exploring the linkage between corporate governance and shareholder value 
maximisation. In focussing on firms from Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa, the 
current study attempts to do a cross-country study by investigating how board characteristics 
and other corporate governance indicators enhance shareholder value in these countries. We 
have therefore moved away from the popular firm performance angle in order to ascertain 
how shareholders’ interest are directly enhanced or otherwise. The strength of this paper lies 
in its focus on highlighting both country and sector specific effects on shareholder value 
maximisation. Findings of the study do not only inform practitioners and academics but also 
contribute meaningfully towards reshaping corporate Africa.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section two reviews the literature and section 
three discusses data and methodological issues. Section four is devoted to empirical findings 
and section five concludes the paper. 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Studies linking law and finance have largely focussed on corporate governance around the 
world and concentrated on differences in legal systems across countries. This line of thinking 
grew out of the finding that laws that protect investors differ significantly across countries 
and legal origins (La Porta et al., 1998). Recent studies have shown that cross-country 
differences in laws and their enforcement affect among others ownership structure, dividend 
payout and market valuations (La Porta et al., 1999, 2000; Claessens et al., 2000; Berkowitz et 
al., 2003; Lombardo & Pagano, 2000). The theoretical framework for corporate governance 
is the agency theory which indicates that the existence of information asymmetry allows 
managers of a corporate entity as agents to pursue objectives that may be at variance with 
those of owners or shareholders (Ross, 1973; Fama, 1980). The agency theory therefore is 
the foundation on which this empirical study is being conducted. Stemming from “The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property” by Berle and Means (1932), corporate governance 
gains its strength from a fundamental agency problem in modern firms where there is a 
separation between management and finance or ownership and control. 
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The principal-agent paradigm scenario normally generates a conflict of interests. This 
conflict of interests between managers, or controlling shareholder, and outside or minority 
shareholders refers to the tendency that the former may be less interested to pursue new 
profitable ventures. 
 
In its initial development, the agency theory was seen as directly applicable to managers and 
equity holders with no explicit recognition of other parties interested in the well-being of a 
firm. This is what is regarded as the shareholder theory and is seen by many as a narrow 
definition in an attempt to address the interests of the various constituents of a corporate 
entity. Other studies thus widened the scope and included not only equity holders but all 
other stakeholders including employees, creditors, governments and others. This approach, 
which seeks to align the interests of managers with that of all interested parties is known as 
the stakeholder theory. John and Senbet (1998) undertook a comprehensive review of 
corporate governance with particular emphasis on the stakeholder theory. In that exercise 
there was the recognition of the fact that a firm has several interested constituencies who 
often have competing interests. For instance, while equity holders would welcome and 
support investment in high yielding but risky projects, such investment would be seen as 
detrimental to the interest of debt holders.  
 
The principal-agent problem is also an essential element of the “incomplete contracts” view 
of the firm developed by Coarse (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Williamson (1975, 1985), Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart (1995). This is because 
the principal-agent problem would not arise if it were possible to write a “complete 
contract”. In this case, the investor and the manager would just sign a contract that specifies 
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ex-ante what the manager does with the funds and how the returns are shared. In addressing 
this problem there has been propositions within both market and non-market mechanisms. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) provide an elaboration on the drawbacks of the market induced 
mechanisms for securing the interests of stakeholders. Thus, there is an emphasis on non-
market mechanisms, corporate governance, to deal with and reduce agency problems in a 
firm. There is a considerable amount of empirical work on using corporate governance 
mechanisms to reduce agency cost and to examine its linkage with firm performance. How 
does shareholder value maximisation fall within this context? 
 
According to the shareholder model, the objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder 
wealth through allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. The criteria by which 
performance is judged in this model can simply be taken as the market value (i.e. shareholder 
value) of the firm. Therefore, managers and directors have an implicit obligation to ensure 
that firms are run in the interests of shareholders.  
 
Shareholder wealth maximisation is a long-term decision and its success largely depends on 
solid value-based management practice. Indeed, it is the basic requirement that companies 
are run in a manner that maximises shareholder wealth. Brealey and Myers (1988), Block and 
Hirt (2000) and others agree that shareholder wealth maximisation should be the overall goal 
of every corporate entity. Shareholder wealth is the sum total value of the company less the 
value attributed to debt holders. Woods and Randall (1989) generally accept shareholder 
wealth as the aggregate market value of the common shares which in turn is assumed to be 
the present value of the cash flows which accrues to shareholders discounted at their 
required rate of return on equity.  
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 Thus, shareholder wealth is the total benefit to shareholders from investing in a company. 
This includes dividends and perhaps more importantly capital appreciation of the 
shareholders’ investments. Maximisation of shareholders’ wealth ensures that shareholders 
are adequately compensated for risk undertaken (Dufrene & Wong, 1996). Admittedly, 
shareholder wealth maximisation is not a one-time occurrence. It involves making conscious 
efforts to grow the resources entrusted to the care of corporate management.  
4.2.2 Empirical Literature 
 
Several empirical studies have provided the nexus between corporate governance and firm 
performance (Yermack, 1996; Claessens et al., 2000; Klapper & Love, 2002; Gompers et al., 
2003; Black et al., 2003 and Sanda et al., 2005), with inconclusive results. The main 
characteristics of corporate governance identified in these studies included board size, board 
composition, and whether the CEO is also the board chairman. 
 
4.2.2.1 Size of the board 
 
Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) have argued that large boards are less effective 
and are easier for a CEO to control.  Raheja (2005) shows that larger boards have higher co-
ordination costs. Also smaller boards reduce the possibility of free riding by individual 
directors and thus increase their decision-making processes – a fact supported by empirical 
research.  For instance, Yermack (1996) shows that for large U.S. industrial corporations, the 
market values firms with smaller boards more highly.  Eisenberg et al. (1998) find a negative 
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relationship between board size and profitability when studying a sample of small and 
midsized Finnish firms. Mak and Yuanto (2003) also confirmed the above findings in firms 
listed in Singapore and Malaysia when they find that firms are highly valued by using board 
membership of five directors; a number considered relatively small in those markets. In a 
Nigerian study, Sanda et al. (2005) find a positive relationship between small-sized boards 
and corporate performance. 
 
4.2.2.2 Board Independence 
 
John and Senbet (1998) show that the independence of a corporate board is measured by the 
number of outside or non-executive directors on the board. Thus, the larger the proportion 
of non-executive directors, the more independent the board is. This variable has produced 
mixed empirical results in research though a number of studies have shown that the 
appointment of non-executive board members enhances firm performance (Brickley & 
James, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994).  Baysinger and 
Butler (1985) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) have also shown that the market rewards 
firms for appointing outside directors.  A general consensus however is that non-executive 
directors are deemed to act as “professional referees” to ensure shareholder value 
maximisation (Fama, 1980). Nonetheless, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and 
Black (2002) find no significant relationship between board independence and performance.  
Yermack (1996) shows that the percentage of outside directors does not significantly affect 
firm performance.  Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) suggest that boards that are expanded for 
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political reasons often result in too many outsiders on the board, and could affect 
performance adversely.  
4.2.2.3 CEO duality 
 
Should a CEO double as a board chairman? Considerable attention has been given to the 
role of boards in monitoring managers and in removing non-performing CEOs.  Jensen 
(1993) voices a concern that a lack of independent leadership makes it difficult for boards to 
respond to failure in top management team.  Fama and Jensen (1983) also argue that 
concentration of decision management and decision control in one individual reduces a 
board’s effectiveness in monitoring top management.  It has been noted though, that when a 
CEO doubles as board chairman, it leads to leadership facing conflict of interests and 
increasing agency costs (Berg & Smith, 1978; Brickley et al., 1997). Largely, studies have 
shown that the separation of the two positions enhances shareholders’ value.  
 
In carrying out this study, we have given due recognition to the fact that corporate 
governance involves a set of complex indicators which face substantial measurement error. 
It would therefore be appropriate to have had a broader set of indicators. However, due 
primarily to data limitations, we have employed governance indicators such as board size, 
board independence, CEO duality, size of audit committee and CEO tenure as our 
governance variables. Unlike previous studies, we focus on examining the impact of 
corporate governance on shareholders’ value maximisation. 
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4.3 Data and Methodological Issues 
4.3.1 Sample and Data 
 
Data used for this study was obtained from 103 listed companies on the Ghanaian, Nigerian, 
Kenyan and South African stock exchanges. Firms were included in the sample on the basis 
of data availability and with due regards to year of operation. Again they are firms that 
responded to the questionnaire administered. They included industrial, manufacturing, 
mining, agricultural and services sectors. In defining what constitutes these sectors, we 
largely depended on the classifications given by the various stock exchanges. We 
acknowledge that there is a possibility of non-uniform classification which could pose a 
problem with regard to the analysis and results. However, we are of the opinion that such 
differences are marginal and thus have little impact on compromising the validity of our 
results. The finance sector is omitted in tandem with studies on corporate governance 
(Faccio and Lasfer, 2000). The data covers the period 1997 to 2001. For the financial data, 
INET-Bridge and the various stock exchange fact books served as the main sources and this 
was supplemented with the administration of a questionnaire for some of the governance 
variables.  
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4.3.2 Variable Description and Justification 
 
Several studies have looked at corporate governance and firm performance and others, to 
some extent, have looked at corporate governance and investor protection by essentially 
looking at legal and accountability issues related to firms (Klapper et al., 2004). While some 
have contended that the creation of value by enhancing the performance of a firm indirectly 
ensures shareholder value maximisation, we counter such argument and advance the point 
that the performance of a firm many not necessarily impact on shareholder wealth. In this 
study, we measure shareholder value by looking at dividend yield as our dependent variable. 
Indeed, the dividend yield is a popular direct measurable benefit that accrue to shareholders. 
We measure dividend yield as the ratio of total dividend pay-out to total historical price 
levels. 
 
1-t
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With regard to the independent and governance variables, we capture the size of the board, 
the independence of the board, whether the CEO doubles as board chairman or otherwise, 
the tenure of the CEO, and the size of the audit committee. We also include both country 
and sector categorical variables to ascertain whether the country and specific sectors have 
any significant impact on shareholder value maximisation.  
 
We measure the size of the board by the number of members on the board. The 
independence of the board is measured by the ratio of non-executive directors to total board 
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size (John & Senbet, 1998). The duality of the CEO is measured as dummy variable with a 
value of 1 when a CEO doubles as board chairman and 0 when two people are entrusted 
with the two responsibilities. The tenure of the CEO is measured by the length of time a 
CEO serves in that capacity. One important variable captured in this study is the size of the 
audit committee. Though studies have recognized the importance of audit committees in a 
corporate governance structure, very little attention seems to have been given to this variable 
and especially to the influence of its size in empirical studies. Due to our recognition of the 
fact that we are inadequately equipped to model shareholder value maximisation, we capture 
firm specific characteristics such as firm size (measured by employee size), asset tangibility 
(measured by ratio of fixed assets to total assets), debt ratio (measured by the ratio of total 
debts to total assets), firm level risk and firm age, as possible control variables. For the 
purposes of regression, we find the natural log of employee size and firm age due to the wide 
variations in these variables at levels. For the purposes of our study, we also measure risk 
(earnings volatility) as the standard deviation of the first difference of the ratio of Earnings 
Before Interests and Taxes (EBIT) to total assets. Thus, 
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4.3.3 Analytical Framework and Empirical Model Specification 
 
Our analysis is carried out within a panel data framework, basically because of its advantage 
of allowing for a broader set of data points. Thus, we specify the basic framework for our 
analysis in the form of the following regression equation: 
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where ( )  and Ni ......,....................1= ( )Tt ,..............................1=  
and is a K-dimensional vector of explanatory variables not including the constant. itx
 
In equation (4), the heterogeneity or individual effect is , where  represents a 
constant term and a set of observable and unobservable variables.  With  containing only 
a constant term, OLS thus provides consistent and efficient estimates of the slope vector 
iz /α iz /
/z
β . 
 
However, if unobserved and correlated with , then the OLS estimators are biased and 
inconsistent due to an omitted variable. Dealing with this situation, we employ either the 
Fixed or Random Effects Estimations technique by carrying out the Hausman specification 
test.  
/z itx
 
4.3.3.1 Empirical Model Specification 
 
We employ a modified version of the model by Wen et al. (2002). The modification of the 
model involves the inclusion of both country and sector categorical variables. This is to 
enable us capture the impact of country and sector specific effects on the dependent 
variables of shareholder wealth. Hence our empirical model is specified as follows: 
 
 95 
 
tiiititi
ti
ti ControlZ
V
D
,2,1,0
,
, εληβββ ++++′+= ,                    9 
           
where,  and  ,5................1;103.............1 == ti
 
titi VD ,,  is a measure of dividend yield for firm i at time t, 0β  is the intercept, is a  
vector of observations on explanatory variables for firm i at time t,  is  
vector of control variables for firm i and time t, 
tiZ ,′
ti,
xk1
xk1k Control
1β and 2β  are a  vector of parameters, 1kx
iη  and iλ  are categorical country and sector specific variables respectively, and ti,ε  is the 
error term. 
4.4 Empirical Findings 
 
4.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4-1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Dividend yield 388 0.085706 0.0971097 7.93e-06 1.102996 
Normalised EPS 388 0.011399 0.0253487 -0.0179616 0.1890727 
Board Size 388 9.224227 3.409779 3 23 
Board Independence 388 0.419022 0.259989 0.05 0.846 
CEO duality 388 0.193299 0.3953953 0 1 
CEO tenure 388 3.510309 1.585593 2 8 
Audit committee size 388 4.146907 1.188474 2 9 
Asset tangibility 388 0.4486696 0.2532175 0.005 0.9986 
Firm risk 388 0.0496657 0.0712374 1.00e-05 0.68973 
Firm age 388 42.13918 23.55106 5 154 
Firm size  388 9873.709 36954.1 20 303098 
SDR 388 0.2917814 0.2146533 0.0013022 0.9159 
LDR 388 0.3722482 0.2076858 0.001 0.8736 
Leverage 388 0.6636894 0.2410705 0.006 0.991 
Note: SDR and TDR are Short-term and Long-term leverage respectively; DPS and EPS are dividend and earnings per 
share respectively. 
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Of the 103 companies, 31 were in the Industrial sector, 25 in the Manufacturing sector, 24 in 
the Mining sector, 10 in the Agricultural sector, and 13 in the Services sector. These 
companies were unevenly distributed across countries, with South Africa and Nigeria 
contributing the largest share. Most of the mining companies were in the South African 
sample. The mean dividend yield of 0.085706 and that of earnings per share of 0.011399 
shows the impact interest and taxes have on firms’ profits. This is supported by the 
minimum and maximum values. The size of corporate boards in our sample is highly 
dispersed considering the minimum of 3 and a maximum of 23 board members. This is also 
supported by a high standard deviation of about 3.41. Again, there is a high variation 
between and within firms with regard to board size; most of the firms in our sample operate 
with a board size of about nine members. The descriptive statistics show that most of the 
boards in the sample have more executive directors than non-executive directors. This is 
shown by a mean value of 0.42, suggesting that about 42 percent of all boards are made up 
of non-executive directors. This means that corporate boards in these countries are less 
independent John and Senbet (1998). However, some are very independent with about 84.6 
percent of the members being non-executive. At the tip of most governance structures in the 
sample, there is a clear separation between the person occupying the position of chairman of 
the board from the person occupying the position of CEO. The mean value of about 19 
percent indicates that of the 103 firms, just about 19 percent have both CEO and board 
chairman positions embedded in one person. These CEOs serve a term ranging between two 
and eight years with most of them serving a term of about three-and-a-half years. All the 
sampled firms have audit committees in place with a mean size of about four members and a 
minimum and maximum size of two and nine members respectively. Most of the firms have 
a relative balance between current and fixed assets with a mean value of about 45 percent 
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representing asset tangibility and most of the firms have been operating for about 42 years. 
However, there is wide variation between the ages of these firms, with minimum and 
maximum operational years of five and a hundred and fifty-four respectively. Using the 
number of employees as a proxy for firm size, there is wide variation between and within 
firms. While, the smallest firm has 20 employees; the largest has over 300,000 employees. 
Most of these firms are heavily dependent on debt as a source of finance for their operations 
as against equity and this is driven by long-term debt rather than short-term debt. 
4.4.2 Discussion of Regression Results 
 
General regression 
 
The regression results in Table 4-2 show the interaction between the dependent and 
independent variables. The results show that the size of a board enhances shareholder value 
maximisation and leads to higher dividend yield. This is rather contrary to studies by Jensen 
(1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992), Mak and Yuanto (2003), Yermack (1996), Eisenberg et al. 
(1998) and Sanda et al. (2005). However, it could be explained that the presence of large 
board sizes affords corporate entities the opportunity to enjoy the depth and experience a 
large pool could bring to bear on its operations. This inevitably enhances firms’ performance 
and promotes shareholder value maximisation.  Results concerning the independence of the 
board shows that it is negatively related to dividend yield contradicting studies by Rosenstein 
and Wyatt (1990), Weisbach (1988), Byrd and Hickman (1992), Brickley et al. (1994), 
Baysinger and Butler (1985), and Brickley and James (1987) who showed that the 
independence of the board enhances a firm’s worth and shareholder value. However, studies 
by others such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black (2002), Yermack (1996) 
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found no significant relationship between a board’s independence and shareholders’ value. 
Again, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) have indicated that a board that is increased for political 
reasons leads to many outsiders being appointed, but this does not enhance performance. 
We should point out at this stage that with the exception of South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, 
and Nigeria are at the lower ebb of development with governments owning huge shares in 
many corporate entities. In tandem with theory and other empirical findings, a situation 
where a CEO serves as a board chairman leads to greater conflict of interest and higher 
agency cost resulting in lower firm and shareholder value (Berg & Smith, 1978; Brickley et al., 
1997; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Sanda et al., 2005). Indeed, Fama and Jensen (1983) point out 
that the concentration of decision management and decision control in one individual 
reduces a board’s effectiveness in monitoring top management and has a negative impact on 
firm and shareholder value. The CEO tenure also has a negative impact on firm and 
shareholder value. Though surprising, studies have shown that when a CEO holds tenure for 
a longer period, most of the time is spent on achieving personal objectives and on empire 
building for personal satisfaction and entrenchment rather than using time for productive 
purposes (Abor, 2006). Our findings also show that larger audit committees have adverse 
effects on shareholder value. This is due to increased co-ordination and problem processing 
costs as well as the possibility of free riding by other members. The control variables largely 
showed the expected signs. However, the age of a firm as proxy for reputation surprisingly 
showed a negative effect on shareholder value maximisation.   
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Table 4-2: Regression Results (Random Effects Estimates)  
 Dependent Variable 
 Dividend Yield 
Regressors  
Board size 0.0070861 
(2.98)** 
Board independence -0.0597712 
(-2.59)** 
CEO duality -0.0300516 
(-2.22)** 
CEO tenure 0.0058782 
(  1.68) 
Size of Audit committee -0.011076 
(-1.60) 
Firm level risk -0.0653713 
(-0.94) 
Asset tangibility 0.0633562 
(3.26)** 
Leverage -0.0136886 
(-0.58) 
Log of size -0.0002731 
(-0.07) 
Log of age -0.019529 
(-2.07)** 
Constant 0.0656252 
(1.43) 
R-squared 0.9580 
No. of observations 388 
Test of Probability Wald Chi2(10)=34.78 [ ]0001.0  
Hausman test Chi2 (10) = 0.00 [ ]0000.1  
Note: All regression includes a constant. T-statistics are in parenthesis and Probability values are in square 
brackets. ** indicates significance at 5 percent level. 
 
 
Sector Specific Effects 
 
Table 4-3 presents a categorical regression model run to ascertain the effect of specific 
sectors on shareholder value maximisation. In our model, we use the industrial sector as the 
reference point to which all other sectors are compared. Our results show that the mining 
sector pays a higher dividend compared to the industrial sector. This conforms to empirical 
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evidence that the mining sector is associated with relatively higher profits and thus is in a 
position to give more to shareholders in the form of cash dividends. Following closely are 
the Agriculture and Services sectors which also appear to be paying a higher dividend to its 
shareholders relative to the Industrial sector. However, the results are not significant. The 
Manufacturing sector on the other hand is seen to be paying less to its shareholders in terms 
of dividend compared to the industrial sector.   
 
Table 4-3: Regression Results Sector Specific Effects Random Effects Estimates)  
 Dependent variable 
 Dividend Yield  
Agriculture 0.0110 
(0.68) 
Manufacturing -0.0033 
(-0.26) 
Mining 0.1145 
(5.36)** 
Services 0.0071 
(0.47) 
Constant 0.1445 
(3.01)** 
R-squared 0.57 
No. of observations 388 
Test of probability Wald Chi2(4)=68.66 [ ]00000.  
Note: All regression includes a constant. T-statistics are in parenthesis and Probability values are in square brackets. ** 
indicates significance at 5 percent level. 
 
 
Country Specific Effects 
 
With the obvious differences in development levels of the countries in our study, we decided 
to ascertain whether there is any country specific impact on shareholder value maximisation. 
In doing this, we used South Africa as the reference point as it is the most developed. The 
results are presented in Table 4-4. The results show that Ghana ranks higher in the payment 
of dividend yield and is closely followed by Kenya and Nigeria, respectively. These countries 
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appear to be paying a higher dividend yield than South Africa. This is in tandem with finance 
theory of the relationship between risk and returns. The results thus, suggest that South 
Africa has relatively lower country specific risk as compared to the other countries.  
Table 4-4: Regression Results Country Specific Effects  
 Dependent variable 
 Dividend Yield 
Ghana 0.1318 
(5.02)** 
Nigeria 0.0834 
(3.44)** 
Kenya 0.0979 
(3.48)** 
Constant -0.1560 
(-2.47)** 
R-squared 0.93 
No. of observations 388 
Test of probability Wald Chi2(4)=64.62 [ ]00000.  
Note: All regression includes a constant. T-statistics are in parenthesis and Probability values are in square 
brackets. ** indicates significance at 5 percent level. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Corporate governance has been identified as one of the key elements that impact an entity’s 
performance. Though some studies have investigated the linkage between corporate 
governance and firm performance, this study examined corporate governance and its impact 
on shareholder value maximisation especially within the African context on selected African 
countries. Results showed that, though highly dispersed both within and between firms, 
most firms in the sample make use of boards of nine members and that corporate boards in 
the sample are relatively less independent. The regression results, contrary to expectations, 
showed that large board sizes enhance shareholder value maximisation. The independence of 
corporate boards rather had a negative effect on shareholder value maximization while 
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having a CEO serving a dual role as board chairman was identified to increase agency cost 
thereby having a negative impact on shareholders wealth. The results confirm previous 
studies that indicate that having a CEO serve for a longer term has an adverse effect on 
corporate wealth and shareholder value due essentially to productive time being wasted on 
empire building and the pursuance of personal objectives.  
 
Our study also showed that both sector and country specific effects impact shareholder 
value maximisation. The mining sector is seen as dominant in the payment of a higher 
dividend yield. The study finally showed that shareholder value maximisation is also 
dependent on the level of country specific risk – with countries with low risk paying less 
cash dividend and vice versa in tandem with risk-return configuration in finance theory. The 
foregoing analysis induces us to recommend that it is imperative for stakeholders to 
recognise the critical role of corporate governance in maximising shareholders’ value and 
thus work in harmony to promote efficient structures in corporate entities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING CHOICES OF FIRMS IN 
KENYA:  A PANEL DATA ANALYSISℵ 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The concept of corporate governance has been mostly applicable in developed markets and 
essentially to large and listed firms. In recent times, however, the term is on the development 
agenda of many developing economies due to the realisation that corporate governance is 
important for the promotion of sustained growth as it boosts the bottom line. Corporate 
governance has two meanings. It firstly refers to the relationship between a firm and its 
stakeholders, including shareholders, employees, creditors, competitors, consumers, etc. In 
the second definition, corporate governance is seen as signifying the mechanism for 
checking and monitoring the behaviour of top management due to separation of ownership 
and control. Thus, corporate governance refers to the clear establishment of how an 
organisation ought to be run and controlled and ensure accountability on the part of 
management towards owners. Studies have shown that corporate governance enhances 
performance (Gompers et al., 2003; Claessen et al., 2003). 
 
The question we are trying to answer in this study concerns whether there is any relationship 
between how an organisation is governed and its financing decisions or capital structure 
using data from Kenya. After the much cited seminal work by Modigliani and Miller (M&M) 
                                                 
ℵ This paper has been published by the South African Journal of Economics (SAJE), Vol. 74(4), pp.670-681  
 
   The paper was also presented at the SAFA Conference, University of Cape Town, in January 2006 
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in 1958 on capital structure, a host of further studies have been conducted in the area of 
capital structure. This has resulted in a number of both theoretical and empirical research 
projects. A segment of this vast research has concentrated on the determination of the 
explanatory factors of capital structure. We could query whether the issue of capital structure 
or financing decisions has any relevance in the study of corporate finance.  It must be noted 
that a critical decision that confronts every corporate entity is the nature of its capital 
structure. In this view, a firm must decide between equity and debt according to Glenn and 
Pinto (1994). At present, only a very scanty study of the link between corporate governance 
and financing decisions of firms has been undertaken, especially in Africa. Studies by Berger 
et al. (1997), Friend and Lang (1988), Wen et al. (2002), and Abor (2006) have provided some 
link between corporate governance and financing decisions of firms. While the other three 
studies looked at the issue from a relatively developed market perspective, Abor’s study 
considered SMEs in Ghana. 
 
This study therefore looks at the issue of corporate governance and its relationship with the 
financing decisions of firms. It is necessitated by the fact that there have not been enough 
studies in the area especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. Hence, by using panel data from 47 
firms listed on the Nairobi Stock Exchange covering the five-year period of 1999-2003, the 
study adds to the current literature on governance and financing decisions of firms in Africa 
especially since no study of this nature has been done in Kenya.  
 
The organisation of the rest of the paper is as follows: Section two deals with both 
theoretical and empirical literature by way of a literature review; Section three looks at 
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methodology, data, and variable description; Section four discusses empirical findings, and 
Section five draws conclusion emanating from the study findings. 
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Theoretical Literature 
 
Corporate governance has been defined variously by various authors. Metrick and Ishii 
(2002) define corporate governance from the perspective of the investor as “both the 
promise to repay a fair return on capital invested and the commitment to operate a firm, 
efficiently given investment”. This definition simply suggests that the nature of the 
governance structure of a firm has an impact on the firm’s ability to access the capital 
market. The Cadbury Committee (1992) defines corporate governance as “the system by 
which companies are directed and controlled”. Mayer (1997) sees corporate governance as 
concerning ways of bringing the interests of investors and managers into line and ensuring 
that firms are run for the benefit of investors. Corporate governance is concerned with the 
relationship between the internal governance mechanisms of corporations and society’s 
conception of the scope of corporate accountability (Deakin & Hughes, 1997). Furthermore, 
it has been defined by Keasey et al. (1997) to include “the structures, processes, cultures and 
systems that engender the successful operation of organisations”. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
have described corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return to their investment”. Thus, corporate 
governance could be summarized as the processes, measures and established line of 
responsibility and accountability a company puts in place to ensure that the organisation 
does well regarding financing and performance. 
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Previous studies on financing decisions have largely been based on famous capital structure 
theories such as the tax-based theory, the signalling theory and the agency theory. The tax-
based theory suggests that firms choose their debt-equity ratio by trading-off the benefits 
from tax reduction on interest payments against the potential costs of financial distress 
owing to the accumulation of more debt. Yet, in firms where individuals who supply capital 
do not run the firms themselves, there comes to the fore two types of information 
asymmetry problems. The first results from adverse selection because the controlling 
managers may have access to information that is not known to the outside investors. Under 
such circumstances, the method of financing can serve as a signal to outside investors of the 
possibility of the existence of new investment avenues or otherwise to the firm. Therefore 
the existence of information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders results in firms 
having a financial hierarchy in which retained earnings are used first and the firms gradually 
moves downwards to risk-less debt when internal funds run out – the pecking order theory. 
It has also been argued that equity is only issued when firms do not have debt capacity, 
according to Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984). 
 
Another problem that emanates from information asymmetry is the principal-agent conflict 
referred to as the agency cost. It is the presence of moral hazard in the firm that leads to the 
conflict called agency cost of equity. In such instances, managers may pursue their own 
interests against the interests of shareholders. One way to deal with this agency problem is to 
employ debt financing as a disciplining tool on managers (Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990). It must 
however be indicated that debt financing creates other agency costs in its wake. Thus, the 
decision to employ either debt or equity for financing the operations of a firm is a critical 
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issue. In this study we are attempting to find out the role of corporate governance in this 
important decision.  
5.2.2 Empirical Literature 
 
There have been some studies that link corporate governance and financing decisions of 
firms. For instance, Berger et al. (1997), Friend and Lang (1988), Wen et al. (2002), and Abor 
(2006), showed that the nature of corporate governance in a firm has an influence on the 
financing decisions of firms. The main corporate governance characteristics that have been 
identified as impacting on financing decisions of firms include board size, board 
composition, CEO duality, tenure of the CEO, and CEO compensation. The empirical 
literature on governance and capital structure so far, though scanty, show varied results and 
seem largely inconclusive.  
 
The board of any corporate entity is the highest decision-making body entrusted with the 
responsibility of ensuring that the firm operates efficiently and competitively. The board’s 
size, measured by the number of people that constitute the board has a significant 
relationship with the financing decision of a firm according to Pfeffer and Selancick (1978) 
and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). Berger et al. (1997) showed that firms with larger boards tend 
to have low leverage or rather concentrate on equity financing. The underlying principle is 
that a large board inevitably translates into coercion from the board on managers to rather 
depend on less debt to enhance firm performance. A critical issue raised by Jensen (1986) is 
that firms with a high leverage or debt ratio have larger boards. This twist introduces an 
issue of causality. The question relates to whether firms resort to high leverage because they 
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have larger boards or whether they increase board size because they are highly leveraged. 
Studies into this dimension are largely non-existent. However, empirical results from China 
by Wen et al. (2002), and by Abor in Ghana (2006) point to a positive relationship between 
board size and leverage. These findings presuppose that large boards which are relatively 
more entrenched due to monitoring by regulatory bodies, target higher leverage to enhance 
corporate value. It could also be due to the difficulty of arriving at consensus in decision-
making. Such a scenario has the tendency of weakening corporate governance, leading to 
dependence on high leverage. Furthermore, Anderson et al. (2004) point out that the cost of 
debt is lower for larger boards probably due to the fact that creditors view these firms as 
essentially having in place effective monitoring mechanisms. 
 
The nature of the relationship between board composition (measured by the proportion 
non-executive directors of the board) and capital structure is indeterminate. From the 
resource dependence approach propounded by Pfeffer (1973) and Pfeffer and Salancick 
(1978) it is advanced that when a firm has more external directors it enhances the firm’s 
ability to protect itself against the external environment and uncertainties among others. This 
increases the ability of the firm to raise funds or increase its value. Thus, a higher proportion 
of non-executive directors is associated with higher leverage. While Wen et al. (2002) found a 
negative relationship between proportion of outside directors and leverage (Abor, 2006; 
Berger et al., 1997) on the other hand show that firms with more outside directors tend to be 
highly leveraged consistent with the resource dependence theory.  
 
Studies have also shown that the nature of board structure (CEO duality) also has a 
relationship with the financing decisions of a firm. In this case, research have centred on 1-
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tier and 2-tier board structures. A firm is said to have a 1-tier board structure if the CEO 
also serves as the board chairman. On the other hand, in a situation where the CEO and 
Chairman positions are occupied by two distinct individuals, the firm is said to have a 2-tier 
board structure in place. In the single tier board structure typology, it is deemed that the two 
critical issues of decision management and control are vested in the same individual. This has 
however, been deemed inappropriate (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Fama and Jensen (1983) 
defined decision management as the right invested in a CEO to initiate and implement new 
proposals warranting expenditure of the firm’s resources, and decision control comprises the 
right to ratify and monitor those proposals. Hence there exists a conflict of interests and 
higher agency cost if these are done by the same individual signalling the lack of separation 
of “decision management and decision control”. Forsberg (2004) has shown that a 2-tier 
board typology is characterised by a higher leverage or debt equity ratio compared to a 1-tier 
leadership scenario. Abor (2006) in a Ghanaian study however, found a negative relationship 
between 2-tier board structure and leverage.  
 
CEO tenure and compensation are other governance characteristics that have an impact on 
the financing decisions of firms. Tenure refers to the number of years a CEO serves and it 
has been empirically identified as having a negative relationship with leverage or debt ratio of 
firms (Berger et al., 1997; Wen et al., 2002). This is because entrenched CEOs (with relatively 
longer tenure in office) prefer low leverage to reduce the performance pressures associated 
with high debt. On the other hand, CEOs with fixed attractive compensation have the 
tendency of pursuing lower leverage ostensibly to reduce the financial risk associated with 
debt so as to keep their jobs and enjoy the attractive compensation (Stulz, 1988; Harris & 
Raviv, 1988). Evidence from empirical studies on the contrary, has produced mixed results. 
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For instance, Jensen & Meckling (1976); Leland & Pyle, (1977); and Berger et al, (1997), 
showed a positive association between the CEO’s compensation and a firm’s debt ratio, 
while Wen et al. (2002), Friend and Hasbrouck (1988), and Friend and Lang (1988), found a 
negative relationship between compensation and leverage.  
5.3 Data and Methodological Issues 
5.3.1 Variable Description 
 
Data for the study is obtained from forty-seven companies listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange in the five-year period covering 1999 and 2003. For the dependent variable, we 
use the firm’s debt ratio measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets (LEV=Leverage). 
For a deeper understanding of further relationships, we break down leverage into short-term 
leverage (STL) and long-term leverage (LTL), and these are measured as the ratio of short-
term debts and long-term debts to assets respectively. Regarding the independent variables, 
we employ Board size (BDS) measured by the number of board members; Board 
composition (BDC) measured by the ratio of non-executive board members to board size as 
a measure of board independence, and CEO duality (CEO) is a dummy (equal to unity when 
a CEO serves as board chairman and zero, otherwise). CEO tenure and compensation were 
not disclosed by the firms. Due to model specification inadequacy, we include some standard 
determinants of capital structure as control variables. These include profitability, firm risk, 
firm size, firm age and firm growth opportunity. We measure profitability as return on assets 
(ROA) captured by the ratio of EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes) to total assets; firm 
size (SZE) is measured by using net total assets; CIN is firm’s growth rate and is measured 
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by the annual rate of change in turnover (i.e. ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −
−
−
1
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tt
TurnOver
TurnOverTurnOver
); age (AGE) is 
measured by the number of years of operation, using the year of incorporation as the 
reference; and firm risk (RSK) is measured by earnings variability.   
 
5.3.2 Analytical Framework and Empirical Model Specification  
 
Our analysis is carried out within the panel data framework due basically to its advantage of 
allowing for a broader set of data points. Thus, we specify the basic framework for our 
analysis in the form of the following regression equation: 
 
ititit izxY εαβ ++= //                                                   1  
 
where ( )  and Ni ......,....................1= ( )Tt ,..............................1=  
and  is a K-dimensional vector of explanatory variables not including the constant. itx
 
In equation (1), the heterogeneity or individual effect is , where  represents a 
constant term and a set of observable and unobservable variables.  With  containing only 
a constant term, OLS thus provides consistent and efficient estimates of the common and 
the slope vector
iz /α iz /
/z
β . 
 
However, if  is unobserved and correlated with , then the OLS estimators are biased 
and inconsistent, due to an omitted variable. In dealing with this situation, it is 
/z itx
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recommended to employ either the fixed or random effects models. The fixed effect is 
specified as shown in the following equation: 
 
itiitit xy εαβ ++=  ,                   2 
 
where  and captures all the observable effects and specifies an estimable 
conditional mean. Since the fixed effects is not time variant and therefore non-stochastic, we 
consider the random effects which operates on the assumption that the individual 
unobserved heterogeneity formulated is uncorrelated with the included variables, as shown 
in the following equation: 
ii z
/αα =
 
( ) ( )[ ] itiiititit zEzzExy εααβ +−++= ////  ,                3 
 
which could be reduced to the form 
 
ititit xy εαβ ++= / ∗                                       4 
 
This is a linear regression model with a compound disturbance that may be consistently 
estimated by least squares. Thus, the use of either the fixed or random effect technique is 
dependent on the behaviour of the components of the error term (equation 5):  
 
itiit νμε +=                     5 
                                                 
∗ (See Verbeek, M., 2004. A guide to modern econometrics) 
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5.3.3 Empirical Model Specification 
 
From the above, our model is based on that of Wen et al. (2002) with some modifications. 
The modification of the model involved the inclusion of other standard capital structure 
variables that are not captured in the model used by Wen et al. (2002). Hence the model is 
specified as follows: 
 
itititit XGY l++= 10 αα  ,                 6 
 
where is the dependent variable (leverage) measured by the ratio of debt to assets.  is a 
vector of governance characteristics;  is a vector of standard capital structure variables 
serving as control, and  is the error term. Thus,  captures short-term leverage, long-
term leverage, and total leverage; G captures Board size, Board composition and CEO 
duality as a measure of corporate governance. With short-term leverage, we are referring to 
debt obligations with a maturity period of one year or less and long-term leverage comprises 
debt obligations with a maturity period that expands beyond one year. 
itY itG
itX
it
itl itY
 
5.3.4 Estimation Issues 
 
The most basic estimator of panel data sets is the pooled OLS.  In the simplest case, in 
which there are no firm specific and time specific effects, the ordinary least square is the 
most appropriate.  Johnston and DiNardo (1997) recall that the pooled OLS estimators 
ignore the panel structure of the data, treats observations as being serially uncorrelated for a 
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given firm, with homoscedastic errors across individuals and time periods. A more 
appropriate approach is therefore to estimate the model using panel data techniques.  In 
estimating our model, unobservable effects could be accommodated using one of two 
techniques. To reduce the number of parameters to be estimated, it is possible to justify 
treating the individual fixed effects as being drawn from some distribution. The parameters 
of this distribution then become parameters to be estimated with the unobservable effects 
included in the error term. The variance-covariance matrix of the resulting non-spherical 
errors is transformed to obtain consistent estimates of the standard errors. In this case, the 
random effects estimator is the most appropriate (Hsiao, 1989).   
 
However, a problem arises with the random effects estimator if the unobservable effects, 
which have been included in the error term, are correlated with some or all of the regressors.  
This simultaneity makes the random effects estimator inconsistent. As a consistent 
alternative to the random effects estimator, a dummy variable could be included for each 
firm. This estimation approach, known as fixed effects, yields consistent estimates regardless 
of correlation between firm specific error components and the regressors. However, it is less 
efficient than the random effects estimator. The inefficiency arises because the fixed effects 
estimator requires a separate parameter to be estimated for each firm in the sample in place 
of the single variance estimate that is required for the random effects estimator. 
5.3.5 Choosing between Random or Fixed Effects Technique 
 
Hausman (1978) suggested a test to check whether the individual effects are correlated with 
the regressors. Under the null hypothesis of orthogonality, that is, no correlation between 
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individual effects and explanatory variables, both random effects and fixed effects estimators 
are consistent, but the random effect estimator is efficient, while the fixed effects is not.  
Under the alternative hypothesis that individual effects are correlated with the regressors, the 
random effects estimator is inconsistent, while the fixed effects estimator is consistent and 
efficient.  
 
In addressing this problem, Greene (1997) recalls that, under the null hypothesis, the 
estimates should not differ systematically.  Thus, our test is based on a contrast vector H: 
 
H= [bGLS-bw]´[V(bw)-V(bGLS)]-1[bGLS-bw] ,                            7  
 
where H is approximately chi-squared distributed with k degrees of freedom and k is the 
number of regressors excluding the constant. Thus, in carrying out our regression, we test 
the hypothesis that there is no correlation between individual effects and the explanatory 
variables using our baseline model and the results of the Hausman specification test reported 
in subsequent tables. 
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5.4   Empirical Findings 
5.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5-1: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable   Mean  Std. Dev. Min.  Max  Obs. 
 
BDS Overall  7.8066  2.6188  3  13  N=212 
 Between    2.6720  3  13  n=47 
 Within    0  7.8066  7.8066  T=4.5 
BDC Overall  0.177089  0.1274265 0  0.71248  N=212 
 Between    0.1264454 0  0.71428  n=47 
 Within    0  0.17779 0.17779   T=4.5 
CEO Overall  0.1698113 0.3763556 0  1  N=212 
 Between    0.3798826 0  1  n=47 
 Within    0  0.1698113 0.1698113 T=4.5 
ROA  Overall  0.0815525 0.5648411 -2.3421  7.73582  N=212 
 Between    0.2510516 -0.460781 1.542153  n=47 
 Within    0.5011093 -1.799766 6.275219  T=4.5 
STL Overall  0.4049035 0.2900415 0.010087  0.9975  N=212 
 Between    0.0482773 0.3663556 0.489746  n=47 
 Within    0.2876244 0.0049418 0.982267  T=4.5 
LTL Overall  0.7875697 0.680053  0.00125  5.5357  N=212 
 Between    0.1072186 0.5859774 0.8661719 n=47  
 Within    0.68233289 0.0558261 5.547257  T=4.5 
LEV Overall  1.192473  0.6553353 0.011337  6.22716  N=212 
 Between    0.5169143 0.739418  4.451647  n=47 
 Within    0.3766239 -2.497145 3.607903  T=4.5 
AGE Overall  57.00472  26.12683  8  152  N=212 
 Between    25.89469  8  152  n=47  
 Within    0.4072797 55.00472  59.00472  T=4.5 
SZE Overall  3.55e+07 3.71e+08 45254  5.40e+09 N=212 
 Between    1.65+08  50968.6  1.14e+09 n=47 
 Within    3.29e+09 -1.04e+09 4.30e+09 T=4.5 
RSK Overall  0.3980358 0.2879798 0.00002  1.2266  N=212 
 Between    0.205919  0.006647  0.706139  n=47 
 Within    0.1996487 -0.2164381 1.016036  T=4.5 
CIN Overall  0.6279688 7.677573  -7.4965  111.1172  N=212 
 Between    1.076828  -0.1031588 2.483807  n=47 
 Within    7.61165  -6.765372 109.2614  T=4.5 
N refers to overall panel observations (nXT), n is the cross-sectional observations (firms), T is the time frame. 
 
 
The mean board size is about eight with the minimum and maximum being three and 
thirteen respectively. There is also some amount of variation in this ratio across the cross-
section of firms as seen in the standard deviation between the cross-sections.  
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With board composition, the mean ratio of 17.7% suggests that more insiders serve on these 
boards than outsiders. This also suggests that these boards are relatively less independent.  
However, the minimum and maximum of 0 and 71.2% respectively are indications of some 
of the boards being more independent. On average, 17% of the boards are 1-tier board 
structures, meaning that about 83% of the firms have the critical roles of decision-taking and 
decision-management embedded in two individual, which augurs well for firm management. 
The standard deviation of 0.38 between cross-sections shows that these firms are widely 
dispersed with regard to CEO duality. Most of the firms are doing well with regard to 
profitability. It is evident that a large number of the firms are highly leveraged and most of 
them depend on long-term rather than short-term leverage, and these firms, on average, 
have been operating for the past 57 years. Furthermore, most of these firms are considered 
relatively risky, as shown by their average earning variability of 40%, though the minimum 
risk measured is 0.00002.  
5.4.2 Discussion of Regression Results 
 
In Table 5-2, the results of the Hausman specification test do not allow us to reject the null 
hypothesis that the difference in coefficients is not systematic. Given such results, the 
preferred model is the Random-effects GLS because it is consistent and efficient. 
 
The study shows a positive correlation between short-term and long-term debts and total 
leverage and corporate board size, contradicting the findings of Berger et al. (1997) who 
showed that firms with large boards employ less leverage. The positive relationship between 
the board size and leverage suggests that larger boards employ high debt policy to raise 
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corporate value. This may be due to the apparent lack of consensus building due to the size 
of the board resulting in weaker corporate governance. This is consistent with studies by 
Jensen (1986), Wen et al. (2002) and Abor (2006), thereby confirming the argument by 
Anderson et al. (2004) that the cost of debt is lower for larger boards probably due to the 
fact that creditors view these firms as essentially having effective monitoring of their 
operations. Again, this may be due to the fact that large boards, which are relatively more 
entrenched due to monitoring by regulatory bodies, target higher leverage to enhance 
corporate value. 
 
The results of the study show that the independence of the board achieved through the 
appointment of more outside directors is negatively related to short-term leverage but 
positively related to long-term and total leverage. While the relationship between short-term 
leverage and the independence of the board contradicts other studies, the positive 
relationship between board independence and both long-term and total leverage confirm 
earlier findings by Jensen (1986) and Berger et al. (1997) that firms with higher leverage tend 
to have more outside directors which also supports the argument by Pfeffer (1973) and 
Pfeffer and Salancick (1978). They showed that when a firm has more external directors, it 
enhances the firm’s ability to protect itself against external environmental uncertainties 
among others, and this increases the ability of the firm to raise funds or increase its value. It 
must however be pointed out that board independence is insignificant in explaining both 
long-term and total leverage.  
 
The study shows that agency costs rise when a CEO serves as board chairman and this 
discourages lenders to invest in such entities leading to a lower leverage ratio. The finding of 
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the study is consistent with earlier findings by Forsberg (2004) that a two tier leadership 
structure results in a higher debt/equity ratio. Though the study shows that it has a positive 
impact on long-term leverage when a CEO serves as board chairman, the result is not 
significant. The result for short-term leverage is highly significant compared to total leverage 
buttressing the argument that one person occupying the two positions leads to conflict of 
interests and higher agency costs thereby discouraging investors. 
 
The control variables in the regression also showed signs that are consistent with standard 
capital structure theories. Firms that generate internal funds largely tend to avoid employing 
more debt. This is basically because while profitable entities may have better access to debt 
finance, the demand for debt finance may probably be lower if retained earnings are 
adequate to finance new investments according to the pecking order theory. The negative 
effect of risk means that below-average performers tend to be less leveraged. That is, firms 
with more risk exposure tend to control risk by reducing financial risks and therefore employ 
less debt. This is due to the fact that such firms find it difficult to sustain financial risk. Age, 
as a measure of reputation, is also positively related to short-term leverage but insignificant 
in determining both long-term and total leverage. However, evidence concerning the size of 
the firm appears to be inconclusive in determining a firm’s leverage. While, it is positively 
related to short-term leverage, it is negatively and significantly related to both long-term and 
total leverage. This is because large firms are more diversified and thus are capable of 
employing higher leverage. Again, lenders are more willing to support large firms because of 
the perception of the existence of lower risk levels as against small ones. However, the 
findings of the study suggest that firms with capacity to employ debt may use less debt 
primarily as a result of their ability to generate enough internal funds as shown by the 
 129 
 
 130 
 
profitability and risk variables. Surprisingly, firm growth rate does not influence a firm’s 
ability to employ debt irrespective of the maturity period. 
Table 5-2: Regression Results (Random Effects Estimation) 
 DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Variable Short-term Leverage 
(Random Effect Estimation) 
Long-term Leverage 
(Random Effect Estimation) 
Leverage (Total) 
(Random Effect Estimation) 
 Model 1 
 
Model 2  Model 1 Model 2 
Board size 0.024877 
(2.64)** 
0.0230226 
(2.20)** 
0.024663 
(0.91) 
0.04954 
(1.91)** 
0.0488461 
(1.93)** 
Board independence -0.2768097 
(-1.95)** 
-0.3465926 
(-2.17)** 
0.5654548 
(1.38) 
0.2886452 
(0.74) 
0.2318657 
(0.60) 
CEO duality -0.1785673 
(-4.02)** 
 0.0154349 
(0.12) 
-0.1631324 
(-1.34) 
-0.1656613 
(-1.36) 
Firm growth rate -0.000103 
(-0.47) 
-4.46e-06 
(0.18) 
0.0000383 
(0.60) 
0.0000281 
(0.47) 
-0.1233908 
(-1.50)** 
Profitability -0.1129504 
(-3.75)** 
 -0.0061427 
(-0.07) 
-0.1190931 
(-1.44) 
 
Risk -0.3587314 
(-6.09)** 
 -0.0537259 
(-0.32) 
-0.4124573 
(-2.55)** 
-0.3953801 
(-2.48)** 
Log of firm age 0.0400735 
(1.19) 
0.0613251 
(1.62)** 
-0.1346571 
(-1.38) 
-0.0945836 
(-1.02) 
 
Log of firm size 0.0150849 
(1.07) 
0.023782 
(1.60)** 
-0.0931517 
(-2.28)** 
-0.0780668 
(-2.01)** 
-0.0789078 
(-2.11)** 
Constant 0.0589993 
(0.28) 
-0.3111427 
(-1.45) 
2.434692 
(4.02)** 
2.493692 
(4.33)** 
2.142358 
(4.43)** 
R-squared 0.67 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.12 
No. of Obs. 212 212 212 212 212 
Test of probability Wald Chi2 (8)=118.54 [ ]0000.0  Wald Chi2 (5)=44.93 [ ]0000.0  Wald Chi2 (8)=13.56 [ ]0940.0  Wald Chi2 (8)=14.93 [ ]0606.0  Wald Chi2 (6)=13.68 [ ]0334.0  
Hausman test Chi2 (8) = 1.66 [ ]9897.0  Chi2 (5)=3.27 [ ]6579.0  Chi2 (8)=2.40 [ ]9664.0  Chi2 (8)=1.26 [ ]9960.0  Chi 2 (6)=1.05 [ ]9837.0   
Notes: All regressions include a constant. T-statistics are in parenthesis and Probability values in square brackets. ** indicate significance at 5 percent level 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
Corporate governance refers to how corporate entities ought to be run, directed and controlled. 
It is believed that better corporate governance enhances a firm’s profile through better access to 
finance, lower cost of capital, better performance and preferential treatment from all 
stakeholders. Of critical importance is the fact that the concept of corporate governance has 
come to dominate the policy agenda of most developing nations primarily because it has been 
noted to ensure sustained growth and partly due to the East Asia crisis and the relative lack of 
corporate governance mechanisms on the African continent. The study looked at corporate 
governance and its relationship with the financing choices of firms by using data from forty-
seven listed firms on the Nairobi Stock Exchange covering the period 1999 to 2003. The 
Random-Effects GLS panel data regression model was employed and results showed that 
corporate governance indeed influence financing decisions of firms.  
 
The findings of the study indicate that firms with larger boards employ more debt irrespective of 
the debt’s maturity period to raise corporate value as against equity. Again, the regression results 
showed that while independence of the board positively affects both long-term and total leverage, 
it is negatively and significantly correlated with short-term debt and that when a CEO doubles as 
board chairman, less debt, particularly short-term debt, and, to some extent, total leverage are 
employed.  
 
In conclusion, therefore, it is recommended that firms should position themselves by 
strengthening governance structures so as to enhance their outlook and thus enjoy the financial 
benefits thereof. With regard to specific policy implications emanating from the findings, the 
study supports the institution of good corporate governance mechanisms in order to enhance a 
firm’s outlook and therefore be in a capacity to access the financial markets. One of the 
mechanisms that have been projected as depicting a good corporate governance principle is 
board independence. Indeed, in South Africa, the King Report makes a sound recommendation 
in this direction. It is therefore our recommendation, in tandem with others, for example the 
King Report, that corporate entities should make more use of external directors so as to ensure 
board independence and send a positive signal to potential investors (debt holders in this case). 
Perhaps one main policy recommendation that arises out of our findings is the ability to strike a 
good balance between quality and quantity with regard to board sizes. Since larger boards 
discourage investors, it is our recommendation that corporate entities should not sacrifice quality 
for quantity with regard to board appointments. A case in point is that of South Africa. The 
pursuance of the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Policy for instance, should be 
conducted with a great sense of caution in order not to send wrong signals to the investment 
community.  
 
. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
6 THE LINK BETWEEN FIRMS’ INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET AND  
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE→ 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The performance of corporate governance structures in advanced economies have been 
examined in great detail especially in the United States and Japan (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Claessens et al. (2003) have shown that better corporate framework benefits firms through greater 
access to financing and better performance among others.  They argue that weak corporate 
governance results in poor firm performance and is also conducive for macroeconomic crises. 
Donaldson (2003) showed that good corporate governance is also important for increasing 
investor confidence and market liquidity. In spite of the importance of corporate governance and 
its related merits in running the affairs of a modern corporate entity, less empirical work has been 
carried out in developing economies in general and on the African continent in particular. In 
these developing economies, markets are also noted to be dominated by large business groups 
(Khanna, 2000). Corporate governance is gaining ground in Africa and has continued to 
dominate debates and development policies though little empirical work exists to substantiate 
such importance. The continent is generally characterised by weak governance systems and the 
relative poor performance of corporate Africa has been attributed largely to weak governance 
                                                 
→ This paper was accepted for presentation at the Value Added Conference, Johannesburg, October, 2006. 
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systems. Studies have indicated that the level of corruption at the political level in Africa is closely 
linked with corporate governance. This is because, it is argued that “a corrupt system influences 
corporate governance through its impact on calculus of crime and punishment as well as on the 
credibility of the apparatus for enforcing corporate rules and regulations” (Ayogu, 2001). The 
problem with Africa is certainly not a lack of laws, but has always been the lack of power to 
enforce corporate regulations and laws for a better system (Ayogu, 2001). As stated previously 
however, South Africa could be singled out as having well-developed corporate governance 
structures. A sustained research into corporate governance and its linkage with various 
dimensions of corporate behaviour is the needed recipe for understanding and appreciating 
corporate governance on the continent.  
 
It should be pointed out that while there is a growing amount of literature on corporate 
governance law and the functioning of capital markets around the world7, a study by Ayogu 
(2001) is about the only well-documented paper on corporate governance in Africa. Ayogu (2001) 
focussed on the examination of corporate governance indicators involving legalities and 
regulatory matters in a selected cross-country study. The focus of the current work however, is 
not directly on examining the functioning of corporate governance in disciplining poorly 
performing managers but on investigating how corporate governance structures of firms affect 
their investment or growth opportunities in selected African countries. The major contribution of 
this paper to the link between corporate governance and firm behaviour is the dimension of both 
sector and country specific effects on the linkage between firm growth opportunities and 
corporate governance.   
 
                                                 
7 Reference: La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999) and Johnson et al. (2000).  
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The rest of the paper is organised similarly to previous chapters: section two looks at the 
literature; section three focuses on data and methodology; section four discusses empirical 
findings; and section five concludes the paper. 
6.2 Literature Review 
 
The study of corporate governance has its foundations in the agency theory which stems from 
separation between ownership and control in running the affairs of corporate entities. Such 
situations breed costs related to agency theory. This is more pronounced in that modern 
corporations are characterised by owners (principals) who employ managers (agents) in 
controlling capacities to steer corporate affairs. Ceteris paribus, these agents are expected to 
pursue objectives that are in line with that of the owners. However, agents, more often than not 
pursue their own set of objectives and these most of the time are in conflict with owners’ 
objectives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Hence, agency theory demonstrates that the presence of 
different types of corporate governance controls is determined by the cost of numerous and 
often conflicting objectives and information asymmetry. In this environment, the role of 
corporate governance is regarded as one of cost mitigation through discouraging managers from 
the pursuance of objectives that are deemed detrimental to firm value maximisation. Therefore, 
corporate governance is a mechanism designed to ensure that owners’ objectives are aligned with 
that of managers in order to ensure that there is minimal deviation (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Corporate governance, once again, is identified as an important mechanism in promoting 
monitoring and incentives in order to reduce agency costs (Brickley et al., 1997; Conyon & Peck, 
1998; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Singh & Harianto, 1989).  
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Though, some studies have looked at corporate governance and firm performance, the results 
have been largely inconclusive. Most of these studies have concentrated on performance 
measures such as Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Tobin’s q, etc. A probable 
explanation for the weak and conflicting results may be the failure of these studies to recognise 
that the relationship between corporate governance controls and firm performance could be 
influenced indirectly by a firm’s organisational environment. The argument is that corporate 
controls may not be effective for every firm and that the environment within which a firm 
operates rather could be more influential on its governance and control structures. In this study 
we therefore use a firm’s investment or growth opportunities as a proxy for the organisational 
environment within which it operates in line with Hutchison and Gul (2004). This is not to 
suggest that that is the only viable proxy for organizational environment is growth opportunities. 
there could be others, but for the purposes of this study we would want to concentrate on 
growth opportunities.  
 
From the foregoing analysis, the theoretical underpinning of the current study is unique in that 
the study does not necessarily look at corporate governance and firm performance, but examines 
how governance structures impact on a firm’s investment or growth opportunities as its 
organizational environment. Indeed, the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance is open to criticism due basically to endogeneity problems. This emanates from the 
fact that the link between performance and corporate governance could be bi-directional. 
Performance could impact on governance and governance could also impact on performance. In 
advancing our argument, we make reference to studies by Hutchinson and Gul (2004) which 
show that corporate governance variables have an impact on a firm’s growth opportunities and 
firms with more growth opportunities are more difficult to monitor and vice versa.  
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Agency theory posits that corporate governance controls are linked to information asymmetry 
and the incidence of information asymmetry is higher for growth firms because managers have 
private information about the value of future projects and their actions also are not easily read by 
shareholders. Thus, higher shareholder/manager agency costs are associated with high growth 
firms and such firms therefore develop a greater need for corporate controls (Hutchinson & Gul, 
2004). Smith and Watts (1992) have shown that the observability of managers’ actions decreases 
along with the increase of investment opportunities of a firm. This is explained by the fact that 
the value of growth options is determined by discretionary expenditure by managers while assets 
in place do not require such investment (Gaver & Gaver, 1993). Resulting from this, growth 
firms employ certain control mechanisms to motivate and compensate managers some of which 
involve corporate boards. 
6.2.1 The Investment Opportunity Set and Board Monitoring 
 
The few studies that have tried to explore this area have used three main independent variables, 
namely board monitoring, management shareholding, and managerial remuneration in explaining 
the growth of a firm. 
 
Several studies have investigated the usefulness of a corporate board as a monitoring device as 
such boards communicate shareholders’ objectives and interests to managers. It is argued by 
Munter & Kren (1995) that external board membership promotes proper management 
supervision and therefore limits managerial opportunism. In this regard, empirical research has 
shown that a greater proportion of non-executive directors on a board is likely to enhance 
decision-taking that is in the interest of external shareholders thereby enhancing firm growth 
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(Brickley et al., 1997; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Tosi et al., 1997; Weisbach, 1988). However, 
managerial hegemony theory challenges this argument and stipulates that boards essentially are 
passive instruments owing greater allegiance to the managers who appoint them, and that such 
boards usually lack knowledge about the firm and constantly fall on executives for information, 
arguably for their own efficiency (Coles et al., 2001). They further argue that a firm’s investment 
opportunities are firm specific defined comparable to issues such as managerial skills (Anderson 
et al., 1993). Following from that, it is believed that it is a difficult task to monitor managers’ 
actions in growth firms. The point is, it is relatively difficult to determine whether the growth of a 
firm actually is a result of managers’ actions or whether it is due to external factors. Control 
variables are introduced in the regression model to address an issue of this nature. 
 
The studies that have investigated the link between board monitoring and firm investment 
opportunities have often led to inconclusive and conflicting results. Bathala and Rao (1995) and 
Hutchinson (2002) found a negative relationship between the proportion of outside directors and 
firms’ growth rate. However, Hossain et al., (2000) found that the proportion of outside directors 
on a board is positively related to a firm’s investment opportunities. Anderson et al. (1993) also 
show that a firm with higher growth or investment opportunities incurs higher monitoring costs 
in terms of director and auditor fees. Again, in some instances it is asserted that where growth 
firms have a higher proportion of executive directors on the board, managers have greater 
discretion in terms of investment opportunities which is a product of managers’ discretionary 
expenditures (Hutchison & Gul, 2004). Under such circumstances it is probable that both 
shareholders and debt holders will demand a higher proportion of non-executive directors to 
serve as a monitoring device on executives and this serves as moderation on agency costs. Non-
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executive director dominated boards are deemed to protect the investments of both debt holders 
and shareholders.   
 
In this study, not only do we investigate the proportion of non-executive directors to the board 
size, we also employ broad characteristics of corporate boards that impinge on their monitoring 
ability. In this regard, the paper makes a very significant contribution to the literature by testing 
the agency theory empirically. Again, due to the lack of studies of this nature on the African 
continent, the study seeks to shed more light on matters of corporate governance in Africa.  
6.3 Data and Methodological Issues  
6.3.1 Sample  
 
Data for the study is collected from 103 firms listed on selected stock exchanges in Africa. 
Countries selected for the study include Ghana, Nigeria, South Africa and Kenya and the study 
covers the period 1997 to 2001. The data includes both financial and non-financial. For the 
financial data, INET-Bridge and the various stock exchange fact books served as the main 
sources and this was supplemented with the administration of a questionnaire for some of the 
governance variables. Firms selected were on the basis of data availability and with due regards to 
response to the questionnaire. Sampled firms represented the Industrial, Manufacturing, Mining, 
Agricultural and Services sectors and in defining what constitutes these sectors we largely 
depended on the classifications given by the various stock exchanges. We are not unaware of the 
possibility of non-uniform classification which could pose a problem with regard to the analysis 
and results. We are of the opinion, however, that such differences are marginal and thus have 
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little impact on compromising the validity of our results. The finance sector is omitted consistent 
with studies on corporate governance (Faccio & Lasfer, 2000).  
 
6.3.2 Variable Description and Justification 
 
Though previous studies have looked at this relationship focussing on proportion of non-
executive directors, managerial shareholding and managers’ remuneration, data on managerial 
shareholding and managers’ remuneration could not be obtained as respondents were unwilling 
to disclose such information. In this study therefore, we dwell largely on board characteristics, 
other corporate governance mechanisms, and country and sector categorical instruments as the 
main independent variables.  
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Our dependent variable is a firm’s investment or growth opportunity which could be measured 
by the ratio of market to book value of assets. Kallapur and Trombley (1999) show that among 
the commonly used proxies, the ratio of market to book value of assets is the most highly 
correlated with future growth of firms. Hence studies by Anderson et al. (1993), Baber et al. 
(1996), Gaver and Gaver (1993), Gul (1999), Hossain et al. (2000) and Skinner (1993) have all 
used price-based proxies because these tend to strengthen the robustness and sensitivity of 
regression results. However, in order to differentiate this chapter from previous chapters, we 
employ the ratio of R&D to sales as a proxy for growth opportunity. This is equally consistent 
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with studies by Kallapur and Trombley (1999), Anderson et al. (1993), Baber et al. (1996), Gaver 
and Gaver (1993), Gul (1999), Hossain et al. (2000) and Skinner (1993). 
 
Independent Variables 
 
While studies have shown that effective monitoring of the board depends mostly on the ratio of 
non-executive members on a corporate board, we argue that the effective monitoring of a board 
depends to a large extent on broad board characteristics and other corporate governance 
indicators. In this study therefore, in addition to the proportion of non-executive board 
members, we also employ board size, CEO duality, and CEO tenure as our independent 
variables. The board size is measured by the number of board members (and by extension this in 
part measures expenditure or fess on the board); CEO duality is a dummy variable and takes the 
value of 1 when a CEO serves as board chairperson and of 0 where two people occupy the two 
positions of CEO and board chairman; we also measure CEO tenure by the number of years of 
CEO service. Both country and sector are categorical variables. With country, we assign the 
following numerical values (South Africa = 0; Ghana = 1; Nigeria = 2; Kenya = 3) whiles we 
assign the following numerals to the sectors (Industrial = 0; Mining = 1; Manufacturing = 2; 
Agricultural = 3; Services = 4). The implication of the above is that South Africa is the reference 
point for comparative analysis while the Industrial sector is the reference point for comparative 
analysis to ascertain country and sector specific effects in our regression. 
 
 
 
 
 146 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
We acknowledge our inability to fully model growth opportunities of firms and therefore we 
employ control variables in our model. Smith and Watts (1992) show that firm size is positively 
related to various firm characteristics, debt covenants, dividend policy and management 
compensation. We use number of employees as a measure of size and this is logged to normalise 
it in the regression. We also include leverage as a control variable because it represents external 
corporate governance control. For instance, debtholders who are interested in safeguarding their 
investments in a firm will monitor the firm especially when the capital structure becomes more 
debt oriented. We measure leverage as the ratio of total debts to total book value of assets. 
Skinner (1993) posits that since book values are used to write debt contracts, these measure 
proxies for debtholder and shareholder conflicts more accurately than market-based measures. 
The debt ratio shows how firms choose to finance their operations. We also include ROA as 
profitability measure of the firm as another control variable. Indeed, to enhance the robustness of 
the model, this variable is captured as a lag variable in order to help capture its dynamic 
adjustment. Finally, we include firm level risk, measured by earnings volatility as another control 
variable. 
 
Since this is a cross-country and cross-sector study, we realise that specific countries and sectors 
will have specific effects on investment opportunities of any firm. Thus, we include both country 
and sector categorical variables to account for these specific effects in our model. 
6.3.3 Analytical Framework and Empirical Model Specification 
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Our analysis is carried out in a panel data setting due essentially to its advantage of allowing for 
more data points. The basic panel data regression model is given by 
 
ititit uXy ++= αδ / , where TtNi .....................,.........1;....................,.........1 ==            1 
 
In this basic model, i denotes the cross-sectional dimension and t represents the time dimension. 
δ is a scalar, α is a , and  is the  observation on 1Kx itX ith K  explanatory variables. In this case, 
there is a one-way error component model for the disturbances with 
 
itiitu νμ +=                     2 
 
In estimating the basic model, the behaviour of the components of the error term (equation 2) 
determines the choice of estimation technique. In order to deal with the situation as to which 
specification to employ in estimating the regression equation, Hausman (1978) suggested a test to 
check whether the individual effects are correlated with the explanatory variables (Xit). Under the 
null hypothesis of orthogonality, that is, no correlation between individual effects and 
explanatory variables, both random effects and fixed effects estimators are consistent, but the 
random effect estimator is efficient while that for fixed effects is not.  Under the alternative 
hypothesis that individual effects are correlated with the explanatory variables, the random effects 
estimator is inconsistent while the fixed effects estimator is consistent and efficient. Greene 
(1997) indicates that, under the null, the estimates should not differ systematically.  Thus, the test 
to choose between Fixed or Random Effects is based on a contrast vector H: 
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H= [bGLS-bw]´[V(bw)-V(bGLS)]-1[bGLS-bw]                  3  
           
We carry out the Hausman specification test in our estimations to determine the appropriate 
estimation method to employ and results reported in subsequent tables. 
6.3.4 Empirical Model Specification 
 
Our model to be estimated was thus given as  
 
itiiititit uSectorCountryControlsGovXticsInvOpp +++++= 3210/ ααααδ            4 
 
where is the Investment or growth opportunities set for firm i at time t;  is 
the governance variables for firm i at time t;  represents the control variables for firm i 
at time t;  is a categorical variable measuring country specific effect;  is also a 
categorical variable measuring sector specific effects;  is the error term; and 
 
itInvOpp
Country
..........,.........
itGovXtics
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itControls
.5..............
i
.......
itu
..........,.........1;1031 == ti
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6.4 Empirical Findings 
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6-1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Investment or Growth 
Opportunity  set (ratio of 
R&D to Sales) 
388 0.2152213 0.3798653   0   1.35 
Board Size 388 9.224227 3.409779 3 23 
NED 388 0.419022 0.259989 0.05 0.846 
CEO duality 388 0.193299 0.3953953 0 1 
CEO tenure 388 3.510309 1.585593 2 8 
Profitability 388 0.1268295   0.1458879 -0.426 0.68 
Firm risk 388 0.0496657 0.0712374 1.00e-05 0.68973
Firm size 388 9873.709 36954.1 20 303098 
SDR 388 0.2917814 0.2146533 0.0013022 0.9159 
LDR 388 0.3722482 0.2076858 0.001 0.8736 
Leverage 388 0.6636894 0.2410705 0.006 0.991 
Note: SDR and TDR are Short-term and Long-term leverage respectively. NED is the ratio of non-executive directors to board 
size 
 
 
Table 6-1 shows the summary statistics of both the dependent and independent variables. The 
distribution of the 103 companies is as follows; 31 are in the Industrial sector, 25 in the 
Manufacturing sector, 24 in the Mining sector, 10 in the Agricultural sector, and 13 in the 
Services sector. The distribution among the countries is uneven, with South Africa and Nigeria 
contributing the largest share of firms in the Mining sector. The descriptive statistics show that 
most of the firms have experienced modest growth of about 21.5 percent per annum. While 
some did not experience any growth at all at some points, the standard deviation of 0.38 rather 
suggests that growth is less dispersed among the sample firms. These firms are doing well with 
regard to profitability with a mean profit of about 13 percent. The size of corporate boards in the 
sample is highly dispersed with a minimum of three and a maximum of 23 board members. The 
high standard deviation of about 3.41 lends credence to the above. Again, there is a high variation 
between and within firms with regard to the board size, but most the firms in the sample operate 
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with a board of about nine members. The descriptive statistics also show that most of the boards 
have more executive directors than non-executive directors. This is indicated by a mean value of 
0.42, suggesting that about 58 percent of all boards are made up of executive directors. According 
John and Senbet (1998), the above statistics show less independent corporate boards. However, 
some are very independent with about 84.6 percent of the members being non-executive. At the 
tip of most governance structures in the sample, there is a clear separation of the personalities of 
board chairman and CEO and their functions. The mean value of about 19 percent indicates that 
of the 103 firms, about 19 percent have both CEO and board chairman positions embedded in 
one person. These CEOs serve a term ranging between two and eight years with most of them 
serving a term of about three-and-a-half years. Using the number of employees as a proxy for 
firm size, there is wide variation between and within firms. Most of the firms are heavily 
dependent on debt financing for their operations as against equity financing and this is driven by 
long-term debt. 
 
6.4.2 Discussion of Regression Results 
 
In Table 6-2, our regression results show that the size of the board has a positive impact on the 
growth opportunities of firms. It indicates that the larger the size of the board, the better the 
chances of the firm growing. This could be due to the fact that a larger board effectively monitors 
and scrutinises management and hence ensures that decisions including those regarding 
expenditure are taken in the interest of shareholders. All things being equal, a larger board by 
implication means larger expenditure on the board. In that regard, the finding supports studies by 
Anderson et al. (1993) who show that firms with higher growth or investment opportunities incur 
higher monitoring costs in terms of director and auditor fees. The ratio of non-executive 
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directors to board size gives the right signal, indicating that the presence of more non-executive 
directors on a corporate board safeguards the interests of shareholders and promotes firm 
growth. This confirms studies by Hossain et al. (2000) who found that the proportion of outside 
directors on a board is positively related to a firm’s investment opportunities, and also Munter 
and Kren (1995) who indicated that external board membership promotes proper management 
supervision and therefore limits managerial opportunisms. This variable however is not 
significant. When a CEO doubles as the board chairman, it increases agency costs and impact 
negatively on investment opportunities of a firm as the results show. Again, this variable is 
insignificant in explaining firm growth opportunities. The results also show that when a CEO has 
a longer tenure in office, it enhances firm growth. This could be explained by the fact that, when 
a CEO serves for a longer term, the CEO is motivated to see through decisions to their logical 
conclusions, coupled with the benefit of having job security, stability and focus. This enhances 
commitment and dedication to the firm’s objectives, thereby improving shareholders’ value. The 
control variables invariably showed the expected signs with the exception of firm size which 
showed a negative relationship with firm growth. The implication however, is that size may not 
translate into opportunities if pragmatic decisions and actions are not taken.   
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Table 6-2: Regression Results Dependent variable: Investment Opportunity Set (ratio of R&D to Sales)) 
(Fixed Effects Estimation) 
Regressors  
Board size 0.0311173 
(4.55)** 
Ratio of NEDs 0.0805285 
(0.97) 
CEO duality -0.0584821 
(-1.18) 
CEO tenure 0.0460997 
(3.67)** 
Profitability (ROA) 0.43432 
(3.15)** 
Firm level risk -0.4555231 
(-1.73)** 
Leverage 0.1104545 
(1.23) 
Log of firm size -0.0291448 
(-2.18)** 
Constant -0.0940997 
(-0.80) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1622 
No. of observations 388 
Test of probability F(8, 375) = 9.07 [ ]0000.0  
Hausman specification test Chi2 (8) = 13.0 [ ]1120.0  
Note: The regression includes a constant. T-statistics are in parenthesis and Probability values are in square brackets. 
** indicates significance at 5 percent level. 
 
 
Table 6-3 shows the regression results for both country and sector specific effects on firm 
investment and growth opportunities. Using South Africa as the reference point, the results show 
that firms in South Africa have higher investment or growth opportunities more than Ghana, 
Nigeria and Kenya. This was expected because of the developed nature of the South African 
corporate governance structures. While firms in Ghana grow more than those of Nigeria, firms in 
Kenya are the worst performers with regard to growth of firms. This implies that whereas firms 
may be growing generally, different countries with different governance mechanisms will lead to 
specific behaviour and response of firms. The other probable implication is that, while South 
Africa leads the continent in terms of corporate governance and dealing with agency costs, 
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Ghana’s corporate governance structures are better than those of Nigeria, and Nigeria’s better 
than those of Kenya.  
 
Using the industrial sector as the reference point, the results show that firms in the other sectors 
have higher investment and growth opportunities and the mining sector particularly is dominant, 
followed by the Services, Manufacturing and the Agricultural sectors respectively. This may be 
due to the fact that most of the mining firms in Africa are owned by foreign multinational 
organisations. They therefore are likely to be influenced by global governance structures in 
reducing agency costs and maximising shareholders and debt holders’ interests.  
 Table 6-3: Regression Results Country and Firm Specific Effects (Random Effects GLS Regression) 
 Dependent Investment Opportunity Set (MTBV)) 
Variables Country Effects Sector Effects 
Ghana -0.2502158 
(-4.24)** 
 
Nigeria -0.3360478 
(-6.02)** 
 
Kenya -0.4793645 
(-8.36)** 
 
Agriculture  0.0295227 
(0.49) 
Manufacturing  0.0362727 
(0.76) 
Mining  0.4040287 
(7.09)** 
Services  0.0490973 
(0.87) 
Constant 0.5700158 
(11.07)** 
0.1940606 
(6.22)** 
R-squared 0.1423 0.1267 
No. of Observations 388 388 
Test of Probability Wald Chi2 (3)=73.10 [ ]0000.0  Wald Chi2 (4)= 55.58 [ ]0000.0  
6.5 Conclusion 
The study set out to examine corporate governance mechanisms, largely along board 
characteristics, and how they influence firm investment or growth opportunities. The study 
started from the premise that the performance of any firm may be largely determined by the 
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organisational environment and not necessarily just by the governance structures that are in place. 
The need for the investigation was strengthened by the fact that corporate governance is 
gradually taking shape on the African continent and the examination of its relationship with 
various firm characteristics is not only appropriate but overdue. Our results show that firms with 
investment or growth opportunities indeed employ large boards (high board and auditor fees), 
have longer CEO tenure and are profitable. The study also showed that both country and sector 
specific effects influence firm response to existing governance structures and towards growth. 
While firms in South Africa exhibit relatively higher growth rates, the study revealed that 
governance structures in Ghana may be better than in Nigeria and Kenya, and that firms in the 
mining sector dominate with regard to growth opportunities.  
 
While the results have implications for policy setters by suggesting that firms with higher growth 
rates employ larger boards and give CEOs longer tenure, it also shows that corporate governance 
is important in affecting a firm’s growth, thereby disproving the managerial hegemony theory 
which posits that boards are passive instruments owing allegiance to managers who employ them 
and therefore may not affect a firm’s behaviour. Though, we acknowledge the fact that corporate 
governance embraces a broader set of variables, data limitations restricted us. In spite of this 
limitation, the validity of our findings is not compromised. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7 CORPORATE BOARD DIVERSITY AND PERFORMANCE OF 
 
MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS IN GHANA:  THE EFFECT OF GENDERγ 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The concept of microfinance has gained grounds and has been regarded as a poverty reduction 
tool especially on account of the success story of the famous Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. 
Many countries have in the past used and are currently using microfinance as a poverty reduction 
strategy. Countries such as Ghana, Malawi and Uganda, to mention but a few, are known to have 
embraced the concept with alacrity. It must also be pointed out that, not everyone sees 
microfinance as a development and poverty reduction tool. Whiles one strand argues that 
microfinance has been very positive with regards to economic and social impact (Holcombe, 
1995; Hossain, 1988; Khandker, 1998; Otero & Rhyne, 1994; Rameyi, 1991; Schuler et al., 1997), 
others contend that such optimism should be expressed with a reasonable degree of caution 
(Adams & von Pischke, 1992; Buckley, 1997; Montgomery, 1996; Rogaly, 1996; Wood & Sharrif, 
1997). In between these strands of thoughts is the school which contends that, though 
microfinance impacts positively on the poor, it does not assist the poor at all times (Hulme & 
Mosley, 1996; Mosley & Hulme, 1998). In spite of these misgivings, the overwhelming success 
story of the Grameen Bank points to a concept that has a huge potential for the improvement of 
the livelihoods of the productive poor. It is in this regard that we deem it imperative to examine 
                                                 
γ This paper was published in Studies in Economics and Econometrics (S.E.E.), Vol. 30(3), pp.19-33 
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the relationship that exists between governance structures in these institutions and ascertain how 
these structures impact on institutional performance. Findings of the study do not only aim at 
fine-tuning governance in Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) in terms of policy direction, but 
equally important to ensure that collapse of MFIs as a result of governance is forestalled so as not 
to dent the critical process of poverty reduction and development. 
 
Microfinance comprises the provision of loans and other financial services to the productive 
poor who cannot access formal financial intermediation. Indeed, microfinance has evolved 
primarily as a consequence of the efforts of individuals and agencies committed to the idea of 
ensuring that the poor have access to some form of credit. The industry is noted to be growing 
rapidly and how they are governed therefore matters. Practitioners in the industry have 
recognised that good governance is an important element in the success of MFIs (Campion, 
1998; Rock et al,, 1998). In spite of this observation, only a few studies have focussed on 
governance and the examination of the linkage between various governance mechanisms and 
performance (McGuire, 1999). Moreover, these studies, such as that by Hartarska (2004), have 
concentrated primarily on European MFIs.  
 
Due to their increasing role in controlling significant resources, governance issues in MFIs are 
not only essential but also an important variable in the bid to promote the well-being of the poor. 
In the not-too-distant past, waves of corporate scandals in well-structured corporate entities in 
developed countries have been a wake-up call pointing to the need for improvement in 
governance practices even in well-regulated markets and industries with established mechanisms 
for control. Growing rapidly with varying degrees of diversity, the Microfinance sector in Ghana 
has moved from the predominantly non-regulated ROSCAS to a wide variety of regulated formal 
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and semi-formal institutions. MFIs in Ghana include Rural and Community Banks (R&CBs), 
Credit Unions (CUs), Savings and Loans Companies (S&Ls), Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAS), Regular Savings and Loans Associations (RESCAS) and some 
Commercial and Development Banks. While the Banks and mostly the formal and semi-formal 
MFIs are regulated, a considerable number of the MFIs are not regulated.  
 
Most MFIs in Ghana are male dominated in terms of governance and leadership. However, with 
regard to the performance of MFIs, it is believed that the presence of women enhances depth of 
outreach and sustainability. Of late, arguments around governance reforms have been geared 
towards the importance of gender diversity, especially in the boardroom, thus, the issue of gender 
diversity has become a central theme of many recent governance codes (Higgs, 2003; Tyson, 
2003). It is argued that boards could enhance their effectiveness by tapping broader talent pools 
for their directors and that a more diverse board is likely to have better relations with other 
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers and employees (Ellis & Keys, 2003). 
 
Though, governance has assumed an increasing importance for MFIs, there is some justification 
for the apparent lack of research on the effect of MFI governance on performance. In MFIs, 
performance data are largely deemed proprietary and are difficult to obtain. In spite of the fact 
that MFIs are mostly funded from donor and public funds, the practice has always been to 
withhold performance information that is considered sensitive from the public.   
 
Corporate governance and having diversity on a firm’s board has been given some attention in 
recent times. The topic has received comments not only from academics but also from 
practitioners and especially in the press. One must point out that a considerable volume of 
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discussion has centred on the difficulties women encounter in trying to get promotion to senior 
management levels. This phenomenon is normally referred to as the glass ceiling effect. Of late, 
however, most of the studies are devoted to issues and matters relating to women holding 
management portfolios and having a visible presence in corporate boardrooms (Carter et al, 
2003; Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Kesner, 1998; Daily et al., 1999).  
 
Boards are important in the management of MFIs because of the relatively limited role of 
external market forces. Like other sectors of the Ghanaian economy, fewer women hold senior 
executive positions in MFIs. Again, most of the boards in corporate organisations, including 
MFIs, are also dominated by male presence. Does this have any implication for performance? 
Studies on MFIs in Ghana have not looked at governance and how it affects performance. The 
broad objective of this study is to investigate board diversity by highlighting the gender angle and 
examining its impact on the performance of MFIs with the use of data from Ghana. The current 
study seeks to extend board characteristics by incorporating gender and to examine whether 
having a female CEO and a board structure dominated by females is positively or negatively 
related to performance. Not only will the study add to the existing literature on governance in 
MFIs, but also contribute towards reshaping the governance of MFIs. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows; Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3 looks at 
data description and methodology; Section 4 discusses the empirical findings and Section 5 draws 
conclusions emanating from the findings. 
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7.2 Literature Review 
 
In the domain of microfinance, governance is defined as “the mechanisms through which 
donors, equity investors and other providers of funds ensure themselves that their funds will be 
used according to the intended purpose” (Hartarska, 2004). This definition stems from the 
definition given by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) that corporate governance is the mechanism 
through which shareholders assure themselves that they will receive maximum return on their 
investment. The importance of control mechanisms is crystallized in the existence of conflict of 
preferences and objectives between managers as agents and providers of funds as principals. This 
is what is referred to as agency cost. In this context, the principal is regarded as the residual 
claimant of the firm’s wealth (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, corporate governance is put in 
place to minimise agency cost through aligning the objectives of principals and agents. However, 
MFIs have unique characteristics that complicate the study of their governance. This is because, 
apart from MFIs meeting the objective of operational sustainability, they also need to ensure 
substantial outreach by serving poor clients.  
 
One must note that the key elements of an effective governance structure are ownership (this 
involves both institutional and managerial), board size, board composition and its structure, CEO 
characteristics and board members remuneration, auditing, information, and the market for 
corporate control (Keasey et al 1997). Indeed, corporate boards are primarily put in place by 
shareholders to serve as a check on management and also to provide direction and guidance in 
the form of advice. In the corporate governance literature, the degree of board independence is 
measured by the proportion of non-executives on the board (John & Senbet, 1998). In this 
regard, the more independent outsiders there are on a board, the more the board is viewed as 
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playing an effective monitoring role. However, the linkage between board independence and 
performance has been largely inconclusive (Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992).  Corporate governance has been identified to involve all 
the processes and mechanisms that a firm puts in place to ensure that agency costs are reduced 
within the context of the famous principal-agent paradigm. 
 
Though, there has been consensus on the importance of board diversity and the role of gender in 
managing business entities to enhance performance, organisational scholars have also pointed out 
that diverse top management teams may disagree more (Eisenhardt et al, 1997) and thus may have 
a negative impact on performance. The argument is that the effectiveness of a corporate board 
does not necessarily depend on the number of women there are on the board. For instance, it is 
argued that increasing the number of female directors on a board and thereby making it highly 
diversified may require extra mechanisms to ensure cooperation and harmony among directors. 
This is again supported by the fact that heterogeneity in groups can increase conflict leading to 
slower decision making (Blau, 1977). It is also posited that in spite of the fact that a diversified 
board has the opportunity of benefiting from diverse opinions and reducing complacency in the 
process, this can only be achieved when there is an increased interaction among team members. 
This is to ensure the curtailment of a potential conflict arising out of prolonged disagreements as 
a result of entrenched positions and blocks. Goodstein et al. (1994) also stress that more diverse 
boards may require relatively more time to make decisions. This has the tendency of stifling 
progress and productivity. 
 
In sharp contrast to the above position, Adams et al. (2004) in their study on gender diversity in 
the boardroom showed that female directors have fewer attendance problems at board meetings 
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than their male counterparts suggesting that diverse boards could be more effective and 
productive than homogenous boards. In one of their findings, they indicate that gender 
composition plays an important role in organisation design for corporate boards. For instance, 
they show that Tobin’s q as a measure of firms’ value is positively and significantly correlated 
with the number of women on corporate boards and that higher market valuation is associated 
with more women on corporate boards supporting an earlier assertion by Carter et al. (2003).  
There have been several arguments in favour of having more women on corporate boards. 
Women, it is believed, could add value by bringing different perspectives, experiences and 
opinions. Others have also argued that women generally have higher expectations in terms of 
their responsibilities as directors which could influence the board’s effectiveness towards 
productivity (Fondas & Sassalos, 2000). With regard to Microfinance, policies to promote gender 
diversity in governance have been deemed appropriate.  
 
This study thus uses unique data on Ghanaian MFIs to ascertain whether board diversity affect 
performance.  
7.3 Data and Methodological Issues 
7.3.1 Data and Variable Description  
 
Panel data covering a ten-year period from 1995 - 2004 was used for the study. The performance 
variables are obtained from the annual financial reports of the MFIs, while most of the 
governance variables are obtained through the administration of a questionnaire. 
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Dependent Variable 
 
Performance is measured by annual return on assets (ROA) which is a standard finance literature 
measure of performance. It shows how management of an entity has been able to turnover assets 
of the organization over-one-year. To a large extent, ROA also deals with operational 
sustainability of these institutions.   
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
The size of the board 
The size of the board is measured by the number of board members as has been done by many 
authors such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1999, 2002) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). In their 
various studies, the size of the board has been seen to have an inverse relationship with firm 
performance. Thus, it is expected that the size of the board would have an inverse correlation 
with performance.  
 
The independence of the board 
We use the independence of the board measured by the proportion of non-executive board 
members to board size. John and Senbet (1998), for instance, have pointed out that a board is 
deemed independent if there are more non-executive members than executive members. We 
expect the independence of the board to have a positive correlation with performance.  
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CEO’s tenure 
The tenure of the CEO influences a firm’s investment decisions. Studies have shown that a long 
tenure does not augur well for firm performance as the CEO spends energy and time building an 
empire to control instead of using time for productive activities (Abor, 2006). We however do 
not know this sign a-priori.  
 
CEO duality typology 
We also measure the extent of agency cost by capturing board structure typology. When a CEO 
serves as the board chairman, the critical issues of decision control and decision management are 
embedded in the same person. Studies have pointed out that agency cost tends to be higher in 
such a scenario, thereby stifling performance (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). This is a dummy 
variable which is equal to unity if the CEO combines as the board chairman and zero if these 
positions are assigned to different people. We expect that this will have a negative relationship 
with performance.  
 
Board competence (education level) 
The expertise, competence and quality of a firm’s board inevitably impacts on performance. The 
higher the quality, the better the performance. We use the number of board members who have 
received tertiary education or its equivalent as a proxy for board quality and competence. Hence, 
we expect this variable to have a positive correlation with performance. 
 
Gender  
With gender, we capture whether a CEO is a female and the gender composition of the board.  
Information concerning female CEOs is captured as a dummy with a value of 1 when a CEO is a 
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female and a value of 0, otherwise. We measure gender composition as the proportion of women 
serving on a board to total board size. The signs of these variables are expected to be positive. 
 
Control variables 
Due to our inability to adequately model performance, we include MFI’s size measured by the 
asset base, and age of an MFI as a proxy for reputation as control variables. 
7.3.2 Analytical framework and Empirical Model specification   
 
The methodological approach used in most previous work examining the impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance variables utilizes a multiple regression. Thus, following a 
modified version of the econometric model of Miyajima et al (2003) we estimate the following 
equation: 
 
tiit
m
l
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Where  represents ROA of a MFI i in time t.  is a vector of 
explanatory variables and Controls  is a vector of control variables for firm i at time t. 
ePerformanc sBodXristic
tλ  are 
time specific effects, iη are individual firm effects and ti,μ is the error term. It must be noted that 
we resort to this model because of its direct applicability with regards to the present study. 
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Estimation Issues  
 
The appropriate technique for estimating the basic model is dependent on the behaviour of the 
component of the error term, ti,μ  that is;  
 
ti,μ = iti νε +,                 2 
 
Thus, in carrying out our estimation, we undertake the appropriate test to determine which 
estimation method to employ. The results of these tests are reported in our regression table.  
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 Table 7-1: Correlation Matrix:  
(Showing the level and direction of correlation existing between both dependent and independent variables) 
 
  BDS   BDC       CEO           CET  ROA       GEN   GCPN            AGE      NBG            LOGSZE 
 
BDS   1.0000 
BDC  -0.0022   1.0000  
CEO  -0.1686  0.0962        1.0000           
CET  0.2768   0.0235         -0.0536       1.0000              
ROA  0.0724 -0.0196         -0.0434      -0.0555  1.0000           
GEN  -0.1929  -0.0282         0.2462       0.1860 0.0485        1.0000  
GCPN  -0.0130  0.0113       -0.0500       -0.0989 0.0111        -0.0324  1.0000 
AGE  -0.1635  -0.0592         0.1188        -0.0287  0.0791         0.0672  -0.0414  1.0000 
NBG  0.1036  0.0577         -0.0737        0.2411  -0.0259         0.0191  -0.0634  0.2790        1.0000      
LOGSZE -0.2320  0.0862       0.0123         0.1860 0.0421         0.1150  -0.0926  0.4493       0.7981 1.0000 
 
Notes: BDS is the board size; BDC is the board independence measuring the proportion of outside board members as a ratio of total board members; CEO is a 
dummy variable which equals to 1 when the CEO combines as the board chairman and 0 otherwise; CET is the CEO’s tenure in office and captures the length of time 
a CEO serves as a CEO; ROA is the return on assets which is a performance variable and it is measured by total profit before tax divided by the total assets; GEN is a 
dummy variable which is equal to 1 when a CEO is a woman and 0 otherwise; GCPN denotes gender composition of the board size and it is captured by dividing the 
total number of women on a board by the board size; AGE of the MFI is calculated by taking the number of years the firm has been in operation using the year of  
incorporation as the reference point; NBG is the number of board members who have had University education or its equivalent; LOGSZE is the natural log of the 
asset base of the MFIs representing size of the MFI. 
 
  The correlation matrix in Table 7-1 shows that the size of the board is positively correlated with return on assets though the correlation 
co-efficient is weak. Similarly board independence, CEO duality and CEO tenure have weak and negative correlation with return on assets.  
 
 
 
 
7.4  Empirical Findings 
7.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 7-2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs     Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Return on Assets 520 0.3916346 1.524334 0.06 35 
Board Size 520 6.230769 1.826959 3 10 
Board Independence 520 0.4771154 0.1221016 0.3  0.7     
CEO Duality 520 0.5  0.5004815 0 1 
CEO Tenure 520 2.846154 0.7181816 2 4 
Women CEOs 520 0.4961538 0.5004667 0  1    
Gender Composition 520 0.3738462 0.1530947 0.1 0.7 
Log of firm Size 520 14.51752 1.901209 11.77  18.73 
Age of Firm 520 17.82692 5.024875 10  41 
Board Competence 520 2.884615 1.566187 1  7 
 
 
Performance of the Microfinance Institutions are widely spread. On the average, the MFIs 
recorded a return on assets of 39.2%. While the maximum performance was 3,500%, the 
minimum was 6% indicating a widely spread performance. The standard deviation of 1.52 
lends credence to this scenario. This is further buttressed by between and within means of 
0.209 and 1.511 across institutions. The institutions studied have also been operating for the 
past 41 years with the average age standing at about 18 years. 
 
On the average, 6 persons serve on a board of a MFI and a standard deviation of 1.83 
coupled with a maximum board size of ten members and a minimum board size of three 
members suggest that these boards are widely dispersed. It must also be pointed out that on 
the average three members of every board have had University education or its equivalent. 
The maximum number of university graduates serving on any board is seven and the 
minimum number is one. Combining the mean board size and the number of graduate 
members suggest that boards of the MFIs are relatively competent. 
 
Most of these boards are deemed less independent shown by the relatively higher percentage 
of executive board members. The mean board composition of about 48% suggests that 
about 52% of all boards are constituted by executive members. However, some of the 
boards are regarded as highly independent with a maximum of 70% membership being non-
executive. The boards are however divided equally between scenarios where the CEO serves 
as the Chairman and where two individuals occupy the positions of Board Chairman and 
CEO. Thus, 50% of the firms have their CEOs serving as the board chair-persons whiles 
50% on the other hand have the two positions of decision management and control 
embedded in two separate individuals. Most of the CEOs of these MFIs serve a three year 
term as tenure with the maximum being four years.  
 
The results also show that about 50% of the institutions have their CEOs as women and on 
average, 37% of all boards is made up of women. However, whiles the maximum gender 
composition on a board is 70%, the minimum is 10%. This again, suggests that some of the 
MFIs have women dominating their boards. 
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7.4.2 Discussion of Regression Results 
 
Table 7-3: Regression Results (Random Effect Estimation) 
Dependent Variable: Return on Assets  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Board size 0.1927 
(4.23)** 
0.1923 
(4.23)** 
0.1761 
(3.91)** 
Board independence -0.1921 
(-0.35) 
-0.1887 
(-0.35) 
-0.2643 
(-0.48) 
CEO duality -0.1981 
(-1.43) 
-0.2004 
(-1.45) 
-0.1309 
(-0.97) 
CEO tenure -0.2681 
(-2.61)** 
-0.2711 
(-2.65)** 
-0.2151 
(-2.15)** 
Women CEO 0.2958 
(2.08)** 
0.2962 
(2.09)** 
 
Gender Composition 
of the board 
0.0615 
(0.35) 
 0.6346 
(0.36) 
Age of MFI 0.0152 
(1.01) 
0.1484 
(0.98) 
0.0151 
(1.00) 
No of graduate board 
members 
-0.2926 
(-3.62)** 
-0.2918 
(-3.62)** 
-0.2976 
(-3.67)** 
Log of firm size 0.2637 
(3.59)** 
0.2626 
(3.58)** 
0.2689 
(3.65) 
constant -3.2708 
(-3.33)** 
-3.2268 
(-3.31)** 
-3.2293 
(-3.27)** 
R-squared 0.33 0.2948 0.3167 
No. of observations 520 520 520 
Test of probability Wald Chi2(9)=31.02 [ ]0003.0  Wald Chi2(8)=30.89 [ ]0001.0  Wald Chi2(8)=26.51 [ ]0009.0  
Hausman Test Chi2(9)=3.20 [ ]9559.0  Chi2(8)=1.63 [ ]9903.0  Chi2(8)=2.97 [ ]9362.0  
Notes: All regressions include a constant. T-statistics are in parenthesis and P-values in square bracket. ** 
Significant at 5 percent level 
 
 
Board size is rather positively related to ROA suggesting on the contrary that MFIs should 
have larger board sizes. The results confirms studies that support the view that larger boards 
are better for corporate performance because members have a range of expertise to help 
make better decisions, and are harder for a powerful CEO to dominate. This is in sharp 
contrast to findings by Jensen (1993), Lipton & Lorsch (1992), Eisenberg et al. (1998), and 
Sanda et al (2005). The fundamental issue is ‘should a board therefore be expanded ad-
infinitum’?  The answer is obviously NO! To address this is to have an optimal board size 
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made up of a judicious combination of executive and non-executive members for effective 
performance of MFIs.  However, the issue of optimal board size has come up in other 
studies but has not really been dealt with thoroughly (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2002). 
 
The independence of the board also shows a negative correlation with profitability of the 
MFIs. The results suggest that when more non-executive members serve on a MFI board it 
worsens performance. This also means that an independent board has a negative impact on 
MFI performance. Once again, this is contrary to findings by other studies such as Brickley 
and James (1987), Weisbach (1988), Byrd & Hickman (1992), and Brickley et al. (1994). In 
their studies, they found that the independence of the board enhances firm performance. 
This is because; it is believed that outside directors are difficult for CEOs to control and 
their presence promote shareholders’ value. It is however important to note that this variable 
is not significant in explaining MFI performance in this present study. 
 
 
There have been mixed findings on CEO duality and firm performance.  In the present 
study, the regression results show that when two separate people are entrusted with decision-
management and decision-control functions, firm performance is enhanced contrary to the 
stewardship theory which suggests that the concentration of decision-management and 
decision-control in the same personality reduces the extent of bureaucracy associated with 
decision-making and this enhances performance.. The findings conform to earlier studies 
which suggest that when a CEO doubles as board chairman it leads to leadership facing 
conflict of interest and agency costs increases. For instance, Fama & Jensen (1983) argue 
that concentration of decision management and decision control in one individual reduces 
board’s effectiveness in monitoring top management.  
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The tenure of the CEO has a negative effect on ROA. Though, some contend that when a 
CEO serves longer term, it affords the CEO the opportunity to undertake and see through 
projects deemed profitable to the firm. However, it could be argued that tenure may not 
necessarily affect profitability if an institution does not have a proactive and pragmatic CEO. 
Again, the longer the tenure, the greater the possibility of empire building by the CEO 
making the CEO difficult to control and this negatively affects performance. 
 
The results show that women CEOs enhance performance of microfinance institutions and 
that board diversity of having more women also improves performance. This is in tandem 
with recent debates which have highlighted the importance of gender diversity especially in 
the boardroom (Higgs, 2003; Tyson, 2003). It is advanced that boards could enhance their 
effectiveness by tapping broader talent pools for their directors and that more diverse board 
is likely to have better relations with other stakeholders such as customers, suppliers and 
employees (Ellis and Keys, 2003). It should however be indicated that whiles having women 
as CEOs significantly enhances performance; the gender composition variable is statistically 
insignificant.  
 
In conformity with theory, the age of the firm, as a proxy for reputation impact positively on 
performance likewise the size of a MFI. Expectedly, the size of a MFI has a significant 
positive impact on performance. This may be due to the fact that a large firm has the ability 
to accommodate risk and to enhance productivity through diversification of products and 
services.   
 
Contrary to expectation, the expertise and competence of the board measured by the 
number of university graduates on such boards has a negative impact on performance. This 
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suggests that having more university graduates serve on such boards do not necessarily equip 
the board to offer the necessary direction, mission and vision in this complex sub-sector 
within the financial services sector. What is needed could rather be members with a wealth 
of experience in the operations of these institutions and the sector they operate in. 
 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
This paper examined empirically the relationship between corporate board diversity and the 
performance of MFIs. The study used a panel data set of fifty-two Microfinance Institutions 
in Ghana covering the ten year period 1995 – 2004. Performance of the MFIs is measured 
using Return on Assets (ROA) and board diversity is measured by women CEOs and gender 
composition of a board. 
 
Though, generally mixed results are found with regard to the broad corporate governance 
variables, the critical variables of interest showed the expected signs. The study showed that 
having women CEOs on MFI boards enhances performance and again the more women 
there are on a board the better the performance.  
 
The findings of this paper have important policy implications for MFIs governance. Giving 
the important role governance structure plays in the operations of microfinance institutions, 
the study reaffirms the rather hazy principle that board diversity with women dominance is 
paramount for enhanced performance of microfinance institutions. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
8 ECONOMIC GROWTH IN AFRICA: THE ROLE OF CORPORATE 
 
GOVERNANCE AND STOCK MARKET DEVELOPMENTψ 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The fundamental role of stock markets in the economic growth and development of 
countries has been debated for years. However, there is the argument that one of the main 
merits for the development of a stock market is its potential to promote long-term 
investment and economic growth through raising capital and sharing risks between issuing 
firms and shareholders. Again, liquid stock markets allow shareholders to dispose of shares 
quickly and cheaply and in the process enable them to finance otherwise illiquid projects 
(Levine, 2000). An investment by a firm or the accumulation of physical capital formation 
has been identified to be closely associated with economic growth (McKinnon, 1973 & 
Shaw, 1973). Hence stock or equity markets promote economic growth essentially through 
investment. Though, it is believed that one important role of the stock market is to promote 
efficient corporate governance, recent scandals involving firms such as the Enron Corp and 
WorldCom has raised more questions than answers. For instance, what should be the 
composition of a board of directors? The story of Enron and WorldCom shows clearly that 
corporate governance would fail to work if the board of directors lack the needed 
independence and capacity to monitor management due to information asymmetry. The 
                                                 
ψ This paper was published Corporate Ownership and Control Journal, Vol. 4(2  cont’d), pp.226-232 
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development and growth of a stock market in emerging economies has been rampant in 
recent times especially in Africa.  From thirteen stock markets at end of 1992, bourses in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had increased to eighteen in 2002; these markets, with the 
exception of South Africa, doubled and in some cases more than doubled their capitalisation 
during the 1992-2002 period (S&P Emerging Markets Handbook). Total market 
capitalisation for Africa also more than doubled from US $113,423 million to US$ 244,672 
million in the same period. For instance, the Ghana Stock Exchange was adjudged the 
world’s best performing market at the end of the first quarter of 2004 with an annual return 
of 144% in US dollar terms compared to a 30% return by Morgan Stanley Capital 
International Global Index, 26% Standard & Poor in US and 32% in Europe, amongst 
others (The Databank Group, 2004). On the continent itself, five other bourses namely 
Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, Mauritius and Nigeria, besides Ghana, were amongst the best 
performers in the year. Zimbabwe, however, was the worst performer with an abysmal 
return of -84%. This is illustrated in figure 8-1. 
 Figure 8-1: Performance of Some stock Markets Compared to Other World Indicators 
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The concept of corporate governance has traditionally been associated with the principal-
agent paradigm. The principal-agent relationship arises when there is a separation between 
ownership and control of firms, according to Berle and Means (1932). In this instance, 
principals (owners) hire agents (managers) to manage a firm on their behalf for a fee. This 
arrangement often leads to conflict of objectives as managers may pursue a set of objectives 
very different from that of owners. In order to reduce such agency costs associated with 
separation of ownership and control, several mechanisms have been proposed, among them 
is corporate governance. The term corporate governance has been used in many different 
ways and the boundaries of the subject vary widely. However, corporate governance could 
be defined as the set of rules, principles, structures, processes and mechanisms that a firm 
puts in place to ensure effective accountability of management to several corporate 
constituencies. The ongoing discussions on corporate governance have highlighted two basic 
models, namely the shareholder and the stakeholder models. The shareholder model posits 
that the fundamental objective of the firm is to maximise shareholder wealth through 
allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency. Thus, a firm’s performance is judged by the 
market value or shareholder’s value of the firm. In this case, managers aim constantly to 
ensure that firms are run in the interests of the shareholders. This has often been regarded as 
a narrow view of corporate governance warranting the advancement of the second model 
called the stakeholder model. This takes a broader view of the firm and its constituents. The 
main argument in this model is that a firm is responsible to a wider constituency of 
stakeholders other than shareholders. This wider constituency may include contractual 
partners such as employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and social constituents such as 
members of the community within which a firm operates, environmental interests, local and 
national governments and indeed the society at large.   
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Corporate governance in Africa is relatively undeveloped. While much could be said of 
South Africa as having governance structures comparable to the developed market 
economies, corporate governance in most of the countries on the continent is in a 
developmental stage. One major characteristic of governance on the continent is the issue of 
institutional weaknesses and apparent lack of structures to swiftly address corporate disputes. 
For instance, Ayogu (2001) points out that the quality of corporate governance in Africa may 
not be independent of the quality of state governance. This is because, he argues that the 
quality of the state provides the backbone upon which a board of directors can govern and 
upon which shareholders can “re-direct” the directors or monitor the monitors. 
Notwithstanding the above, there is overwhelming interest in corporate governance on the 
continent and this has become the focus of policy discussion and agenda because it is 
believed that good corporate governance leads to sustainable growth. Like corporate 
governance, stock markets in Africa are also at various levels of development and efficiency. 
As mentioned, however, the last three decades has seen an upsurge of stock markets on the 
continent.   
 
The question concerns whether there is any link between corporate governance, stock 
market developments and economic growth. This is the fundamental question this paper 
seeks to explore. The theoretical link between stock market development and growth hinges 
on the advantage of stock markets spreading and pooling risk. In this light, stock markets 
influence growth through a number of channels: liquidity, risk diversification, acquisition of 
information about firms, corporate governance and savings mobilisation (Levine & Zervos, 
1996). Levine (1991) used endogenous growth to show that stock markets help protect 
investors against idiosyncratic risk (firm-specific productivity risks) by providing firms with 
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the opportunity to hold diversified portfolios.  The rapid development of African bourses is 
also quite clear. Plausible reasons for these developments lie in the importance of stock 
markets in economic development. Pardy (1992) has noted that, even in less-developed 
countries, capital markets are able to mobilise domestic savings and are able to allocate funds 
more efficiently. Empirical studies on the link between stock markets and growth have 
varied in methods and results. Atje and Javanovic (1992), using cross-sectional regressions, 
conclude that stock markets have long run impacts on economic growth. Harris (1997) has 
also shown, within a cross-sectional framework, that stock markets promote growth, though 
this occurs only for developed countries. Rousseau and Wachtel (2000) also find that stock 
markets influence growth via value traded of shares whilst Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel 
(2001), using time-series on five industrialised countries, indicate that stock markets play a 
role in growth. Indeed, one other critical role of stock markets is their ability to provide an 
alternative tool for corporate governance through the use of shareholders’ monitoring 
devices as well as a market for corporate control where raiders can buy up the shares of 
poorly managed firms, replace the management and make capital gains as seen in the United 
States and the United Kingdom (Allen & Gale, 2000). The link between the equity market 
and corporate governance is through the gamut of listing requirements, satisfaction of 
objective criteria such as equity size, profitability, years of operation and future prospects. 
Hence, listed firms are supposed to be relatively profitable and large. While the positive 
relationship between stock market development and economic growth is not at all in dispute, 
the impact of corporate governance on economic growth is yet to be thoroughly explored, 
more so on the African continent where such studies are currently non-existent. Some have 
argued that one important element of improving macroeconomic efficiency is through 
corporate governance (Maher & Anderson, 1999). Thus, well governed firms are expected to 
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perform better and this could lead to higher economic growth. By this, therefore, the 
transmission mechanism through which corporate governance affects economic growth is 
firm performance. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section two is devoted to data and 
methodology; Section three discusses empirical findings and section four concludes. 
 
8.2 Data and Methodological Issues 
 
In carrying out this study we use unique data from 103 companies listed on the Ghanaian, 
Nairobi, Nigerian, Kenyan and South African stock exchanges. Apart from the stock 
exchange factbooks, some data was also obtained electronically from INET-Bridge. Firms 
sampled were on the basis of data availability. Sampled firms cover the Industrial, 
Manufacturing, Mining, Agricultural and Services sectors. In defining what constitutes these 
sectors, we largely depended on the classifications given by the various stock exchanges. We 
acknowledge the possibility of non-uniform classification which could pose a problem with 
regard to the analysis and results, but we are of the opinion that such differences are 
marginal and thus have little impact on compromising the validity of our results. The finance 
sector was omitted in conjunction with studies on corporate governance (Faccio & Lasfer, 
2000).  
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8.2.1 Empirical Model Specification 
 
We carry out our analysis in a dynamic panel data framework with the following model 
specifications: 
 
titititi uZyy ,,1,, +′++= − ψλδ ,                                1 
            
where  and  ,5................1;103.............1 == ti
 
tiy ,  is the annual GDP growth rates for country i at time t; tiZ ,′ is a vector of explanatory 
variables of stock market development and firms’ governance indicators, and control 
variables; and  
 
tiitiu ,, νμ +=                     2 
 
Our main stock market development variables are the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP 
measuring size, and the ratio of value trading to GDP as a measure of liquidity, size and 
transaction cost. We use the size of the board (measured by the number of directors) and the 
independence of the board (measured by the ratio of non-executive directors to total board 
size) as the main governance variables. The duality of the CEO (a dummy variable equal to 1 
when the same person occupies CEO and Board chair positions, and to 0, otherwise), CEO 
tenure, and the size of the economy measured by the standardised GDP in dollar terms are 
used as control variables. The specified model has two main characteristics. An 
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autocorrelation problem due to the presence of the lagged dependent variable among the 
regressors and individual effects characterising heterogeneity among the interactive variables. 
Thus, in carrying out our estimation we employ the Arellano and Bond estimator which uses 
additional instruments and utilises the othogonality conditions that exist between lagged 
values of  and the disturbances tiy , ti,ν  (Arellano & Bond, 1991). In this regard the study 
adopts the Arellano and Bond (1991) Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic 
instrumental variable modelling approach where the lagged values of the dependent variable 
(growth) and differences of the independent variables are suitably used as a valid instrument 
to control for this bias. The use of instruments is important because, in a dynamic panel, the 
lagged dependent variable [ 1−− itit yy ] will be correlated with the lagged error terms 
[ ] by construct and induce the possibility of endogeneity of some explanatory 
variables. Based on the assumption of no serial correlation in the error terms and weak 
exogeneity of explanatory variables, the following moments condition applies: 
1−− itit ee
 
( )[ ] 011 =− −− ititit eeyE                      3 2≥y
 
( )[ ] 011 =− −− ititit eezE    ,                 4 2≥y
 
where  is a set of explanatory variables. Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimation is 
based on these moment conditions and is consistent if lagged values of explanatory variables 
are valid instruments. The validity of the use of instruments is checked via the utilisation of a 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions which tests for correlation between the 
instruments and the model residuals. 
itz
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8.3 Empirical Findings 
8.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 8-1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Board size 388 9.224227 3.409779 3 23 
Board independence 388 0.4190222 0.259989 0.05 0.846 
CEO duality 388 0.193299 0.3953953 0 1 
CEO tenure 388 3.510309 1.585593 2 8 
Board meetings 388 10.53093 2.149833 5 14 
Size of audit 388 4.146907 1.188474 2 9 
Audit committee 
meetings 
388 4.71134 1.49907 2 12 
Profitability (ROA) 388 0.1268295 0.1458879 -0.426 0.68 
GDP Growth 388 0.0258657 0.147148 -0.0023688 0.0470028 
Mkt. Capitalisation 388 1224.69 74642.71 209.7413 231289 
Mkt. Cap to GDP 388 0.2943687 0.4461504 0.0564919 1.503618 
Value Traded to 
GDP 
388 0.0807902 0.190179 0.0020291 0.6349773 
 
 
The firms that were investigated operate with a mean board size of about nine members, 
with a minimum and maximum board size of three and twenty-three members respectively. 
Most of these boards are deemed to be relatively less independent because about 42% of 
them are composed of non-executive directors, which implies that about 58% of such 
boards are composed of executive directors or insiders (John & Senbet, 1998). With a mean 
percentage point of 19, most of the firms have two individuals occupying the positions of 
CEO and board chairperson. The situation suggests the presence of less conflict of interest 
and fewer agency problems. These CEOs have been operating with a mean tenure of about 
four years, with a range between two and eight years, and these boards have a mean of about 
eleven meetings annually with the minimum and maximum being five and fourteen meetings 
per year respectively. Having audit committees in place, these committees average four 
meetings per year, though some meet twelve times a year. The mean of four meetings could 
be due to the fact that the audit committees review financial and operational issues on a 
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quarterly basis.  Though most of the firms show steady performance with regard to 
profitability, some of them also did not appear to perform well during the period under 
study. Stock markets in these economies have also experienced some degree of growth with 
regard to size, liquidity and cost of transaction.   
 
Table 8-2: Pair-wise Correlation Matrix 
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Board size 1.0000        
Board 
Independence 
 
0.1277 
 
1.0000 
      
CEO  
duality 
 
-0.1108 
-
0.2426* 
 
1.0000 
     
CEO 
tenure 
 
0.3607* 
 
-0.0130 
 
0.2132* 
 
1.0000 
    
Ratio of Mkt. 
Cap. To GDP 
 
 
0.6124* 
 
 
0.2655* 
 
 
-0.2000* 
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1.0000 
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Traded to 
GDP  
 
 
0.5998* 
 
 
0.2624* 
 
 
-0.1961* 
 
 
0.4941*
 
 
0.9758* 
 
 
1.0000 
  
ROA 0.2527* 0.2433* -0.1324 0.0089 0.1363 0.1412 1.0000  
GDP  
Growth 
Rate  
 
 
 
0.0653 
 
 
0.2620* 
 
 
0.1349 
 
 
0.1551 
 
 
-0.0044 
 
 
0.0090 
 
 
0.2152*
 
 
1.0000 
Note: * indicates significance at 1% level.  
 
 
The pair-wise correlation matrix in Table 8-2 shows that both the size of the board and its 
independence have positive relationship with firm performance. Again, the independence of 
the board has a positive impact on economic growth through firm performance. The results 
also show that stock market indicators could influence each other towards growth and 
development. For instance, the liquidity and the size of the market are positively correlated 
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shown by the high correlation coefficient of 0.9758 at 1% level of significance. It is clear 
from the table that all the corporate governance indicators showed the expected signs both 
with stock market variables and economic growth. For instance, the size of the board has a 
positive relationship with both market size, liquidity and transaction cost likewise the 
independence of the board. A combination of board chair and CEO positions by the same 
person negatively affects stock market activities ostensibly through a rise in agency costs. 
The CEO tenure also has positive impact on both stock market development variables 
likewise firm profitability. The implication being that longer tenure enables CEO to enhance 
firm value and this eventually translates into market developments through size and liquidity.     
8.3.2 Discussion of Regression Results 
 
Table 8-3: Regression Results  
                                                            Dependent variable: GDP Growth Rate 
Regressors Model 1 Model 2 
Lagged GDP 
                                       
0.3395796 
(14.38)** 
0.8453405 
(35.71)** 
Board size 
                                       
-0.0000493 
(-1.40) 
-6.08e-06 
(-0.10) 
Board independence 
                                       
0.002097 
(3.17)** 
 
CEO duality 
                                       
0.0005314 
(1.99)** 
 
Capitalisation ratio 
                                       
0.1493188 
(15.66)** 
 
Value traded to GDP 
                                        
-0.2568253 
(-13.24)** 
0.01026 
(5.38)** 
Size of the economy 
                                       
-0.0027471 
(-21.49)** 
 
Constant -0.000097 
(-10.14)** 
-0.0000196 
(-1.41) 
Obs 347 347 
 Wald Chi2(7)=8492.93 Chi2(3)=2104.73 
 
Note: All regressions include a constant. T-statistics are in parenthesis and probability values in square brackets. 
** indicates significance at 5% level. 
 
Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0: H0: no autocorrelation   z =  -7.80   
Pr > z = 0.0000. Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0:  H0: no 
autocorrelation   z =  -0.21   Pr > z = 0.8314.   
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A regression analysis and the interaction between the dependent and the independent 
variables is also carried out and the results are shown in Table 8-38. The results clearly 
reaffirm the notion that countries that grow have the potential to grow, in that previous 
growth rate reinforces current capacity to grow as lagged GDP growth rate is significantly 
and positively related to GDP growth. The capitalisation ratio (ratio of market capitalisation 
to GDP) and total value of share traded to the GDP ratio (measuring size, transaction cost 
and, more importantly, liquidity) are the main stock market development indicators. The 
results show that the ratio of market capitalisation to GDP has a positive relationship with 
GDP and economic growth, augmenting growth. In model 1, the surprise is the negative 
relationship between market liquidity and economic growth. The results presuppose that an 
increase in stock market activities through higher liquidity has negative implications for 
economic growth. However, the correlation matrix in Table 8-3 suggest that there is a high 
correlation between ratio of market capitalization and market liquidity (with coefficient of 
0.9758) and thus using the two variables in the same regression could be problematic. This 
could partly explain the sign of market liquidity to GDP growth in model 1. In Model 2 
however, higher liquidity is seen to augment GDP growth. The implication of the results of 
the two models is that an increase in stock market activities should be well-directed and 
focussed and that too many policies could erode the effect of critical indicators. The results 
also show that the independence of a corporate board enhances firm performance and 
therefore promotes economic growth. This is consistent with other studies such as Fama 
(1980) who suggested that outside directors may act as “professional referees” to ensure that 
competition among insiders stimulates actions consistent with shareholder value 
                                                 
8 All models passed the diagnostic testing of validity of instruments via Sargan Test and second order serially 
correlated errors via AR tests. Results are not shown for brevity. 
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maximisation and thus firm performance. Again, a number of empirical studies on outside 
directors support the beneficial monitoring and advisory functions to firm shareholders (see 
Brickley & James, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Brickley et al., 1994).  
Baysinger and Butler (1985) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) showed that the market 
rewards firms for appointing outside directors.  Brickley et al. (1994) found a positive relation 
between the proportion of outside directors and stock-market reactions to poison pill 
adoptions. In addition, the size of a corporate board is seen to have a negative correlation 
with performance and therefore with economic growth, though it is not significant.  
 
While all the control variables relatively showed the expected signs, the size of the economy 
showed a surprise result, pointing to a negative relationship between the size of an economy 
and growth. While this at first sight sounds surprising, it could be true, empirically re-
iterating the fact that growth may not necessarily be dependent on size if resources are not 
effectively harnessed and channelled, and combined with appropriate policies within a 
conducive environment. 
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Table 8-4: Country Specific Effects (South Africa as Reference) 
Dependent Variable: GPD Growth Rate (Random Effect Estimation)  
Regressors  
Board Independence 0.0021712 
(0.97) 
Ratio of Value Traded to GDP 0.0450028 
(6.23)** 
Ghana 0.0417801 
(10.41)** 
Nigeria 0.0297743 
(7.57)** 
Kenya 0.0070739 
(1.76)** 
Constant -0.0000965 
(-0.02) 
R-squared 0.9377 
Number of Observations 388 
Test of Probability Wald Chi2(5)=1769.55 [ ]0000.0  
Note: The regression includes a constant. ** indicates 5% significance level. T-statistics are in parenthesis and 
probability values in square bracket.  
 
 
The regression results for country specific effects shown in Table 8-4 indicate that the 
performance in the growth variable is largely driven by Ghana, followed by Nigeria and 
Kenya in that order. The implication is that the economic growth pattern of these countries 
within the period under study was influenced by the nature and direction of economic 
growth in Ghana. Surprisingly, all the countries in the sample namely Ghana, Nigeria and 
Kenya appear to have performed better than South Africa within the period. 
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
The study examined how corporate governance and stock market developments impact on 
economic growth. While most boards were seen to be less independent, the regression 
results point to a positive relationship between corporate governance particularly 
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independent boards and economic growth. Again, while stock market development has 
positive implications for economic growth, the study shows that policies should be well-
focussed and well-directed in order to promote economic development. Our 
recommendation is that corporate boards should be made as independent as possible and 
that stock market activities should be studied carefully in order to design an appropriate 
policy mix for the desired effect of enhancing economic growth and development to be 
realised. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
 
9 SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS 
 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
9.1 Summary  
 
In spite of the recognition that good corporate governance is important for enhanced 
corporate performance and sustained macroeconomic stability, the subject area is highly 
understudied especially in Africa. In trying to fill this gap this study investigated 103 listed 
companies drawn from Ghana, Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa and 52 Microfinance 
Institutions from Ghana. Data consisted basically of governance and financial variables and 
analysis was done primarily within the Panel Data Framework in which various shades of 
panel data estimations were carried out. The first chapter introduced the study by 
highlighting the research gap, research objectives, significance of the study, the organisation 
of the study and the limitations within which the study was carried out.   
 
The dissertation presented the results of research work underlying seven stand-alone but 
related essays focussing on the relationship between corporate governance and various 
aspects of firm performance. Whilst, five of the essays dwelt on corporate governance and 
firm specific attributes, one considered determinants of board size and its composition by 
using Ghanaian data, and the last paper explored how corporate governance mechanisms 
particularly board independence and stock market development affect economic growth. 
The first essay looks at corporate governance and firm performance and the second 
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focussed on the determinants of board size and its composition. The third essay examined 
how corporate governance affects shareholder value maximisation using dividend yield and 
by arguing that well-performing firms may not necessarily make shareholders better off. In 
an attempt to look at the role of corporate governance in the determination of debt or equity 
as a source of finance, the fourth essay considered how corporate governance affects the 
financing choices of firms by using data from Kenya. The link between a firm’s investment 
opportunity set and corporate governance is the subject matter of the fifth essay. While, the 
sixth essay looks at how corporate board diversity through gender affects the performance 
of microfinance institutions in Ghana, the last and seventh essay is devoted to an exploration 
of a possible linkage between corporate governance, stock market developments and 
economic growth with emphasis on board independence as the main governance variable.  
 
9.2 Conclusion 
 
Findings of the study show that the direction and the extent of impact of corporate 
governance on firms are dependent on the performance measure being examined. Large and 
independent corporate boards are seen to enhance corporate performance irrespective of 
performance being market or accounting based. While, the CEO duality does not 
significantly impact on the market-based performance measure of Tobin’s q, it has a negative 
relation with firm profitability in tandem with other studies.  
 
Interestingly, a CEO’s tenure in office is seen to enhance a firm’s profitability but has a 
negative effect on shareholders’ value maximisation. Results also reveal that board activity 
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intensity has a negative effect on profitability consistent with other studies. Furthermore, the 
study shows that the size of audit committees and the frequency of their meetings have a 
positive influence on Tobin’s q (a market-based performance measure), but seem to have no 
relationship with a firm’s profitability. Likewise, it is seen that institutional shareholding 
essentially sends a positive signal to potential investors and that enhances market valuation 
as against accounting-based performance measures.  
 
The study also showed that both sector and country specific effects impact on shareholder 
value maximisation and that shareholders wealth is influenced by country specific risk. The 
mining sector is seen as dominant in the payment of a higher dividend per share. 
 
Findings of the study confirmed that the size and composition of a corporate board is a 
function of firm and sectoral characteristics. Specifically, the study found a positive 
relationship between firm level risk and board size. On the other hand, it found that firms 
with longer CEO tenure and reputation employ smaller board sizes. Again, the findings of 
the study contradict other findings that suggest that the longer the CEO tenure, the fewer 
the number of outside directors appointed; firms with heavy institutional shareholding also 
use fewer outside directors. Furthermore, banks are seen to employ smaller boards and 
fewer outside directors, probably as a result of the existence of other regulatory mechanisms 
for ensuring good governance in such institutions. 
 
The study also indicated that firms with larger boards employ more debt irrespective of 
maturity period, rather than equity, to raise corporate value. Again, results show that while 
the independence of the board has a positive relationship with both long-term and total 
 210 
 
 
leverage, it is negatively and significantly correlated with short-term debt and also when a 
CEO doubles as board chair-person, less debt is employed. Results furthermore, showed 
that firms with investment or growth opportunities employ large boards (high board and 
auditor fees), have longer CEO tenure and are profitable. In addition, our findings show that 
country and sector specific effects influence a firm’s response to existing governance 
structures and that impact on firm growth as well. While firms in South Africa exhibit 
relatively higher growth rates, findings of the study suggest that governance structures in 
Ghana may be better than those of Nigeria and Kenya, and firms in the mining sector appear 
to dominate with regards to growth opportunities. Furthermore, findings of the study are 
consistent with recent thinking and discussions which point to the fact that governance 
reforms have been geared towards the importance of gender diversity especially in the board 
room, thereby enhancing the board’s effectiveness and improving performance.  
 
Finally, findings indicate that corporate governance particularly board independence has a 
positive impact on economic growth through firm performance. Again, while stock market 
development has positive implications for economic growth, findings of the study suggest 
that there should be a judicious mix of policies and programmes which should be well-
focussed and well-directed in order to promote economic growth and development simply 
because too many policies could have the potential of eroding the effect of critical indicators.  
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9.3 Recommendations  
 
It is evident that corporate governance has an influence on a firm’s performance. Indeed, 
while some of our findings are revealing, clear policy implications should not be lost. For 
enhanced performance of corporate entities, it is important to separate the positions of CEO 
and board chair and also to maintain and operate with relatively independent boards and 
audit committees. It is our recommendation, in tandem with others, for instance the King 
Report, that corporate entities should make more use of external directors so as to ensure 
board independence, promote shareholder value by enhancing firm performance and also 
send a positive signal to potential investors.  
 
Perhaps one main policy recommendation that arises out of our findings is the ability to 
strike a good balance between quality and quantity with regards to board sizes. Since larger 
boards discourage investors especially debtholders, it is our recommendation that quality 
should not be sacrificed for quantity with regard to board appointments. A case in point is 
that of South Africa. For instance, the pursuance of the Black Economic Empowerment 
(BEE) Policy should be applied with a great sense of caution because it has implications for 
firm performance and repercussions for potential investment. Probably, what is needed in 
this case is the establishment of structures that aim at building a breed of potential and 
promising young people with the requisite training, know-how and skills for future positions.  
 
The findings of this paper have important policy implications for microfinance institutions 
governance. Giving the important role of the governance structure in the operations of 
microfinance institutions, the study reaffirms the rather hazy principle that board diversity 
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with women in dominance is paramount for enhanced performance of microfinance 
institutions.. 
9.4 Suggestions for future Research 
 
As already indicated, it would have been ideal to have had a large data set and probably from 
a lot more countries. The selection of corporate governance variables though consistent with 
several studies was primarily as a result of data limitations. In the future, we would want to 
take a broader look at corporate governance indicators for a thorough understanding of 
corporate governance matters on the continent. In spite of the acknowledged limitations of 
this study, conclusions based on the findings of the study are not compromised and that the 
study has to a large extent contributed to our understanding of corporate governance on the 
continent. 
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APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
A PhD student is carrying out a Dissertation on Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance in Africa at the University of Stellenbosch Graduate School of Business. This 
questionnaire therefore is soliciting for the under listed data. You are assured that the data 
collected is for academic purposes only and will be treated with the strictest confidentiality. 
 
COMPANY BACKGROUND 
 
Country……………………………………………………………………………………... 
 
Sector……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Year of Incorporation………………………………………………………………………. 
 
GOVERNANCE DATA 
 
Board Characteristics 
 
What is the size of the board?............................................................................................................... 
 
How many are Non-executive directors?……………………………………………………. 
 
How frequent does the board meets on yearly basis (start from 1995-2004)?……………….. 
 
Does the CEO serve as the board chair?............................................................................................. 
 
How long does a CEO serve?............................................................................................................... 
 
Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
What is the size of the audit committee?............................................................................................. 
 
How many are employees?.................................................................................................................... 
 
How many are affiliates of the Company?........................................................................................... 
 
How many times does the audit committee meet on yearly basis (start from 1995 -2004)?.......  
